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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation examines how the interaction between cultural and situational 
factors affects business negotiation.  Taking a dynamic constructivist view of culture 
(Hong et al., 2000; Morris & Fu, 2001), I propose that cultural differences in negotiation 
will be exacerbated under certain conditions, but attenuated under other conditions.   
I will apply this view to comparing Chinese and American negotiators, and 
negotiations within and between these two cultures.  Generally, Chinese negotiators tend 
to take a relationship-oriented approach and American negotiators tend to take a self-
focused approach in negotiation.  Such a cultural difference may appear or disappear 
contingent upon two social conditions: whether negotiators are held accountable, and 
with whom they negotiate.  Two sets of experiments are designed to test these hypotheses. 
 
A Gap in Cross-Cultural Negotiation Research 
With the growing trend of globalization, cross-cultural business interaction has 
significantly increased (Leung, Bhagat, Buchan, Erez, & Gibson, 2005).  Nowadays, 
many companies depend on partners from other cultures to make transnational deals, set 
up joint ventures, find after-service collaborators, or outsource goods (Brett, 2001).  
Negotiation, as the social interaction of two or more social units which are attempting to 
make joint decisions when their initial preferences differ (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987; 
Walton & Mckersie, 1965), has increasingly taken place across national boundaries under 
the current circumstance of globalization (Brett, 2001; Graham & Lam, 2003; Weiss, 
2 
 
1994).  For example, in the last ten years, over 30,000 foreign direct investment (FDI) 
contracts in China have been signed between American investors and Chinese 
counterparts (US-China Business Council, 2007).  Numerous inter-cultural negotiations 
are going on every day. 
In response to the culturally diverse business environment, management scholars 
have paid more attention to cross-cultural negotiation in the last two decades (see a recent 
handbook edited by Gelfand & Brett, 2004).  This pursuit is driven by the widely-shared 
belief that culture, as a building block of social interactions, exerts influences on 
negotiation.  Indeed, this line of research has consistently reported cultural differences in 
negotiation processes and outcomes.  Specifically, negotiators from different cultures 
show distinct patterns in terms of negotiation schema (Brett & Okumura, 1998), 
judgment biases (Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999), psychological states (Gelfand & 
Realo, 1999), negotiation strategies (Tinsley & Pilutla, 1998), and communication styles 
(Adair & Brett, 2005; Adair et al., 2001).  Probably due to these cultural differences, it 
has been also reported that it is more difficult to attain joint gains in intercultural 
negotiations than in intra-cultural negotiations (Adler & Graham, 1989; Brett & Okumura, 
1998).  This research has significantly contributed to the development of negotiation 
theories, most of which are substantially established in Western cultures (Brett & Gelfand, 
2006; Gelfand & Brett, 2004; Pruitt, 2004).   
Nevertheless, “rigorous theorizing about negotiation and culture is in its infancy” 
(Gelfand & Brett, 2004: 416).  Our knowledge of cross-cultural negotiation is still very 
limited due to the focus of research and the nature of inquiry in this area.  One salient 
limitation in this literature is that most studies focus only on the main effects of culture 
3 
 
on negotiation while rarely taking social situational factors into consideration (See 
reviews by Bazerman et al., 2000; Gelfand & Dyer, 2000; Gelfand & Cai, 2004).   
The neglect of social contexts may limit our understanding of cross-cultural 
negotiation in several ways.  First, although existing studies offer us simple and 
parsimonious models about the effects of culture on negotiation, the simplicity and 
parsimony have been achieved at the expense of the predictive power of culture.  A 
typical study in this literature starts with an investigation of whether negotiation in 
culture A differs from that in culture B, followed by a further exploration of whether such 
differences could be explained by cultural values, norms or beliefs (e.g., individualism vs. 
collectivism).  The implicit assumption of such inquiry is a trait/entity view of culture, a 
notion that defines culture as a holistic set of stable dispositions, including values, norms, 
and beliefs (see Hong & Chiu, 2001).  Originating from the “national character” research 
(Benedict, 1934/1946; Mead, 1935, 1955), such a trait/entity view assumes culture as a 
static and monolithic trait or entity (see Morris & Fu, 2001).   
The trait/entity view of culture emphasizes between-culture differences but tells 
us little about within-culture variation (Hong & Chiu, 2001; Hong & Mallorie, 2004).  
Without taking situational factors into account, the trait/entity approach assumes that 
culturally typical cognitive or behavioral patterns hold across various social contexts.  
However, such an assumption is problematic.  For example, it has been found that 
Chinese generally rely more on avoiding tactics in conflict resolution whereas Americans 
generally rely more on competitive tactics (Friedman et al., 2006; Morris et al., 1998; 
Tinsley & Pillutla, 1998).  Based on this finding, can we infer that Chinese or American 
negotiators always use their culturally typical conflict resolution tactics no matter with 
4 
 
whom they are negotiating?  Since a trait/entity view of culture, which dominates most of 
the cross-cultural negotiation studies, does not take situational factors into consideration, 
this question cannot be tackled adequately.   In short, regarding culture as a monolithic 
and static trait/entity cannot grasp the dynamic nature of cognitive and behavioral 
patterns within different cultures; and glossing over situational factors fails to inform us 
of the nuance of culture’s effect on negotiation (Morris & Fu, 2001). 
Neglecting the social context of cross-cultural negotiation can lead to a second 
bias of overestimating the influence of culture while underestimating the effect of human 
agency.  Most cross-cultural studies highlight the internal forces of cultural values, norms, 
and beliefs, but downplay individual motivation or free choice.  More than two decades 
ago, Swidler (1986) criticized the deterministic view of cultural influence on human 
action, by arguing that culture provides a “tool kit” or behavioral repertoire, upon which 
people rely in performing actions.  In a similar vein, recent cross-cultural psychology 
research provides evidence that culture does not rigidly determine behavior, and that 
people can adjust their cultural lenses in different cultural environments (Hong et al., 
2000; Triandis, 1989, 1995).  Consequently, researchers recently have called for a 
dynamic view of culture, suggesting that human cognition, affect, and behavior are not 
determined by the quintessence of a certain culture, but rather are influenced by the 
interaction between culture and situational factors (Chiu et al., 2000; Hong et al., 2000; 
Hong & Chiu, 2001).   
Third, cross-cultural psychology scholars have long argued that situational effects 
on cognition, affect, and behavior are even stronger in East Asian culture than in Western 
culture (Makus & Kitayama, 1991; Trafimow & Finlay, 1996).  Compared with 
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Westerners, East Asians are more subject to situational factors in making attributions 
(Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994), more likely to derive intrinsic motivations from 
significant others (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999), and more flexible in adjusting their attitudes 
when dealing with different people (Suh, 2002).  
These context-dependent cross-cultural differences have not yet been captured by 
existing negotiation research (Gelfand & Cai, 2004). Typically, in most negotiation 
studies, either negotiations among Westerners themselves were examined in different 
social contexts (e.g., Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981; De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 
2000), or Western and Eastern Asian negotiators were compared in a single context (e.g., 
Brett & Okumura, 1998; Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999). Despite the insights yielded 
by these studies, they tell us little about whether and how negotiations among different 
cultures are affected by social contexts (Gelfand & Brett, 2004). Thus, existing literature 
provides limited knowledge of how to predict cross-cultural differences in negotiation 
processes and negotiation outcomes. 
Finally, compared with intra-cultural comparative research, there is even less 
research on inter-cultural negotiations, i.e., negotiations between parties from different 
cultures (Gelfand et al., 2007; Gelfand & Brett, 2004).  One interesting research finding 
suggested by few intercultural negotiation studies is that negotiators made lower joint 
gains in inter-cultural negotiations than in intra-cultural negotiations (Adair et al., 2001; 
Brett & Okumura, 1998).  These few studies, however, propose a simplistic dichotomy 
between intra-and inter-cultural negotiations while never examine situational factors 
together with culture.    Such a practice may run the risk of making cultural attribution 
error (Dialdin et al., 2002).  That is, any differences between intral-cultural and 
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intercultural negotiations are generally attributed to the impacts of cultural differences.  
Without taking social contexts into consideration, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
social contexts may drive those differences in negotiation.  More fine-grained questions 
should thus be asked regarding under what conditions would cultural differences exert 
negative or positive effects on negotiation (Morris & Fu, 2001). 
In summary, although previous cross-cultural negotiation research is invaluable, it 
suffers from an overemphasis upon the “internal forces” of culture and neglect of the 
situational factors (Morris & Fu, 2001: 328).  It is time for cross-cultural negotiation 
research to investigate the interplay between culture and social contexts (Gelfand & Cai, 
2004; Morris & Gelfand, 2004).  This dissertation is an endeavor to pursue such an 
investigation.      
 
The Conception of Culture and Negotiation 
It is necessary to clarify the conceptualizations of culture and negotiation upfront 
in this dissertation. Genearlly, based on the most recent theory in cross-cultural 
psychology, this dissertation takes a dynamic constructivist view of culture (Hong et al., 
2000; Hong & Chiu, 2001; Morris & Fu, 2001; Morris & Gelfand, 2004).  In addition, 
negotiation is conceptualized as an open system with the background of social contexts. 
 
The Dynamic Constructivist View of Culture 
According to the dynamic constructivist view of culture (Hong et al., 2000; Hong 
& Chiu, 2001), culture is defined as “a network of shared knowledge that is produced, 
distributed, and reproduced among a collection of interconnected individuals” (Chiu & 
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Hong, 2006: 31).  Shared knowledge refers to collective “habits of thinking, feeling and 
interacting with people” (Chiu & Hong, 2006: 31).    
The dynamic constructivist view differs from the trait/entity view of culture in 
terms of two basic assumptions.  To begin with, culture is regarded as a loosely-
organized knowledge system rather than a general, monolithic, and integrated entity 
(Hong & Chiu, 2001; Hong & Mallorie, 2004).  Moreover, combining the social 
cognitive principles of knowledge activation (Higgins, 1996), research in this thread has 
focused on the dynamic nature of cultural process, asking the questions of when culture 
exerts influences on human cognition, affect, or behavior (Hong & Chiu, 2001; Morris & 
Gelfand, 2004).  Such a dynamic constructivist approach argues that whether a culturally 
typical pattern in a particular domain displays is influenced by the availability, 
accessibility, and activation of cultural knowledge (see details in Chapter 2).   Of 
particular interest are the social conditions under which cultural differences appear, 
disappear, or reverse (Hong & Chiu, 2001; Morris & Gelfand, 2004).   
The dynamic constructivist view of culture has very important implications on 
cross-cultural research.  First, unlike the trait/entity view of culture, which regards 
intracultural variance as measurement errors, the dynamic constructivist view investigates 
intracultural variance.  By examining culture together with social contexts, the predictive 
power of culture may be increased.  Second, with the guidance of social cognition theory 
(e.g., Higgins, 1996), the dynamic constructivist approach may help us predict in which 
situations people would show culturally typical patterns and in which conditions they 
would not (Morris & Fu, 2001; Morris & Gelfand, 2004).  Third, the dynamic 
constructivist view of culture provides us a lens to theoretically understand bicultural or 
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multicultural people, a group of people who can internalize different cultural systems 
(please read Hong et al., 2000 for details).   
Recently, scholars have applied the dynamic constructivist view of culture to 
negotiation studies (Gelfand et al., 2006; Morris & Fu, 2001; Morris & Gelfand, 2004). 
The current discussion focuses on the activation of cultural knowledge, i.e., what factors 
may exacerbate or attenuate cultural influence on negotiation.  In this dissertation, I focus 
on two situational factors relevant to negotiation contexts: group membership (ingroup vs. 
outgroup, Gelfand & Cai, 2004; Wong & Hong, 2005) and accountability (Morris & 
Gelfand, 2004; Gelfand & Realo, 1999).  In the following section, I will briefly define 
these two factors, and a detailed literature review will be conducted in Chapter 2. 
Group membership 
Although the definition of ingroup/outgroup is subjective, ingroups are usually 
connected with common attributes (demographics, activities, preferences, or institutions), 
goals, fate, or external threat; whereas outgroups involve dissimilar attributes, or the lack 
of common goals or common fate (Campbell, 1958; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Triandis, 
1989).  The concept of ingroup-outgroup is related to the psychological boundaries 
between self and others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Cross-
cultural research suggests that East Asians draw the distinction between ingroups and 
outgroups in a more salient way than Westerners (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 
1989; 1995).  Previous research provides evidence that in social interactions, some 
culturally typical patterns are only applicable to ingroup members, but not to outgroup 
members (e.g., Wong & Hong, 2005). 
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Accountability 
Accountability is defined as “the condition of being answerable for conducting 
oneself in a manner that is consistent with relevant prescriptions for how things should 
be” (Schlenker & Weingold, 1989: 24). In many cases negotiators bargain on behalf of 
their organizations rather than on behalf of themselves.  It is believed that accountability 
helps align the interests of a negotiator with those of her constituents (Lerner & Tetlock, 
1999).   
Accountability is a pervasive social mechanism that enforces social norms 
(Tetlock, 1992).  More importantly, what social norms and values that accountability 
reinforces are highly contingent upon micro- and macro-level social contexts (Lerner & 
Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1992).  For example, recent cross-cultural research shows that 
accountability motivates people from different cultures to  follow different culturally 
typical patterns (Briley et al., 2000; Gelfand & Realo, 1999), suggesting that 
accountability may be an important factor that activates cultural knowledge.   
 
Negotiations as Open Systems 
Given the focus of this dissertation, it is necessary to clarify the concept of 
negotiation.  In negotiation literature, there are three general approaches to conceptualize 
negotiation.  Some scholars (e.g., Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Raiffa, 1982) portray 
negotiations as rational systems (McGinn & Keros, 2002; Scott, 1987).  The main 
research question pursued is why negotiators deviate from optimality or rationality.  The 
failure of negotiation is attributed to the deviance from rational choices (e.g., Bazerman 
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& Neale, 1992).  Thus, the key to the success of negotiation is to be aware of the 
limitation of individual cognitions.   
In contrast, other researchers (Fisher & Ury, 1984; Pruitt, 1995; Walton & 
McKersie, 1965) treat negotiations as natural systems (McGinn & Keros, 2002; Scott, 
1987), in which negotiators are problem-solvers.  The success of negotiation depends on 
whether negotiators can cooperate with each other, share information, and find common 
interests.  Therefore, the key to the success of negotiation is to find common goals and 
the ways to achieve that goal.   
Both rational and natural approaches regard negotiations as closed systems, in 
which negotiators are separated from social contexts.  Although social context is found to 
be important in negotiations in the real world (Friedman, 1994), little research has 
incorporated the social contexts in which negotiators are embedded into the investigation.  
Thus, a common criticism of the rational and natural approaches is that social contexts 
are mainly neglected.  For example, Barley (1991) questioned whether findings based on 
simulated negotiations between strangers could be generalized to real negotiations in 
which social contexts play a vital role.  Kramer, Pommerenke, and Newton (1993) 
echoed this critique, arguing that negotiators’ judgment and decision making usually are 
influenced by social contexts, such as preexisting social ties and relationships, which, 
however, are largely ignored in negotiation research.  Kramer further commented that: 
“Context can be reduced conveniently to its bare and least troublesome features 
(e.g., in the prototypic laboratory simulation of a negotiation, comparative strangers with 
little or no prior relationship come together, adopt artificially assumed preferences, 
negotiate over abstract resources for a short period of time, and then depart from each 
other never to meet again).  Little is at stake, little is invested, and the outcome is quickly 
forgotten.” (Kramer, 2004: 220).   
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Recently, a more prominent approach to negotiation has gained popularity among 
scholars (McGinn & Keros, 2002; Putnam & Kolb, 2000). Regarding negotiations as 
open systems, advocates of this approach (McGinn & Keros, 2002; Scott, 1987) propose 
studying negotiation together with the backdrop of broad social backgrounds.  According 
to this view, negotiators improvise interaction and continuously adjust their social 
relations to each other. The failure of negotiation is “not because of cognitive limitations 
or a lack of information exchange, but because the social relations between the parties 
break down” (McGinn & Keros, 2002: 443).  Compared with the rational and natural 
approaches, the open-system approach explicitly emphasizes the social contexts of 
negotiation.   
 
This dissertation follows the open-system approach to negotiation.  Negotiation is 
defined as the social interaction of two or more social units that attempt to make joint 
decisions while differing in their initial preferences (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987; Walton 
& Mckersie, 1965). Negotiators are conceptualized as actors embedded in a broad social 
system rather than as independent individuals.  The key actors in such a social system can 
be categorized as the focal negotiator, her constituents, opponent, and opponent’s 
constituents (Gelfand & Cai, 2004; Wall & Blum, 1991). As Figure 1.1 shows, two 
variables, accountability and group membership, can help capture the social contexts in 
which negotiators are nested. 
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FIGURE 1.1 
 Social Contexts of Negotiation 
Negotiator Opponent 
Negotiator’s 
Constituent 
Opponent’s 
Constituent
Whom I am 
negotiating for? 
Whom I am 
negotiating with? 
Accountability 
Group Membership 
(Ingroup/outgroup) 
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Accountability is included because in many cases negotiators are not acting solely 
on their own behalf, but on behalf of their groups, organizations, or nations (Pruitt & 
Carnevale, 1993).  In these situations, accountability is believed to align the interests of a 
negotiator with those of her constituents (e.g., Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a; Gelfand & 
Realo, 1999).   Meanwhile, the characteristics of the party with whom negotiators 
negotiate are very important.  In this regard, it is believed that group membership, i.e. 
whether the other party is an ingroup or outgroup member, influences negotiation 
dynamics (Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Kramer, 2004; Thompson, 1993).   
 
This Dissertation 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the interplay between culture and 
situational factors in negotiation.  Specifically, I will examine how the interaction 
between culture and two aforementioned situational factors— accountability and group 
membership (ingroup-outgroup)—exerts impacts on negotiation.  I adopt a dynamic 
constructivist approach, proposing that culturally typical patterns in negotiation would 
appear in certain conditions but disappear in other conditions.  Related to this dynamic 
approach to culture, I regard negotiations as open systems, emphasizing the social 
situational backgrounds of negotiations.  Accountability and group membership (ingroup-
outgroup) are identified as two important situational factors that may trigger cultural 
differences in negotiation.     
This dissertation can make multiple contributions to the literature.  First, taking 
into account rarely considered situational factors and exploring the interplay between 
culture and situational factors, this dissertation may enhance our understanding of culture 
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and negotiation.  Specifically, this research can increase the predictive power of culture 
in negotiation, highlight the motivation of negotiators, and sufficiently utilize the existing 
knowledge from the cross-cultural psychology literature.   
Second, this research may contribute to the development of the dynamic 
constructivist view of culture.  Although some scholars have applied such a view to 
management literature, most discussion involves post-hoc explanations of previous 
studies (Morris & Fu, 2001; Morris & Gelfand, 2004).  My research will apply a dynamic 
constructivist view of culture to negotiation context based on a priori predictions rather 
than post-hoc explanations.  Such an investigation will further explore the validity and 
predictability of this approach. 
Finally, this dissertation will not only compare intracultural negotiation in 
different contexts, but also contrast intercultural negotiation with intracultural negotiation 
in these contexts.  There is a dearth of studies pursuing the intercultural interface in cross-
cultural management literature (Gelfand et al., 2007).  My research will increase our 
understanding of intercultural interaction in different situations.  By taking situational 
factors into consideration, it will be possible to reduce the cultural attribution error 
(Dialdin et al., 2002). 
 
In the next chapter (Chapter 2), I will review the relevant literatures in cross-
cultural negotiation, the dynamic constructivist view of culture, and accountability and 
group membership in negotiation.  In Chapter 3, I will present hypotheses, regarding how 
negotiators from two cultures, Chinese and American, may generally differ from each 
other in negotiation frame and negotiation tactics.  From the dynamic constructivist view 
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of culture, I propose that whether these general tendencies are activated depends on the 
group membership of the other party, and the presence of accountability.  The particular 
research method employed and results will be discussed in Chapter 4.  Two sets of 
experiments— one set of intracultural negotiations, and one set of intra- and inter-cultural 
negotiations—are designed to test those hypotheses.  Chapter 5 will present the 
contributions, limitations, and future research directions of this research. 
16 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
This literature review aims to fulfill three tasks.  First, I will review cross-cultural 
negotiation literature, including intra- and inter-cultural negotiation.  The review suggests 
that culture exerts important influence on negotiation by affecting negotiators’ cognition 
and behavior.  Generally, Americans tend to take a self-centered approach whereas East 
Asians tend to take a relationship-oriented approach in negotiation.  In the second section, 
I will introduce a dynamic view of culture in detail, exploring important situational 
factors that may attenuate or intensify the impact of culture on negotiation.  Finally, the 
two situational factors of interest in this dissertation are accountability and group 
membership, and their effects on negotiation will be discussed in the last section.  
 
Cross-cultural Negotiation 
Although negotiation research originated and has mainly developed in Western 
cultures (e.g., Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Raiffa, 1982; Walton & 
McKersie, 1965), cross-cultural negotiation has recently become a blooming area (see a 
recent review by Bazerman et al., 2000; also see a recent handbook by Gelfand & Brett, 
2004).  The quick expansion of cross-cultural negotiation research may have resulted 
from scholars’ awareness of the potential cultural biases in previous negotiation research 
(Brett & Gelfand, 2006; Pruitt, 2004) as well as from their timely response to the 
increasing trend of globalization (Graham & Lam, 2003; Weiss, 1994).   
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Cross-cultural negotiation research can be categorized into two types: one is 
intracultural comparative research which compares within culture negotiations across 
cultures (e.g., American-American negotiation vs. Chinese-Chinese negotiation); and the 
other is intercultural research which examines negotiations involving at least two parties 
from different cultures (e.g., American-Chinese negotiation). 
 
Intracultural Comparative Research in Negotiation 
The fundamental question that intracultural comparative research attempts to 
answer is: What are the differences between negotiations in culture A and those in culture 
B?  Table 2.1 briefly summarizes empirical studies in this branch. 
Main Effect of Culture on Negotiators’ Cognition 
Culture provides basic assumptions for social interaction, including how to define 
self, how to conceptualize others, and how to communicate (Gelfand & Brett, 2004). 
Negotiation, as a social interaction process, is fundamentally influenced by those basic 
assumptions.  Many studies explore a logic thread linking three components: 
cultureÆcultural characteristics (values, norms, beliefs)Ænegotiators’ cognition.  
Influential cultural characteristics in this literature include (1) individualism-collectivism 
(Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1989, 1995), (2) cultural values suggested by Schwartz (1994), 
and (3) Hall’s (1976) culturally-related communication styles (e.g., low vs. high 
communication context and conception of time), which I will discuss respetively.  
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TABLE 2.1  
Empirical Studies Reporting Culturally Typical Patterns in Conflict Management 
 
Area Theme Americans East-
Asians 
Cultural values Study 
Cognition      
      
Conflict frame Compromise-focused Low  High  Gelfand et al., 2001 
 Win-focused High Low   
      
Negotiation Norm Competitive    Tinsley & Pillutla, 
1998 
 Compromise     
 Self-interested High Low Self-enhancement 
(individualism) 
 
 Joint problem-solving High Low Open to change  
 Altruistic     
      
Negotiation & Conflict 
Perception 
Self-serving bias High  Low Individualism (not 
tested) 
Gelfand et al., 2002 
      
Negotiation Schema Self-interest High Low individualism Brett & Okumura, 
1998 
 Power schema Low High Hierarchy   
 Understanding of partner’s preference Low High   
      
Negotiation Perception Fixed-pie perceptions High Low individualism Gelfand & 
Christakapoulou, 1999 
      
 Cooperative perception Low High individualism Gelfand & Realo, 
1999 
      
Negotiation Motivation Egoistic High Low Not directly test Chen et al., 2003 
 Prosocial Low High   
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Area Dimensions Americans East-
Asians 
Cultural values Study 
Behavior      
      
Conflict Resolution 
Style 
Avoiding style Low High Societal 
conservatism 
values 
(Conformity) 
Morris et al., 1998 
 Competing style High Low Self-enhancement 
values 
 
      
      
Negotiation Tactics Claim more values for self High Low  Gelfand & 
Christakapoulou, 1999 
 Promote self (use of threats, warnings, 
comparisons, and putdowns) 
High Low   
      
Negotiation Tactics Appeal to other party’s interests 
 
High Low Individualism 
Hierarchy 
Polychronicity 
Tinsley 2001;  
Tinsley & Brett, 2001 
 Appeal to rules and standard procedures High Low Explicit contracting 
Hierarchy 
 
 Appeal to power Low High Hierarchy  
 Appeal to collective interest Low  High Individualism  
      
Communication Style 
in Negotiation 
Exchange information directly High Low High vs. low 
context culture 
Adair et al., 2001 
 Exchange information indirectly Low High   
 Use power influence tactics Low High   
 Adapt partner’s normative behaviors     
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First, the individualism-collectivism has received most attention (Bazerman et al., 
2000).  Theoretically, individualists tend to have independent self-construals, and thus 
their cognitions are oriented toward their inner attributes or what makes them unique.  In 
contrast, collectivists tend to have interdependent self-construals, and thus their 
cognitions are geared toward the relationship with others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 
Triandis, 1995).   Empirically, it has been found that Americans (individualists) were 
more likely to view conflict as a win-lose situation, whereas Japanese (collectivists) were 
prone to see conflict as a mutual-compromise situation (Gelfand et al., 2001).  This is 
because individualistic negotiators (Americans) endorsed self-interest schema more than 
collectivistic negotiators (Japanese, Brett & Okumura, 1998).  In addition, individualists 
(Americans) were more likely to believe that their counterparts had incompatible priority 
concerns in negotiation (e.g., fixed-pie perceptions) than collectivists (Greeks, Gelfand & 
Christakapoulou, 1999).  Compared with collectivists (Japanese), individualistic 
negotiators (Americans) also tended to view their own behavior fairer than those of their 
counterparts (e.g., self-serving biases of fairness, Gelfand et al., 2002).   In asymmetric 
social dilemmas, Americans (individualists) were less cooperative and had a more 
egocentric view of fairness than Japanese (collectivists) (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002).    
Second, self-enhancement and societal conservatism, two cultural values 
proposed by Schwartz (1994), have also been widely examined.  The former refers to the 
extent to which one prefers setting up one’s own goals and achieving them, while the 
latter refers to the extent to which one is obedient to existing social norms.  Empirical 
evidence suggests that Americans tend to have higher levels of self-enhancement, thus 
endorsing more self-interested and competing norms than East Asians (e.g., Chinese, 
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Indians, and Filipinos) in negotiation (Morris, et al, 1998; Tinsley & Pillutla, 1998).  In 
contrast, East Asians value more societal conservatism, thus sticking to conflict avoiding 
norms.   
In addition, these two cultural values influence negotiators’ mental models (Liu et 
al., 2007).  Mental model in negotiation is “a cognitive representation of the expected 
negotiation, a representation that encompasses understanding of the self, negotiator 
relationships, attributions about the other, and perceptions and knowledge of the 
bargaining structure and process” (Bazerman et al., 2000: 287).  Liu and colleagues (2007) 
found that negotiators with high self enhancement values had competitive elements 
central in their mental models, whereas those with high social conformity values (a core 
dimention of social conservatism) had integrative elements central in their mental models. 
Finally, cultural differences also take shape in distinct communication styles 
across cultures.  Hall (1976) defined communication context as the degree to which 
communication is embedded within the context.  People from low communication 
context cultures (e.g., American) usually use explicit and direct language, whereas people 
from high communication context cultures (e.g., Chinese) prefer implicit and indirect 
messages.  In addition, different cultures have different conceptions of time (Hall, 1976).  
While people prefer multitask in cultures with the polychromic conception of time, in 
cultures with the monochromic conception of time, people prefer handling only one task 
at a time.  Tinsley (1998) combined these two cultural dimensions (communication 
context and polychronicity) with hierarchical differentiation (acceptance of inequalities 
and centralized power) to predict three specific conflict resolution norms: (1) integrating 
interests, (2) following formal rules and procedures, and (3) consulting authority and 
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power.  She proposed that when resolving conflicts Americans prefer interest integration, 
Germans tend to follow rules and procedurals, and Japanese are likely to rely on authority 
(Tinsley, 1998).   From a sample of American and Hong Kong Chinese negotiators, 
Tinsley and Brett (2001) found that Americans embraced the norm of interest integration 
more, whereas Hong Kong Chinese participants embraced the norm of collective interest 
and authority more. 
Main Effect of Culture on Negotiators’ Behavior  
Besides cognitions, culture also has impacts on negotiation tactics or strategies.  
Based on the interest-rules-power model of negotiation (Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1988; 
Tinsley, 1998), Tinsley (2001) examined negotiation tactics in the United States, 
Germany, and Japan.  She found that cultural values (individualism, hierarchy, explicit 
contracting, and polychronicity) were associated with negotiation tactics (use interest, use 
regulations, and use power).  For example, due to the different cultural values embraced 
in the three cultures, Americans used interest persuasion more, German used regulation 
persuasion more, and Japanese used power persuasion more. 
In another study, Adair et al. (2001) found that Japanese managers used more 
indirect information exchange and more power and influence tactics in negotiation than 
American managers. They concluded that this is because Japanese culture is a high-
context and hierarchical culture, whereas American culture is a low-context and less 
hierarchical culture. 
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Summary  
Existing intracultural comparative negotiation literature has provided convincing 
evidence that culture influences negotiators’ cognition and behavior.  Different cultural 
values, such as individualism-collectivism, self enhancement, and societal conformity, 
result in different cognitions and behaviors in negotiation.  Generally, Americans tend to 
take a self-centered approach whereas East Asians tend to take a relationship-oriented 
approach in negotiation.  Specifically, American negotiators tend to be egoistic, have 
fixed-pie perceptions, frame negotiation as a win-lose game, and embrace self-interested, 
competitive negotiation norms. In contrast, negotiators from East Asia (e.g., Japan or and 
China) tend to be less egoistic, adopt a compromise-focused frame, endorse conflict 
avoiding norms, and abide by power authority in negotiation.   
Due to the existence of these cultural differences, some researchers comment that 
intercultural negotiation would be like a dance in which one person does a waltz and the 
other a tango (Hall, 1976; Tinsley et al., 1999).   In the following, I briefly review the 
intercultural negotiation literature.   
 
Intercultural Research in Negotiation 
What is the impact of culture on intercultural negotiation?  Two main arguments 
are dominant in this discussion: one is the culture-clash hypothesis, and the other is the 
cultural adaptation hypothesis.  Table 2.2 provides a brief summary of empirical studies 
on intercultural negotiation.
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TABLE 2.2 
Empirical Studies in the International Business Negotiation Literature 
 
Paper Theme Culture 
(Country/Region) 
Method 
Negotiation Simulation    
Graham, 1985 Negotiation strategy: Problem Solving Approach  American vs. Japanese Face-to-face 
Adler & Graham,1989 Intra- vs. Inter-cultural comparison: Problem solving 
approach, interpersonal attraction, time, satisfaction, 
individual profits, joint profits 
American vs. Japanese 
Canadian Francophone vs. 
Canadian Anglophone 
Face-to-face 
Natlandsmyr & Rognes, 1995 Mexican vs. NorwegianÆ behaviorÆjoin gain Mexican vs. Norwegian Face-to-face 
Brett & Okumura, 1998 Intra- vs. inter-cultural negotiation / compatibility of 
schema: understanding, preference, joint gain,  
American vs. Japanese Face-to-face 
Gelfand & 
Christakopoulou, 1999 
Individualism/CollectivismÆFixed pie error American vs. Greek email 
Adair et al., 2001 US vs. Japan comparisonÆNegotiation process: Direct 
vs. indirect information exchange, Power/influence 
tactics, adaptation, negotiation willingness, clarifying 
questions, discussing negotiation procedures 
American vs. Japan Face-to-face 
Adair & Brett, 2005 High-, mixed-, low-context dyadÆnegotiation 
processÆJoint gains 
American vs. Japanese  
American vs. Hong Kong 
Chinese 
Face-to-face 
Imai & Gelfand, 2006 Cultural intelligenceÆ negotiation processesÆjoint 
gains 
American vs. East Asian Face-to-face 
Liu et al., 2007 Intra- vs. inter-cultural comparison 
Shared mental modelÆnegotiation outcomes 
American vs. Chinese Face-to-face 
    
Other Methods    
Tung,  1982 Factors influence negotiation outcomes in real word American managers in the 
US-China trade companies 
Recall 
Francis, 1991 Adaptation (none, moderate, full)Æ Imagined 
negotiation outcomes and interpersonal attraction 
American vs. imagined 
Japan or Korean 
Scenario 
Tse et al., 1994 Chinese vs. Canadian Æ Conflict resolution strategies Chinese vs. Canadian Scenario 
Rao & Hashimoto, 1996 Japanese vs. Canadian subordinateÆinfluence tactics Japanese vs. Canadian Survey 
Rao & Schmidt,1998 Power, cultural distance, conflict frames, trust, US international negotiators Recall 
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interpersonal orientation, time 
horizonÆhard/rational/soft tacticsÆagreement and 
alliance success 
Chan & Goto, 2003 Ethnicity of supervisor matters—regard more as conflict 
when different ethnicity; prefer different resolutions 
(arbitration, negotiation, mediation, inaction) when 
different ethnicity 
HK subordinate 
American, Mainland, vs. 
HK supervisor 
Scenario 
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Culture-clash Hypothesis 
The culture-clash hypothesis holds that people from different cultures have 
distinct cognitions and tactics to resolve conflict, and that these cultural differences may 
make intercultural conflict resolution a cultural clash process (Adair et al., 2001; Brett & 
Okumura, 1998).   Morris and Gelfand commented that: 
“Negotiators from the same culture, exposed to the same public cultural elements, 
will have a common set of chronically accessible constructs—self-conceptions, 
metaphors, expectations, and scripts—making for an “organized” interaction (Gelfand 
and McCusker, 2002). Not so in intercultural conflicts, which inherently involve two 
negotiations, the original conflict over resources and the meta-level negotiation over the 
meanings that should define the event. ” (Morris & Gelfand, 2004: 65). 
 
Consonant with the above comments, one consistent finding in intercultural 
negotiation research is that it is more difficult to make joint gains in intercultural 
negotiations than in intracultural negotiations (Adair et al., 2001; Alder & Graham, 1989; 
Brett & Okumura, 1998; Natlandsmyr & Rognes, 1995).  For example, Alder and 
Graham (1989) found that Japanese and Anglophone Canadian achieved lower join 
profits in intercultural negotiations than in intracultural negotiations.  In the same vein, 
Natlandsmyr and Rognes (1995) reported that intercultural dyads composed of Mexicans 
and Norwegians made lower profits than intracultural dyads of Norwegians.  Brett and 
Okumura (1998), studying a sample of American and Japanese managers, also indicated 
that intercultural negotiations yielded low joint gains than intracultural negotiations.     
To test such a culture-clash hypothesis, it is important to examine whether the 
incompatibility of negotiation schemas or scripts is associated with less joint gains (Brett 
& Okumura, 1998; Adair et al., 2001).  The reasoning is that if negotiators from different 
cultures have different negotiation schemas, then consequent misunderstanding or lack of 
information exchange would thwart the creation of joint gains.  In one study, Brett and 
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Okumura (1998) did find that cultural values (e.g., individualism/collectivism and 
hierarchy/egalitarianism) were associated with negotiation schemas (self-interest and 
power), but they did not find the link between the compatibility of negotiation schemas 
and the joint gains in intercultural negotiation.  
Cultural Adaptation Hypothesis 
The other argument is the cultural adaptation hypothesis.  Some researchers argue 
that it is not correct to assume that negotiators would think or behave in the same way in 
intercultural negotiation as in intracultural negotiation. According to them, people tend to 
adjust their behaviors to accommodate the other culture in intercultural negotiations 
(Adler & Graham, 1989; Drake, 2001).  If culture is a big hurdle in intercultural 
interaction, then cultural adaptation may be an efficient way to overcome cultural barriers 
(Francis, 1991; Pornpitakpan, 1999; Thomas & Ravlin, 1995; Weiss, 1994).  Cultural 
adaptation is defined as “a change in behavior to be more typical of behavior in another’s 
national culture” (Thomas & Ravlin, 1995: 133).  Although some scholars are suspect of 
a person’s capability to transcend one’s own culture (e.g., Bazerman et al., 2000), direct 
and indirect evidence suggests that cultural adaptation does take place in intercultural 
negotiation.   
For example, Imai and Gelfand (2006) found that cultural intelligence (a person’s 
capability in successfully adapting to new cultural settings, Earley & Ang, 2003) of 
intercultural negotiators led to effective information exchange during negotiation, which 
in turn were positively associated with joint gains. 
For another instance, Adair and colleagues (2001) compared intracultural and 
intercultural negotiations by focusing on negotiation tactics.  They found that in 
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intercultural negotiations between American and Japanese managers, Japanese mangers 
seemed to adapt to American culture, using more direct information exchange, less 
indirect information exchange, and less power influence tactics than their counterparts in 
intracultural negotiation.  In contrast, there were no differences in negotiation tactics 
between American managers in intercultural negotiation and those in intracutlural 
negotiation.  In other words, in intercultural negotiation between Japanese and American 
managers, the cultural adaptation is not balanced—Japanese managers made cultural 
adaptations, whereas American mangers did not.   
Such a finding of imbalanced adaptation is related to another interesting 
phenomenon in intercultural negotiation—compared with their opponents, American 
negotiators seem to absorb less accurate information from intercultural negotiation 
process, thus having more judgment errors and less precise prediction of the priorities of 
opponents (Brett & Okumura, 1998; Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999).  For example, 
Brett and Okumura (1998) asked participants to judge their counterparts’ priority of 
negotiated issues after intercultural negotiation.  They found that Japanese participants 
made more accurate judgment than American participants did.  The authors explained 
this finding by the cultural differences in communication—Americans prefer low-context 
and explicit communication, whereas Japanese prefer high-context and implicit 
communication.  During negotiation, it was easy for the Japanese to understand 
Americans’ explicit communication but hard for Americans to understand Japanese 
implicit communication.  As a result, Japanese negotiators managed to get more accurate 
information than American negotiators did.   
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In another intercultural negotiation study, Gelfand and Christakopoulou (1999) 
found that although there was no difference in fixed-pie judgment error between 
American and Greek students at the beginning of negotiation, American students had 
significantly more judgment errors than Greek students after negotiation.  Such a finding 
was explained by individualism-collectivism. Specifically, Americans, as individualists 
who mainly concern about their own interests, were less likely to adjust judgment errors 
than Greeks, who are collectivists and emphasize interests and needs of others. 
Recent research by Liu and colleagues (2007) provided partial evidence 
supporting both cultural clash and cultural adaptation hypotheses.  Using a sample of 
Chinese and American negotiators, these researchers investigated negotiators’ mental 
models before and after negotiation in intra- and intercultural negotiation.  They reported 
that intercultural negotiation dyads had less similar mental models than intracultural 
dyads at the beginning, a finding offering support to the culture-clash hypothesis.  
However, negotiators’ mental models did change after negotiation, and the extent of 
change was positively associated with joint gains in intercultural negotiation.  Such a 
finding indicates that adaptations did take place and played a critical role in intercultural 
negotiation, thus providing support to the culture adaptation hypothesis.   
 
In summary, two dominant arguments in the intercultural negotiation literature are 
culture-clash hypothesis and cultural adaptation hypothesis.  On the one hand, culture-
clash hypothesis suggests that intercultural negotiation is more difficult than intracultural 
negotiation due to cultural differences.  Empirical studies, however, have not established 
the link between the incompatibility of cultural schemas and negotiation outcomes.  On 
30 
 
the other hand, the cultural adaptation hypothesis indicates that negotiators could make 
cultural adaptation in intercultural negotiation.  There is evidence suggesting that cultural 
adaptation is imbalanced in intercultural negotiation.  Specifically, individualists, such as 
Americans, were less likely to make adaptations and had more judgment errors than their 
collectivistic counterparts in intercultural negotiation.   
In addition, most understanding of intercultural negotiation is based on the 
comparison between intracultural negotiations and intercultural negotiations. There is 
initial inquiry of the impact of cultural intelligence on intercultural negotiation (Imai & 
Gelfand, 2006).  But there is little knowledge of how social contextual factors may 
influence intercultural negotiation (Brett & Gelfand, 2004).  As a consequence, it is hard 
to predict precisely cross-cultural differences in negotiation.     
 
A Summary of Cross-Cultural Research in Negotiation 
A common feature of existing cross-cultural negotiation research is the focus on 
the main effects of culture on negotiation (Drake, 2001; Morris & Gelfand, 2004).  From 
a trait/entity view of culture, the common inquiry is investigating whether cultural 
differences exist in negotiation.  The answer is positive.  We know that Americans tend 
to take a self-centered approach whereas East Asians tend to take a relationship-oriented 
approach to negotiation. Such an inquiry is invaluable in expanding the theoretical 
horizon as well as providing managers with practical advices (Brett & Gelfand, 2006).   
But as pointed out in the introduction part (Chapter 1), one limitation of the cross-
cultural negotiation literature is that social contexts are rarely explored.  It is critical to 
examine cultural and social situational factors jointly (Drake, 2001; Gelfand & Brett, 
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2004).   Otherwise, scholars cannot capture the within-culture variance in negotiation or 
exclude the influence of social contexts on negotiation.  
The ensuing question is: What situational factors should be investigated?  A 
dynamic constructivist view of culture from recent cross-cultural psychology research 
(Chiu et al., 2000; Hong et al., 2000; Hong & Chiu, 2001) can shed light on this question, 
which I will be discussing in the following section.  
 
A Dynamic Constructivist View of Culture 
According to the dynamic constructivist view of culture, culture is “a network of 
shared knowledge that is produced, distributed, and reproduced among a collection of 
interconnected individuals” (Chiu & Hong, 2006: 31).  Cultural knowledge (or construct) 
is shared knowledge, which encompasses “learned habits of thinking, feeling, and 
interacting with people” (Chiu & Hong, 2006: 31).   
Compared with the trait/entity view of culture, the dynamic constructivist 
approach has two very different assumptions.  First, this approach regards culture as a 
loosely-organized knowledge system rather than a rigidly integrated system (Hong & 
Chiu, 2001).  It assumes that people develop domain-specific theories or believes to make 
sense of the world.   It is in this sense that this approach is “constructivist.” For instance, 
Morris and Peng (1994), who focused on the cultural differences in causal attribution 
tendency, argued that attribution tendency is acquired from socialization process.  They 
predicted and found that there was no difference between Chinese and American in 
making causal attributions for physical movements.  However, when making attributions 
32 
 
for social events, Chinese subjects making more external attribution than American 
subjects.   
Second, although domain-specific knowledge can be widely shared among 
cultural group members, whether such knowledge exerts influences on individual 
cognition, affect or behavior depends on whether it is activated or not.  It is in this sense 
that the dynamic constructivist approach is “dynamic.”  For instance, East Asians 
generally make more situational causal attribution than Americans (see a review by Choi 
et al., 1999).  But such a cultural difference may be attenuated or exacerbated in different 
conditions.  Norenzayan and colleagues (Norenzayan et al., 2002, study 2) found that 
when situational information was not salient, there were no attribution differences 
between Koreans and Americans.  In contrast, when situational information was salient, 
Koreans made more situational attribution than Americans.   
It is thus critical to attend to the principles guiding cultural knowledge activation.  
Researchers apply the social cognitive principles of knowledge activation (Higgins, 1996) 
to cross-cultural psychology, suggesting that culture may affect human cognition or 
behavior at three influence points: the availability, accessibility, and activation of cultural 
knowledge (Gelfand et al., 2006; Hong et al., 2000; Morris & Fu, 2001; Morris & 
Gelfand, 2004).   Morris and Gelfand (2004) used a software metaphor to illustrate these 
three influence points: construct availability is akin to whether a software program is 
installed on a laptop; construct accessibility is akin to whether the program is easily 
accessible for use (is there a shortcut on the desktop?); and construct activation is akin to 
whether the program is double-clicked and open for use.   
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In the following, I will briefly review these key terms and relevant findings in the 
conflict management literature. 
 
Construct Availability 
Cultural differences may arise because a construct is available in one culture but 
not in another.  Anthropological, ethnographical, and indigenous work are helpful in 
identifying what constructs are available in one culture but not in another (Morris & Fu, 
2001). Nevertheless, many cultural constructs discussed in cross-cultural literature, such 
as individualism/collectivism and independent/interdependent self, may be available in 
all cultures (Morris & Gelfand, 2004; Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, & Coon, 2002).  Thus, 
researchers suggest that most cultural differences may be not from construct availability 
versus unavailability, but from more subtle differences (Morris & Gelfand, 2004). 
 
Construct Accessibility 
There are two types of construct accessibility: chronic accessibility and temporary 
accessibility (Higgins, 1996).  Chronic accessibility refers to the likelihood that a 
knowledge construct is accessible in the long term, whereas temporary accessibility 
refers to the accessibility of a knowledge construct due to cues in the immediate context 
(Higgins, 1996; Morris & Gelfand, 2004).   
Chronically accessible constructs are usually widely shared because of everyday 
practice, frequent public or private communication (Lau, Chiu, & Lee, 2001), or social 
structure (Morris, Podolny, & Ariel, 2000).  Some researchers suggest that cross-cultural 
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differences found by most previous research could be interpreted as variations of chronic 
accessibility on certain knowledge (Chiu et al., 2000; Morris & Gelfand, 2004).      
For example, given the same social event (e.g., murder), American newspapers 
would be more likely to attribute it to internal factors (e.g., personality) whereas Chinese 
newspapers would be more likely to attribute it to external factors (e.g., environment) 
(Morris & Peng, 1994, study 2).  This finding suggests that making internal attributions is 
a chronically accessible construct in the United States, whereas making external 
attributions is a chronically accessible construct in China.  Consisting with this pattern, 
American individuals made more internal attribution to social events whereas Chinese 
individuals made more external attribution to these events (Morris & Peng, 1994, study 
3).   
For another example, Gelfand and McCusker (2002) found that public discourse 
(e.g., newspaper stories and TV shows) in the North America frequently portrays 
negotiation as sports, racing, or war.  Consequently, it is not surprising that American 
negotiators tend to have a win-lose frame toward conflict resolution (Gelfand et al., 2001). 
 
Temporary accessibility results from cues in the immediate context.  A deeply 
buried knowledge construct may be highly accessible due to recent experience or priming 
cues.  Priming is a frequently used technique to influence temporary accessibility.  If one 
cultural construct is available in one culture but not the other, priming may exaggerate 
cultural differences; but if a cultural construct is available in both cultures and if cultural 
differences are due to variations of chronic accessibility, priming may attenuate cultural 
differences.  Therefore, priming is a useful diagnostic tool to detect availability.  For 
35 
 
example, Hong and colleagues (2000) proposed that some people may accommodate two 
different cultural systems, and they are bicultural in nature.   An important trait of 
bicultural people is that they can switch cultural frames according to situational demands.  
Several interesting studies conducted by Hong et al. (2000) report that when bicultural 
people (Hong Kong Chinese students) were primed by American cultural symbols, they 
showed typical American attribution styles; and when bicultural people were primed by 
Chinese cultural symbols, they showed typical Chinese attribution styles. 
 
Besides availability and accessibility, activation is another important condition for 
the use of cultural knowledge. Compared with the other conditions, the activation facet 
emphasizes more information processing.  Recent research suggests whether a cultural 
knowledge is activated depends on (1) whether the knowledge is applicable to the 
situation; or (2) whether individuals are motivated to follow culturally typical patterns.  
 
Construct Activation—Applicability 
Construct applicability is different from construct availability or construct 
accessibility.  Although individuals tend to primarily rely on the most accessible 
knowledge construct, they also judge whether such knowledge is applicable to the 
particular situation (Chiu & Hong, 2006).    
For example, Chinese people generally prefer social harmony, thus usually 
choosing avoiding tactics in conflict resolution (e.g., Morris et al., 1998).  But the 
distinction between ingroup and outgroup is very salient for collectivists (Triandis, 1989; 
1995).  When the other party is an outgroup member versus an ingroup member, 
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achieving harmony is not an applicable construct.  Empirical studies indicate that Chinese 
people may have a competitive frame in conflict resolution when the other party is from 
outgroup (Derlega et al., 2002; Leung & Bond, 1984).  Researchers recently apply this 
idea to examine whether group membership moderates the effect of culture on mixed-
motive games. 
Wong and Hong (2005) manipulated cultural orientation by showing cultural 
symbols to bicultural people (cf. Hong et al., 2000).  Westernized Hong Kong Chinese 
college students (bicultural) were randomly assigned into different cultural priming 
conditions (Chinese, American, or neutral) and different partner conditions (friend vs. 
stranger).  Participants were asked to run five rounds of prisoner’s dilemma game in 
dyads.  When the partner was a friend, participants in the Chinese priming condition 
significantly made more cooperative decisions and were more confident on the partner’ 
cooperation than those participants in the American priming condition.  However, when 
the partner was a stranger, there were no differences on cooperation between participants 
in these two cultural priming conditions. 
The foregoing review suggests that applicability is an important condition for the 
use of cultural knowledge.  The group membership of the other party (ingroup-outgroup) 
is a critical contextual factor that determines the applicability of cultural knowledge in 
conflict management, especially for collectivists. Collectivists are more likely to 
cooperate with ingroup members than individualists, while both collectivists and 
individualists are likely to compete with outgroup members.  
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Construct Activation—Motivation 
Whether cultural knowledge is activated or not is also influenced by motivational 
factors.  Culture does not rigidly determine individual behaviors, but individuals are 
likely to follow culturally typical patterns when their needs for epistemic certainty are 
high (Chiu et al., 2000; Fu et al., 2007) or when they have a strong motivation for social 
approval (Briley et al., 2000; Gelfand & Realo, 1999). 
Epistemic Certainty Motivation   
Epistemic certainty motivation refers to the extent to which one needs 
unambiguous interpretation or answers (e.g., Webster& Kriglanski, 1994).  Social 
cognition research suggests that an individual is more likely to use accessible information 
when his/her epistemic certainty motivation is high versus low (Webster, 1993; Webster 
et al., 1993).  Since culture provides people with accessible knowledge to make 
interpretation and decisions, people are inclined to use cultural knowledge when their 
epistemic certainty motivation is high (Chiu et al., 2000).  Existing literature suggests that 
need for closure1 (Chiu et al., 2000; Fu et al., 2007), time pressure (Chiu et al., 2000), and 
conflicting information (Friedman et al., 2007) may arouse epistemic certainty motivation, 
thus motivating people to follow culturally typical patterns. 
For example, many cross-cultural studies suggest that when the agent in a social 
event is a group, Americans have a tendency to attribute social events to external factors 
whereas East-Asians have a tendency to make attribution to internal factors (Menon et al., 
1999).  Chiu et al. (2000) extended Menon et al.’s (1999) finding by adding time pressure 
into examination (study 2).  They found that participants under time pressure showed 
                                                 
1 Need for closure is a disposition reflecting one’s epistemic need to resolve social ambiguity (Kruglanski, 
1990; Webster& Kriglanski, 1994). 
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clear cultural pattern as Menon et al’s study (1999) indicated.  But when there was no 
time pressure, there were no differences in attribution patterns between Chinese and 
American participants. 
Social Approval Motivation   
Social approval motivation refers to the extent to which one desires agreement 
and consent by others (Tetlock, 1992).  People with high group identity, high need for 
belongingness, or high social pressure are motivated to follow shared norms (e.g., Jetten 
et al., 2002). 
Accountability is a critical mechanism to strengthen social norms (Tetlock, 1992).  
When one is held accountable to one’s cultural groups, one is motivated to follow 
culturally typical patterns for gaining social approval (Briley et al., 2000; Gelfand & 
Realo, 1999).     
For example, a recent study in marketing research suggests that accountability 
may activate culturally typical shopping decisions (Briley et al., 2000).   Previous 
research found that Asian consumers were more likely to make compromise shopping 
decisions than American consumers (Myers & Simonson, 1992).    Briley and colleagues 
(2000) found some nuance, arguing that such a cultural difference is larger if consumers 
from these cultures were asked to give justifications to audiences from their own culture 
before making decisions.  From different samples, they reported that Asian participants 
were more likely to make compromise decisions than American participants, but only 
when participants were asked to give justification to people from their own cultures.  
Such a finding indicates that when one is expecting to give justifications for one’s choice 
to audiences from one’s own culture, one tends to follow culturally typical patterns in 
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making decisions.  Since giving justification is a type of accountability, this evidence 
suggests accountability can strengthen cultural norms. 
 
Summary 
The dynamic constructivist view of culture proposes that a knowledge construct is 
likely to be used when it is available, accessible, and activated.  According to this view, 
most previous findings about cross-cultural differences may come from the variations of 
the level of chronic accessibility on cultural constructs (Chiu et al., 2000; Morris & Fu, 
2001; Morris & Gelfand, 2004).  More importantly, the dynamic constructivist view 
explores when cultural knowledge would be activated.  The activation of cultural 
knowledge depends on the applicability of knowledge to contexts (e.g., ingroup vs. 
outgroup), or the motivation to follow culturally typical patterns, including epistemic 
certainty motivation (e.g., under time pressure) and social approval motivation (e.g., 
accountability).  
 
The dynamic constructivist view has received increasing attention from scholars 
in management (e.g., Brett et al., 2006), yet most discussions are based on the 
reinterpretation of previous studies (Morris & Gelfand, 2004).  Rarely is there any study 
that explicitly tests the predictions of the dynamic constructivist view may make in 
management.  I aim to fill in this gap by applying such a view of culture to negotiation.  
Specifically, I will focus on the impact of accountability and group membership on cross-
cultural negotiation.  In the following, I will review the existing negotiation literature 
about accountability and group membership. 
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Accountability 
In many cases, negotiators represent others rather than themselves in negotiations 
(Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).  So investigating the relationship between constituency and 
representative has been a topic that continuously attracts attention in the last forty years 
(Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). 
 
Accountability and Negotiation 
From a role conflict perspective, Adams’s (1976) boundary role model suggests 
that representatives need to work with people not only within the organization but also 
outside the organization.  As boundary spanners, representatives are subject to both 
internal and external influences, so that they are easily involved in role conflicts.  One 
solution to role conflict is to separate out the role of those who communicate outwardly 
from a group from the role of those who communicate inwardly information provided by 
outside parties ( Friedman & Podolny, 1992), but this may not always be feasible to 
accomplish.   A basic question that research in this thread asks is: What is the impact of 
constituent pressures on negotiation? 
In terms of negotiation process, it has been repeatedly found that accountability 
leads to contentious behavior of representatives in negotiation (Benton & Druckman, 
1974; Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a; Carnevale et al., 1981; Friedman, 1994; Klimoski & 
Ash, 1974; Mosterd & Rutte, 2000; O’Connor, 1997; Pruitt et al., 1986).  Either in 
distributive negotiation or in integrative negotiation, representatives in high 
accountability conditions are more reluctant to make concessions, take longer to make a 
deal, and use contentious tactics more frequently than those in low accountability 
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conditions.   A meta-analysis of competitive negotiation behavior found that 
accountability affects agreement quality through its influence on the parties’ motives 
(Druckman, 1994). That is, pressure from constituents increases concern for one’s own 
outcomes (Carnevale et al., 1981), which, in turn, bolsters a competitive motive (Pruitt, 
Kimmel, Britton, Carnevale, Magenau, Peragallo, & Engram, 1978).   
Researchers have also identified some moderators to the effect of accountability.  
Particularly, the effects of accountability on contentious behavior would be attenuated by 
constituents’ cooperation intention (versus competition intention, Benton & Druckman, 
1974), surveillance by female (rather than male) constituents(Pruitt et al., 1986), face-to-
face negotiation (versus with negotiation with a visual barrier, Carnavale et al., 1981), 
team negotiation (versus negotiation individually, O’Connor, 1997), and expectation of 
cooperative future interaction (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a).   
What is the effect of accountability on negotiation outcomes?  In most cases, 
negotiation is a mixed-motive and integrative process.  According to the dual concern 
model of negotiation (Filley, 1975; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), only when there is both high 
concern for self interests and high concern for other’s interests will there be creative and 
integrative outcomes in negotiation.  Therefore, accountability, which makes concern 
about own interests salient for Western negotiators, results in contentious negotiation 
outcomes, such as the difference of individual gains, but not joint gains (O’Connor, 1997; 
Pruitt et al., 1986), unless it is also coupled with factors that enhance high concern for the 
other.    
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In summary, previous research indicates that accountability usually leads to 
contentious behavior in negotiation, such as reluctance to make concessions and the use 
of competitive tactics.  It may also result in competitive negotiation outcomes, such as 
differences of individual gains.  Generally speaking, existing literature consistently 
reports accountability as a situational factor that promotes contentious behaviors and 
competitive outcomes in negotiation.   
Previous research on accountability and negotiation, however, were mainly 
conducted in Western (individualistic) cultures, where negotiators generally have a win-
lose, or competitive frame in negotiation (Gelfand et al., 2001).  From the perspective of 
the dynamic constructivist view of culture (Morris & Gelfand, 2004), a win-lose, or 
competitive frame is the highly accessible knowledge to people from these cultures.  
Given that accountability motivates people to adopt socially acceptable behaviors 
(Tetlock, 1992), it is not hard to understand why so many studies conducted in Western 
cultures have documented that accountability intensifies competition in negotiation.  
However, does accountability universally lead to competition or self-interested 
orientation in negotiation? It seems important to examine the effect of accountability in 
different cultures. 
 
Accountability and Culture 
Tetlock (1992) commented that: “although one can make a powerful case for the 
universality of accountability (Semin & Manstead, 1983), the specific norms and values 
to which people are held accountable vary dramatically from one culture or time to 
another.” (p. 337). 
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Culture provides people with social norms and rules in social interaction (Markus 
& Kitayama, 1991).  When people are aware that they need to justify their decisions or 
behaviors to others, they tend to choose the way that is socially acceptable in their 
cultures.  In other words, accountability activates cultural knowledge that is accessible in 
particular contexts.  Some empirical evidence has suggested that accountability can 
activate cultural norms in negotiation. 
In one study conducted by Pruit and colleagues (1986), they found that when 
there was no clear information about constituents’ preferences, negotiators were less 
contentious when they were surveilled by female constituents than by male constituents.  
The potential explanation is that negotiators inferred constituents’ preferences based on 
common beliefs about gender (cultural knowledge).  As a result, if constituents were 
male, negotiators tended to make competitive tendency attribution and thus acted 
contentiously. In contrast, if constituents were female, negotiators tended to make 
cooperative attribution and thus acted cooperatively. 
In another study, Gelfand and Realo (1999) proposed that accountability would 
have different impacts on negotiation in different cultures because cooperation is 
normative in collectivistic societies whereas competition is normative in individualistic 
societies.  Specifically, accountability would increase cooperation between collectivistic 
negotiators, but intensify competition between individualistic negotiators.  Using two 
different samples from North America and Estonia, Gelfand and Realo (1999) provided 
evidence supporting the above prediction: under high accountability conditions, 
collectivistic negotiation dyads were more likely to cooperate, were more willing to make 
concessions, and achieved higher joint gains in integrative negotiation than those under 
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low accountability conditions; in contrast, under high accountability conditions, 
individualistic negotiation dyads were less likely to cooperate, were less willing to make 
concessions, and achieved lower joint gains in integrative negotiation than those under 
low accountability conditions.  Based on these findings, Gelfand and Realo (1999) argued 
that accountability, as a social norm enforcement mechanism (Tetlock, 1992), activated 
the chronically accessible cultural knowledge in negotiation, so that collectivists are more 
likely to cooperate while individualists are more likely to compete (Gelfand & Realo, 
1999; Morris & Gelfand, 2004).     
 
In summary, the specific norms or values that accountability reinforces vary 
across cultures.  People are likely to show culturally typical behavioral patterns when 
they are held accountable (Briley et al., 2000; Gelfand & Realo, 1999).  Therefore, 
accountability can be viewed as an activator of cultural norms. 
Another important situational factor in negotiation is group membership.  I will 
review relevant literature about group membership in the next section. 
 
Group Membership 
Categorizing people into different groups is a ubiquitous social phenomenon (e.g., 
Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1987).  A person sharing with common attributes 
(demographics, activities, preferences, or institutions), goals, fate, or external threat is 
usually regarded as an ingroup member; whereas a person who involves dissimilar 
attributes, or the lack of common goals or common fate is usually regarded as an 
outgroup member (Campbell, 1958; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Triandis, 1989). People 
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generally show favoritism to ingroup members, but negative attitudes toward outgroup 
members (see a review by Messick & Mackie, 1989).    In addition, people tend to 
believe that ingroup members are more honest, trustworthy, and cooperative than 
outgroup members (Brewer, 1979).  Such intergroup discrimination has important 
implications to negotiation.   
 
Group Membership and Negotiation 
Group membership may influence negotiators’ social motivation, which is defined 
as negotiator’s preferences for outcome distributions between him- or herself and 
opponent (De Dreu et al., 1995).  When negotiating with ingroup members, negotiators 
shift “towards the perception of self as an interchangeable exemplar of some social 
category and away from the perception of self as a unique person” (Turner, 1987: 50-51).  
In other words, negotiators downplay personal identity and show more concerns to 
ingroup members.  In contrast, when negotiating with outgroup members, negotiators 
adopt more self-centered orientations.  Existing studies in negotiation literature provide 
evidence that group membership influence negotiators’ cognition and behavior, as well as 
negotiation outcomes.   
First, negotiators had more positive expectations when negotiating with ingroup 
members than with outgroup members.  For example, in one study conducted by 
Thompson (1993, study 1), she randomly assigned participants into either one of the two 
groups (alpha or beta), and then asked participants to negotiate with an ingroup or an 
outgroup member.  She found that negotiators had more favorite evaluations and higher 
expectation of outcomes toward ingroup members than outgroup members before 
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negotiation.  In another study, Harinck and Ellemers (2006) asked students to negotiate 
with another student from the same major (ingroup) or from another major (outgroup).  
They found that negotiators had higher level of anticipated trust toward ingroup members 
than outgroup members.  Moreover, Kramer and Brewer (1984), who conducted three 
social dilemma experiments, reported that individuals were more willing to cooperate 
with ingroup members than with outgroup members.   
Second, group membership also influences negotiation processes.  Moore and 
colleagues (1999) conducted an online negotiation experiment.  They randomly assigned 
participants to negotiate with outgroup members (students from another university) or 
with ingroup members (students from the same university).  They found that ingroup 
dyads revealed more preferences for negotiable issues, asked more information-seeking 
questions, and made fewer procedural statements than outgroup dyads.   
Finally, negotiation outcomes were also affected by group membership.  In Moore 
et al.’s (1999) study, ingroup dyads were found more likely to reach agreements than 
outgroup dyads.  In another study conducted by Kramer and colleagues (Kramer et al., 
1993), researchers highlighted negotiators’ shared social identity by asking MBA student 
(negotiators) to reflect their shared attributes with other MBA students in the program, 
while in the other condition researchers decreased negotiators’ shared identity by asking 
MBA students to reflect their own uniqueness from other MBA students.  In the shared 
social identity condition, negotiators achieved more equal individual gains than those in 
the less shared social identity condition.  So group membership may influence the 
equality of individual gains. 
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However, existing studies did not provide any convincing evidence that in 
negotiations with integrative potentials group membership may influence joint gain 
(Harinck & Ellemers, 2006; Moore et al., 1999; Thompson, 1993). Thompson (1993) 
used Tajfel’s (1970) minimum intergroup paradigm to manipulate the group membership 
of negotiators. She randomly assigned students into group Alpha or group Beta, and then 
asked half participants to negotiate with a member from the same group (ingroup 
condition) while half participants to negotiate with a member from another group 
(outgroup condition).    Although she found that competitive relations existed between 
two groups, there was no difference in joint gains between the ingroup and outgroup 
conditions (Study 1 and Study 2).  Thompson suggested that different negotiation 
processes may achieve similar joint gains. For example, a highly integrative agreement 
may be achieved when two competitive negotiators relentlessly explore every alternative 
and unwilling to concede, or when two cooperative negotiators highly value the other 
party’s interests and honestly exchange information. But Thompson did not provide any 
empirical evidence about negotiation processes.  Another study conducted by Moore et al 
(1999) did not report any difference on joint gains between ingroup and outgroup 
condition either.  Harinck and Ellemers (2006), who also investigated ingroup-outgroup 
differences, made a further step by taking information sharing behavior into consideration.  
They argued that shared membership may set up the stage of negotiation, but what 
negotiators actually do (such as exchange useful information) during negotiation may be 
also very important.  In two experiments, Harinck and Ellemers (2006) manipulated both 
group membership and information sharing behavior.  However, although they found 
48 
 
some effects of group membership and information sharing on negotiator’s initial trust 
and negotiation behavior, they did not find any effect on joint gains (Study 2). 
Why has existing literature found nosignificant relationship between group 
membership and joint gains?  There may be two plausible explanations.  One is that the 
impact of group membership on the whole negotiation task may dilute or disappear once 
negotiators start face-to-face interaction.  The classic intergroup contact hypothesis 
(Allport, 1954; Williams, 1947) proposes that under certain circumstances contacts 
between members of different groups can reduce negative intergroup attitudes.  Actually, 
Thompson (1991) found that negotiators in the outgroup condition had more positive 
evaluations after negotiation than before negotiation (Study 1 and 2).  The other is that all 
existing studies have been conducted in Western cultures, where shared identity or 
membership is less salient than other cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).   
In summary, group membership exerts influences on negotiation processes and 
some impacts on negotiation outcomes.  Specifically, when negotiating with ingroups, 
negotiators have more positive expectations before negotiation, share more information 
during negotiation, and achieve more balanced individual gains after negotiation than 
when negotiating with outgroups. 
Existing negotiation research in this theme has been mostly conducted in Western 
(individualistic) cultures, in which the boundary between ingroup and outgroup is 
arguably fuzzy (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989).  Many cross-cultural studies 
have suggested that group membership may have stronger effects for collectivists than 
individualists (see a recent review by Brewer & Chen, 2007).  It is thus necessary to 
discuss group membership and culture.  
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Group Membership and Culture 
The notion of group membership is related to the psychological boundaries 
between self and others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989, 1995).  East Asians 
(collectivists), who have interdependent self construals, draw a clear line between 
ingroup and outgroup members; while Westerners (individualists), who have independent 
self construals, distinguish autonomous self from other individuals, regardless of ingroup 
members or outgroup members (Chen et al., 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  
Therefore, collectivists pay more attention to the distinction between ingroup and 
outgroup members than individualists (Triandis, 1972).  Usually, collectivists tend to 
collaborate with ingroup members, but to compete with outgroup members.  In contrast, 
individualists pay more attention to the distinction between autonomous self and others.  
Compared with collectivists, individualists tend to treat other individuals, no matter who 
are ingroup members or outgroup members, in a relatively universal way. 
Yamagishi (2003) proposed an institutional view of culture to further explain the 
cultural differences between collectivists and individualists in interacting with in/out-
group members.  He suggested that collectivists are not always more likely to be 
cooperative or to sacrifice own interests for group interests than individualists.  
According to him, collectivists place group interest above individual interests not because 
of their intrinsic tendencies, but because of formal or informal group sanctioning.  Such 
an intuitional view of culture contends that when working with ingroup members, 
collectivists cooperate with each other because of group sanctioning. But when working 
with strangers, collectivists would show egoistic intention because there is lack of 
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external monitoring.  In contrast, individualists, who are generally self-centered, are 
relatively less influenced by whom they are interacting with (Yamagishi, 2003).  
Recently, some scholars have explained cross-cultural differences in intergroup 
discrimination by identifying two types of collectivism: relational collectivism and group 
collectivism (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Brewer & Roccas, 2001).  They argue that 
collectivism-orientation is a target-dependent concept, so it is very important to define 
who the collective is.  So-called collectivists (East Asians) in literature are actually 
relational collectivists, whose ingroup members refer to people within their relational 
networks.  Therefore, collectivists view group primarily as relationship-based concept 
(Brewer & Chen, 2007; Yuki, Maddux, Brewer, & Takemura, 2005).  In contrast, so-
called individualists (Westerners) are more likely to be group collectivists, whose ingorup 
members are defined by categorical memberships (Brewer & Chen, 2007).  Therefore, 
individalists emphasize the categorical distinction between ingroup and outgroup.   As a 
consequence, relational collectivists collaborate with those whom they have relationship 
with (ingroup members), and they pay much attention to the maintenance of relationship 
with ingroup members in social interactions; whereas group collectivists collaborate with 
those whom they share the same category, but such collaboration is not necessarily 
relationship-focused (Brewer & Chen, 2007).   
 
 Empirical evidence consistently shows that group membership has more salient 
effects on collectivists than on individualists.  In the conflict management literature, 
Leung and Bond (1984) found that Chinese allocators were inclined to give in their 
personal gains to assist ingroup members when distributing rewards.  However, 
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Americans failed to form such an ingroup–outgroup distinction.  In addition, Leung 
(1988) discovered that compared with American subjects, Chinese subjects were less 
contentious in disputes with ingroup members but more contentious in disputes with 
outgroup members.  In another conflict scenario study conducted by Derlega and 
colleagues (2002), students from an individualistic culture (Americans) were unlikely to 
accept conflict situations, and would choose to threaten the other party, no matter with 
whom they are interacting.  By contrast, compared with students from individualistic 
cultures, students from collectivistic cultures were more willing to accept conflict 
situations when the other party was an ingroup member, but they were more likely to 
threaten the other party when the other party was from another country.    
In one social dilemma experiment, Chen and Li (2005) compared Chinese and 
Australian decision makers in ingroup and outgroup conditions.  They manipulated group 
membership by asking people to imagine where they were (in a foreign territory vs. in 
one’s own country) and with whom they interacted (a compatriot vs. a foreigner).  When 
one is in a foreign territory, a compatriots is likely to be regarded as an ingroup member, 
but a foreigner is likely to be regarded as an outgroup member.  As predicted, Chen and 
Li (2005) found that in a foreign territory Chinese participants were more cooperative 
when the other party was a fellow Chinese rather than a foreigner.  In contrast, Australian 
participants showed no differences in these two corresponding conditions.  
 
In summary, group membership is an important concept in discussing the cultural 
differences in conflict management.  Particularly, East Asians (collectivists) feel more 
obligated to accommodate the needs of, and keep good relationship with ingroup 
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members than Westerners (individualists).  Empirical studies provide consistent findings 
in conflict resolution scenarios and in mixed-motive games to support this argument.  
Nevertheless, little is known about how the interaction between culture and group 
membership affects negotiation. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Having reviewed the relevant literature about cross-cultural negotiation, the 
dynamic constructivist view of culture, and studies on group membership and 
accountability, I now present my hypotheses in this chapter.   
In my dissertation, I focus on Chinese and American negotiators in both 
intracultural and intercultural negotiations.  There are both theoretical and practical 
reasons to choose negotiators from these two cultures.  Theoretically, it has been 
extensively documented that Chinese and American cultures differ from each other in 
values, norms, and beliefs (see reviews by Choi et al., 1999 and Wang, 1993; Earley, 
1993; Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995).  In particular, the existing conflict management 
literature suggests that Chinese and North Americans follow different norms, use distinct 
frames, and prefer dissimilar tactics in conflict resolution (Leung & Bond, 1984; Morris 
et al., 1998; Tinsley & Pillutla, 1998; Tse & Walls, 1994).  If the trait/entity view of 
culture is correct, then Chinese and American negotiators will always display significant 
differences in negotiation, just as existing literature indicates.  But if these cross-cultural 
differences are contingent upon social contexts, a dynamic constructivist view of culture 
will be supported.  Strategically choosing Chinese and American negotiators therefore 
allows me to robustly test the dynamic constructivist approach in the negotiation research.  
Practically, the frequency and the importance of business interactions between 
China and the United States have dramatically increased in the last twenty five years (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2007).  The two countries are currently each other’s top trade partners, 
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and the United States is the top foreign direct investor in China (U.S.-China Business 
Council, 2007).  There arenumerous business negotiations going on everyday between 
people from these two countries.  Therefore, understanding intra-cultural negotiation 
differences and inter-cultural dynamics between these two cultures has become very 
importantto practitioners.  
Following the theoretical lens provided by the dynamic constructivist approach, I 
first identify potential cultural constructs to which Chinese and American negotiators 
may have different levels of chronic accessibility.  Then, I discuss how accountability 
and group membership respectively moderate the impact of culture on negotiation.  
Finally, a three way interaction between culture, accountability, and group membership is 
explored.  Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the hypothesized model.    
 
Chronically Accessible Constructs in Two Cultures 
Chronic accessibility refers to the likelihood that a knowledge construct is 
cognitively accessible in the long term (Chiu & Hong, 2006; Morris & Gelfand, 2004).  
The more frequently cultural knowledge is activated, the higher the level of chronic 
accessibility (Hong & Mallorie, 2004).  Chronically accessible constructs provide people 
with cognitive shortcuts for sense-making.  Many cross-cultural differences reported by 
previous studies can be explained by variations in the level of chronic accessibility of 
particular knowledge constructs (Chiu et al., 2000; Hong & Mallorie, 2004).  
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In the conflict resolution domain, previous research indicates that Americans 
generally use a self-centered approach whereas East Asians usually prefer a relationship-
oriented approach (see my review in Chapter II).  Such cultural differences mirror 
different conceptions of self, as well as distinct representations of others in social life 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989).  Applying this idea to negotiation, I propose 
that Chinese and American negotiators may differ from each other on two related but 
different constructs in the negotiation process: negotiation frame and negotiation tactics.  
In addition, variations in these two constructs in turn affect negotiation outcomes, such as 
fixed-pie perceptions (an indicator of cognitive outcome), joint gain (an indicator of 
economic outcome), and relational capital (an indicator of social psychological outcome).  
 
Relationship Negotiation Frame 
Negotiation frames are the lens through which negotiators define negotiation 
situations (Pinkley, 1990; Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994).  A relationship negotiation frame 
emphasizes negotiation as the opportunity to develop or strengthen relationship through 
cooperation (Gelfand et al., 2006; Pinkley, 1990; Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994).  It is 
opposite to a task negotiation frame, which concentrates on the material part of 
negotiation, such as property settlement and money (Pinkley, 1990; Pinkley & Northcraft, 
1994).   
Chinese negotiators may be more likely to have a relationship negotiation frame 
than American negotiators.  Cross-cultural research indicates that Chinese people are 
socialized to define themselves as interdependent individuals whereas Americans tend to 
define themselves as independent individuals (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  As a 
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result, while the Chinese focus on the relational facets in social interactions, Americans 
emphasize the individuating aspects in social interactions (Gelfand et al., 2000; Ting-
Toomey et al., 1991).  For example, Gelfand and colleagues (2000) found that when 
collecting information on a person with whom one would interact in the future (a new 
neighbor, a new colleague et al.), Chinese participants believed that relational 
information (e.g., with whom the person has a close relationship) was more useful, 
whereas Americans participants believed that personal information (e.g., personal 
achievement) was more useful.     
In addition, the difference between Chinese and Americans in terms of the 
relationship- versus task-orientation can be even stronger in work settings.  Some 
scholars suggest that the American culture has a Protestant Relational Ideology (PRI), “a 
deep-seated belief that affective and relational concerns are considered inappropriate in 
work settings and, therefore, are to be given less attention than in social, non-work 
settings” (Sanchez-Burks, 2002, 2005; Sanchez-Burks et al., 2003).   In contrast to people 
from Latin-America or East Asia, who pay equal attention to socioemotional and task 
aspects in work settings, Americans emphasize only task or economic aspects during 
work (Sanchez-Burks et al., 2003; Sanchez-Burks, 2005).  Consonant with this idea, in 
business negotiations between the Chinese and Americans, some observers reported that 
Chinese negotiators are concerned about guanxi (relationship or connection) whereas 
American negotiators focus on tasks (Graham & Lam, 2003; Lam, 2000; Pye, 1986).  
 Moreover, it has been found that Americans and East Asians apply different 
frames or metaphors to social conflicts.  Particularly, East Asians regard negotiation as 
the chance for both parties to make mutual compromise, and tend to mutually blame 
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parties who are involved in social conflicts. In contrast, Americans view negotiation as a 
win-lose situation, and tend to blame one side rather than both sides involved in social 
conflicts (Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999; Gelfand et al., 2001).   
Based on these evidences, I propose that a relationship negotiation frame is more 
accessible to Chinese negotiators than to American negotiators.  Hence, I hypothesize 
that:  
Hypothesis 1a: Chinese negotiators are more likely to have a relationship 
negotiation frame than American negotiators. 
 
Relationship-based Negotiation Tactics 
Cultural knowledge is important in understanding not only cognition, but also 
behavior (Chiu & Hong, 2006).  People from different cultures may differ in tactics 
preferences in negotiation.  Specifically, Chinese negotiators may be more likely to use 
relationship-based tactics during negotiation than American negotiators.  Relationship-
based tactics are defined as negotiation tactics that emphasize connection and 
relationship building.  These tactics include personal appeal (asking the target to carry out 
a request as a personal favor), relational appeal (emphasizing common attributes), 
socializing (talking about a subject irrelevant to the request but of interest to the target 
before making the request) (Fu et al., 2004), “expressions of agreement, empathy with 
another’s position, and enthusiasm about the interaction” (Gelfand et al., 2006: 439).  By 
contrast, interest-based tactics focus on positions or interests, and include tactics such as 
threats, warnings, and misrepresenting one’s own positions.   
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Research has shown that the Chinese place more emphasis on harmony, social 
conformity and social tradition than Americans do; in contrast, Americans place more 
emphasis on self enhancement or self direction than the Chinese do (Liu et al., 2007; 
Morris et al., 1998).  Consequently, in the Chinese culture, tactics that focus on 
relationship building and interpersonal relatedness are regarded as influential and 
effective; whereas in American culture, tactics that promote individual benefits and 
uniqueness are viewed as powerful.  For example, when rating the effectiveness of 
advertisement, Americans viewed an advertising message that highlighted personal 
uniqueness more appealing than one that emphasized interpersonal relatedness, whereas 
the Chinese showed a reverse judgment (Aaker & Schmitt, 2001).  Similarly, in conflict 
resolution, while the Chinese believe that an avoiding style is appropriate, Americans 
believe that a competing or self-interested style is appropriate (Friedman et al., 2006; 
Morris et al., 1998; Tinsley & Pillutla, 1998).  Moreover, negotiators from collectivistic 
cultures (e.g., Greek) were found to be less likely to use tactics such as claiming value for 
self, threats, warnings, comparisons, and putdowns than were those from individualistic 
cultures (e.g., American) (Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999).  Therefore, it is proper to 
infer that Chinese negotiators are more likely to use relationship-based tactics than 
American negotiators.   
Hypothesis 1b: Chinese negotiators are more likely to use relationship-based 
tactics than American negotiators.   
 
In summary, according to existing literature, I have identified two knowledge 
constructs that may reflect chronic accessibility differences between Chinese and 
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American negotiators.  Generally, Chinese negotiators are more likely to take a 
relationship-oriented approach, whereas American negotiators are more likely to take a 
self-centered approach.  Specifically, Chinese negotiators may have a higher level of 
chronic accessibility to the relationship negotiation frame and to relationship-based 
tactics. 
However, like most previous studies, the aforementioned predictions focus on the 
main effects of culture.   From a dynamic constructivist view of culture, it is hard to 
predict whether these chronically accessible constructs would be activated in negotiation 
without considering situational factors (Morris & Fu, 2001; Morris & Gelfand, 2004).  
Particularly, we do not know whether negotiators are motivated to use those constructs or 
whether those constructs are applicable to particular negotiation contexts.  In the 
following section, I will examine how accountability and group membership (ingroup vs. 
outgroup) interact with culture in affecting negotiation. 
 
Culture and Accountability 
Accountability requires negotiators to justify the negotiation processes and 
outcomes to constituents, who have the power to allocate rewards to negotiators 
(Carnavale et al., 1981).   In order to gain social approval from constituents, negotiators 
are motivated to achieve what constituents would like to get out from negotiation (Pruitt 
& Carnevale, 1993).  When there is a clear understanding about constituent preferences, 
representatives usually behave accordingly in negotiation (Benton & Druckman, 1974; 
Ben-Yoav and Pruitt, 1984a; Carnavale et al., 1981).   However, if there is no clear 
information about constituent preferences, negotiators will encounter an ambiguous 
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condition with high accountability pressure.  What should negotiators do in such a 
condition? 
Culture provides accessible knowledge for people to make sense of surrounding 
environments.  Cultural knowledge is collective knowledge shared within cultural groups 
(Chiu & Hong, 2006).  More importantly, from the dynamic constructivist view of culture, 
cultural knowledge is activated when people have a strong need to overcome ambiguity 
(e.g., Chiu et al., 2000) or when they are required to report to cultural group members 
(e.g., Briley et al., 2000; Gelfand & Realo, 1999).   The shared meanings that culture 
offers are sources of epistemic certainty and social approval.  Applying this argument to 
negotiation, some scholars propose that in lack of knowledge of constituents’ preferences, 
negotiators would follow culturally typical patterns when under accountability pressure 
(Gelfand & Realo, 1999; Morris & Gelfand, 2004).  There is evidence that supports this 
prediction. 
In the American culture, negotiations are genearlly regarded as competitive games 
(Gelfand & McCusker, 2002).  Thus, negotiation is framed as competitive or interest-
oriented. Without knowing constituents’ preferences, American negotiators were apt to 
assume that their constituents are anxious to win (Gruder, 1971).  Probably due to this 
shared conception of negotiation as competition in Western cultures, many studies have 
reported the accountability-contention link in these cultures (e.g., Carnevale et al., 1981).   
In other words, accountability would intensify the self-centered orientation in negotiation 
for American negotiators.   
However, in other cultures, accountability may strengthen different orientations in 
negotiation because different cultural groups may adopt distinct social norms in social 
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interactions.  For example, when constituents’ preferences were not clear, negotiators 
surveilled by female constituents were less contentious during negotiation than those 
watched by male constituents (Pruitt et al., 1986).  This finding probably results from the 
commonly held belief that females prefer relationship-orientation in social interactions 
more than males.  Another recent study conducted by Gelfand and Realo (1999) provided 
further evidence that the influence of accountability on negotiation depends on culture.  
Using two samples of American and Estonian students, Gelfand and Realo (1999) found 
that when constituents’ preferences were unknown, collectivistic negotiators were more 
likely to concede, cooperate, and achieve more joint gains in high accountability 
conditions than in low accountability conditions; by contrast, individualistic negotiators 
were more likely to compete and achieve less joint gains in high accountability 
conditions than in low accountability conditions.  These examples suggest that 
accountability may intensify the culturally typical patterns in negotiation.   
By the same token, the cultural difference between the relationship-oriented 
negotiation approach of the Chinese and the self-centered approach of Americans may be 
exacerbated in high accountability conditions.  Specifically, when Chinese negotiators are 
required to report and justify negotiation processes and outcomes, they may interpret 
constituents’ preferences as relationship-oriented, and become more relationship-oriented 
in negotiation.  In contrast, in the same condition, American negotiators tend to interpret 
constituents’ preferences as interest-focused, so that they may become more interest-
focused during negotiations.    
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Hypothesis 2a: Accountability moderates the impact of culture on negotiation frame, 
such that: Chinese-American differences in relationship negotiation frame will be 
larger in high accountability conditions than in low accountability conditions.  
Hypothesis 2b: Accountability moderates the impact of culture on the use of 
relationship-based tactics during negotiation, such that: Chinese-American 
differences in using relationship-based tactics will be larger in high accountability 
conditions than in low accountability conditions. 
 
Culture and Group Membership 
According to the applicability principle of knowledge activation (Higgins, 1996; 
Hong et al., 2003; Wong & Hong, 2005), culturally typical tendencies may be activated, 
or dampened, by the group membership of the other party in social interaction (i.e. 
whether the other party is an ingroup or outgroup member).   
Ingroup members are usually connected with common traits, common goals, 
common fate, or the presence of an external threat; whereas outgroup members are those 
with whom one has no connection, or are those with whom one does not share common 
goals or common fate (Campbell, 1958; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Triandis, 1989).  
Research indicates that compared with individualists, collectivists feel more obligated to 
the needs of ingroup members and ingroup harmony, and so they tend to be cooperative 
with ingroup members (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1972, 1989; Yamagishi, 
2003).  In contrast, individualists construe themselves as unique and autonomous 
individuals that are distinct from others, no matter whether those others are ingroup or 
outgroup members (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  They tend to focus on self enhancement 
64 
 
and self interest, while feel less sense of duty toward ingroup members. Although they do 
make distinctions between ingroup and outgroup members (Messick & Mackie, 1989), 
the boundary between ingroups and outgroups is much fuzzier for individualists than for 
collectivists (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).   In other words, “the ingroup-outgroup 
distinction determines social behavior more strongly in collectivist than in individualist 
cultures” (Triandis, 1989: 517).   
In addition, empirical evidence suggests that compared with Westerners, the 
Chinese are more likely to corporate with with ingroup members; but when dealing with 
outgroup members, the Chinese did not differ from the Westerners (Chen & Li, 2005; 
Wong & Hong, 2005).  For example, in a rewards allocation experiment, Leung and 
Bond (1984) found that Chinese subjects followed equality rules when their own 
performance was high and the recipient was a friend, whereas Americans subjects 
followed equity rules in the same situation.  That is, the Chinese were more likely than 
Americans to sacrifice their own interests for those of ingroup members.  But when the 
recipient was a stranger, the Chinese were more inclined to follow equity rules than were 
Americans.   
In mixed-motive games, both Chen and Li (2005) and Wong and Hong (2005) 
found that when partners were ingroup members, the Chinese (or biculturals primed by 
the Chinese cues) were more likely than Westerners (or biculturals primed by the 
American cues) to take cooperative strategies. When interacting with outgroup members, 
participants from either Chinese or Western cultures (or biculturals primed in the cultural 
cues) exhibited similarly low levels of cooperation.   
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The theoretical discussion and empirical evidence listed above suggest that 
Chinese negotiators may follow distinct social rules in interacting with ingroups as 
opposed to outgroups, whereas American negotiators may follow relatively similar social 
rules in interacting with others, no matter who they are (ingroups or outgroups).  
Particularly, when the other party is an ingroup, Chinese negotiators may feel more 
obligated than American negotiators to meet the demands of that ingroup member. 
However, when the other party is an outgroup member, Chinese negotiators and 
American negotiators tend to be similarly less relationship-oriented.  Accordingly, I 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3a: Group membership moderates the impact of culture on negotiation 
frame, such that: Chinese-American differences in relationship negotiation frame will 
be larger when the other party in the negotiation is an ingroup member rather than 
an outgroup member.  
Hypothesis 3b: Group membership moderates the impact of culture on the use of 
relationship-based tactics during negotiation, such that: Chinese-American 
differences in using relationship-based tactics will be larger when the other party in 
the negotiation is an ingroup member rather than an outgroup member. 
 
The above discussion about group membership reveals that the Chinese follow 
very different social norms in interacting with ingroups rather than outgroups.  In 
predicting the effects of accountability on negotiation (Hypotheses 2a and 2b), however, 
the distinction between ingroups and outgroups was not taken into consideration.  Since 
accountability and group membership are two important social contextual factors in 
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which negotiators are embedded (Gelfand & Cai, 2004; Wall & Blum, 1991, see Figure 
1.1), it is thus important to examine them together.   
 
Culture, Accountability, and Group Membership 
The dynamic constructivist view contends that if cultural knowledge is not 
applicable to a particular context, then that cultural knowledge would not be used (Chiu 
& Hong, 2006; Wong & Hong, 2005).  As discussed before, when the other party is an 
outgroup member, both the Chinese and Westerners tend to be competitive in mixed-
motive games (Chen & Li, 2005), to be self-interested in rewards allocation (Leung & 
Bond, 1984), and to act contentiously in conflict resolutions (Derlega et al., 2002; Leung, 
1988).   A social norm-based interpretation of these findings is that the Chinese are not 
supposed to employ a relational or cooperative approach in dealing with outgroup 
members.   In fact, the Chinese are even expected to compete with outgroup members 
(Hwang, 1987; Yang, 1993).  Applying this logic to negotiation, I argue that for Chinese 
negotiators, just as for American negotiators, the relationship-oriented negotiation 
approach is not applicable when the other party is from an outgroup. In other words, 
negotiators, no matter whether they are from Chinese or American culture, are expected 
to take a self-centered approach when negotiating with outgroups (Hypothesis 3a and3b).   
With this in mind, it is easy to imagine that accountability would bolster self 
orientation and competition for both Chinese and American negotiators when negotiating 
with outgroup members.  That is to say, when negotiating with outgroup members under 
high accountability conditions, Chinese and American negotiators would have similar 
negotiation frame and use similar negotiation tactics. Thus, there would be not much 
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cultural differences under high accountability conditions when the other party is an 
outgroup member.   
 
The dynamic would be different when negotiators interact with an ingroup 
member under high accountability conditions.  As argued above, in the Chinese culture 
when the other party is an ingroup member, the social norms strongly encourage 
cooperation (Chen & Li, 2005; Wong & Hong, 2005), needs accommodation (Leung & 
Bond, 1984), and harmony in social interactions (Leung, 1988).  In American culture, 
although people generally treat ingroups better than outgroups (e.g., Kramer & Brewer, 
1984), such a distinction is weak (e.g., Thompson, 1991), especially in business settings 
(Sanchez-Burks, 2005).  It is therefore reasonable to infer that taking a relational 
approach when negotiating with ingroup members is a stronger social norm in the 
Chinese culture than in the American culture.  Since accountability can reinforce social 
norms, Chinese negotiators, when negotiating with ingroup members, may be more likely 
than American negotiators to take a relationship-orientated approach. 
Previous research suggests that collectivists are more likely than individualists to 
view negotiation as the opportunity to strengthen relationships (Gelfand et al., 2006), 
especially with ingroups.  In contrast, individualists are more likely than collectivists to 
view negotiations as win-lose situations (Gelfand & McCusker, 2002). As a consequence, 
the Chinese are more likely to interpret constituents’ preferences as relationship oriented, 
whereas Americans are more likely to view constituents’ preferences as competition 
oriented (Gruder, 1971).  For this reason, American negotiators under high accountability 
conditions are less likely than Chinese negotiators to take a relationship-oriented 
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approach because they may view the other party as a threat, even when the other party is 
from ingroup.   
For example, researchers show that although in general Americans show more 
benevolent attitudes toward ingroups than outgroups (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986), such 
ingroup favoritism is contingent upon whether the group membership could enhance 
one’s self-image (Chen et al., 1998).  When ingroups perform poorly, Americans show 
less ingroup favoritism than when ingroups perform well (Chen et al., 1998; Crocker & 
Luhtanen, 1990; Seta & Seta, 1992, 1996).  In other words, Americans tend to 
psychologically keep at a distance from a group membership when such a group 
membership threatens their own self-image.  By contrast, the Chinese are less motivated 
by the desire for personal self-enhancement; they tend to maintain ingroup favoritism 
regardless of the performance of ingroup members (Chen et al., 1998).   
The above discussion suggests that when negotiating with ingroup members under 
high accountability conditions, Chinese negotiators are motivated to take a relationship-
orientated approach, whereas American negotiators may be motivated to take a self-
centered approach.  Thus, the differences between Chinese and American negotiators on 
negotiation frame and negotiation tactics would be exacerbated when the other party is an 
ingroup member and when negotiators are under high accountable conditions. 
Taking these together, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 4a: Both group membership and accountability moderate the impact of 
culture on relationship negotiation frame, such that: the predicted differential impact 
of accountability by Chinese and Americans on relationship negotiation frame will 
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exist when the other party in the negotiation is an ingroup member, but not when the 
other party is an outgroup member.  
Hypothesis 4b: Both group membership and accountability moderate the impact of 
culture on relationship-based tactics, such that: the predicted differential impact of 
accountability by Chinese and Americans on using relationship-based tactics will 
exist when the other party in the negotiation is an ingroup member, but not when the 
other party is an outgroup member. 
I have proposed that two important facets of negotiation processes, relationship 
negotiation frame and relationship-based tactics, are influenced by culture, accountability, 
group membership of the other party, and their interactions.   Specifically, the Chinese-
American difference in taking a relationship approach would be intensified when they 
negotiate with an ingroup member under high accountability conditions.  Related to this, 
the next critical question is how a relationship-oriented negotiation processes may in turn 
influence negotiation outcomes, including cognitive, economic, and social psychological 
outcomes.    
 
Relationship Approach and Negotiation Outcomes 
Cognitive Outcome: Fixed-pie Perceptions 
The most important feature of integrative negotiation is that negotiators’ interests 
are not completely opposite to each other because they usually have different priorities 
such that they can create joint gains by making trade-offs.  However, people often fail to 
realize trade-off opportunities in integrative negotiations (Thompson & Hastie, 1990).  
One classic example was given by Follett (1940): two sisters quarreled over an orange, 
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and finally they decided to cut the orange into half —one sister drank the juice and threw 
the peel away, and the other used the peel and threw the juice away.   
The belief that the other party’s interest is directly opposite to one’s own is called 
fixed-pie perceptions (Thompson & Hastie, 1990).  In one empirical study, Thompson 
and Hastie (1990) found that most negotiators held such perceptions at the beginning of 
negotiation but they could adjust such biased perceptions after they exchanged 
information about each other’s priorities during negotiation.   
On first thought, negotiators who take a relationship approach would exchange 
information more honestly, such that it is easier for them than for those who take a self-
centered approach to reduce the fixed-pie perceptions.  However, existing literature 
implies that the opposite may be true— negotiators who take a relationship approach may 
be less likely than those who take a self-centered approach to reduce fixed-pie 
perceptions. Three plausible theoretical explanations could account for such an argument. 
First, according to the dual-concern model (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), negotiation 
strategies can be categorized into four types based on two dimensions: negotiators’ 
concern about self interests and their concern about the other party’s interests. The four 
strategies are problem-solving (when both dimensions are high), forcing (when self-
concern is high but concern for the other party is low), accommodating (when self-
concern is low, but concern for the other party is high), and avoiding (when both 
dimensions are low).  In particular, negotiators with a relationship-orientation are very 
likely to take the accommodating strategy in negotiation.  Rather than appearing selfish 
and focusing on their interests, they tend to put high value on the other party’s interests 
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Gelfand et al., 2006). For example, one study conducted by 
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Morgan and Sawyer (1967) reported that non-friends usually required mutual benefits 
when allocating awards, whereas one side of friends was willing to take less awards and 
give the other party high awards.    While accommodating strategy may avoid the hassle 
and tense in negotiation, negotiators may also be unable to exchange useful information 
to make trade-offs, thus failing to adjust fixed-pie perceptions (Fry et al., 1983).    
Second, consonant with the predictions of the dual concern model, negotiators 
with relationship-orientation are less aggressive in providing opening offers, and are less 
likely to make aggressive counteroffers (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Liu, Friedman, & Chi, 
2005). They tend to accommodate the other party’s needs too quickly to fully exchange 
integrative information. 
Third, negotiators who take a relationship approach may care too much about 
building or maintaining a good relationship with the other party, so that they are 
distracted from the problem-solving in negotiation (Fry et al., 1983).  Given the time 
limit in negotiation, the more time is devoted to relationship building, the less time is 
devoted to problem-solving.  So negotiators with a relationship focus may be ineffective 
in reducing fixed-pie bias.   
In summary, I posit that there is a positive connection between the relationship 
approach in negotiation and fixed-pie perceptions.  Given the research focus of this 
dissertation, I further extend this discussion to investigate cross-cultural differences on 
fixed-pie perceptions.  I have proposed in last section that (1) there would be not much 
cultural difference between Chinese and American negotiators in taking a relationship-
oriented approach when the other party is an outgroup member, and (2) the differences 
between Chinese and American negotiators on taking a relationship-oriented approach 
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would be exacerbated when the other party is an ingroup member and when negotiators 
are under high accountable conditions.   Combining those predictions and the discussions 
about the relationship approach and fixed-pie perceptions, I propose:  
Hypothesis 5a: There is no difference in fixed-pie perceptions between Chinese and 
American negotiators when they negotiate with an outgroup member, no matter 
whether the accountability is high or low. 
Hypothesis 5b: There is no difference in fixed-pie perceptions between Chinese and 
American negotiators when they negotiate with an ingroup member under low 
accountability conditions.   But in high accountability/ingroup conditions, the fixed-
pie perceptions of Chinese negotiators will be greater than those of American 
negotiators.  
 
Economic Outcome: Joint Gain 
When negotiators can accurately perceive the integrative potential between each 
party, they are very likely to make trade-offs to capitalize such potential.  Under such 
conditions, each party can create values without jeopardizing the other party’s interests.  
On the contrary, when negotiators believe their own interests are opposite to the other 
party’s (fixed-pie perceptions), it is hard for them to create value by making trade-offs.  
Several empirical studies have provided evidence supporting the negative relationship 
between fixed-pie perceptions and joint gain in negotiation (De Dreu et al., 2000; 
Thompson & Hastie, 1990).  Several other empirical studies indirectly suggest that 
relationship-orientation may hinder the creation of joint gains.  In an integrative 
negotiation study, Fry et al. (1983) compared 74 dating couples and 32 mixed-sex 
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stranger dyads in the United States, finding that dating couples made lower joint gain 
than did stranger dyads.  The researchers attributed the lower joint gain of the dating 
couples to their concern about protecting the relationship.  This finding is also consistent 
with a study reported by Tenbrunsel and colleagues (1999), who found that negotiators 
with strong social ties made suboptimal arrangements in negotiation.   
Based on the logic in Hypotheses 5a and 5b and existing evidence, I propose: 
Hypothesis 6a: There is no difference in joint gain by Chinese and American 
negotiators when they negotiate with an outgroup member, no matter whether the 
accountability is high or low. 
Hypothesis 6b: There is no difference in joint gain by Chinese and American 
negotiators when they negotiate with an ingroup member under low accountability 
conditions.   But in high accountability/ingroup conditions, Chinese will achieve 
lower joint gain than do American negotiators. 
 
Social Psychological Outcome: Relational Capital 
Negotiation outcomes include not only cognitive judgments and economic 
payoffs, but also social psychological outcomes, such as evaluation of economic outcome, 
of the negotiation process, of self as a negotiator, and of the relationship with the other 
party (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; McGinn, 2006).  Negotiation is usually not a one-
shot game, but a social interaction setting up a stage for long-term relationship.  Due to 
the importance of relationship in negotiation, some scholars even argue that the building 
and/or the maintenance of a relationship, but not economic gains, is the key purpose of 
business negotiations (e.g., Salacuse, 1998). In this dissertation, I focus on relational 
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capital, which is defined as negotiators’ “mutual liking, knowledge, trust, and 
commitment to continuing the relationship” (Gelfand et al., 2006: p437).    
As discussed above, when negotiators take a relationship-oriented approach to 
negotiation, they tend to pay attention to relationship development with the other party, 
take the other party’s needs into consideration, and use relationship-based tactics during 
interactions.  That is, in relationship-oriented processes, negotiators place positive value 
on each other’s benefits (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Rabin, 1993), thus developing a 
reciprocity norm between two parties.  As a consequence, negotiators who are 
relationship-oriented are likely to build up more relational capital after negotiation.     
Again, since the relationship orientation is contingent upon social context, I propose that: 
Hypothesis 7a: After negotiating with an outgroup member, Chinese negotiators have 
similar relational capital as American negotiators, no matter whether the 
accountability is high or low.   
Hypothesis 7b: There is no difference on relational capital between Chinese and 
American negotiators when they negotiate with an ingroup member under low 
accountability conditions.   But in high accountability/ingroup conditions, Chinese 
will have more relational capital than American negotiators. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Different research methods have been employed in negotiation research, with 
their own strengths and shortcomings respectively.  Specifically, ethnographic research 
can be used to probe the rich details of social interactions but is less potent in identifying 
causal relationships.  On the other hand, laboratory experiment is better at simulating 
cognitive processes and pinpointing causality but at the cost of losing sight of social 
contexts (Tetlock, 1992).  Some researchers have struck a middle ground that balances 
these two approaches by incorporating social settings into laboratory studies (Pepitone, 
1976; Tetlock, 1992).  I took such a promising approach in this dissertation.   
Two sets of experiments were conducted to test the hypotheses presented in 
Chapter 3.  Study 1 was an intracultural comparative study.  Chinese and American 
negotiators were compared under four different social conditions, with varying degrees of 
of accountability (high or low) and different group membership of the other party 
(ingroup or outgroup). It was a 2 (Culture: Chinese or American) X 2 (Accountability: 
Low or high) X 2 (Group membership: Ingroup or outgroup) factorial design.  Study 2 
compared intracultural negotiations with intercultural negotiations, with variations in 
accountability (high vs. low).   It was a 3 (Condition: Chinese-Chinese, Chinese-
American, or American-American) X 2 (Accountability: Low or high) factorial design.  
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Study 1—Intracultural Negotiation 
The purpose of study 1 is to compare Chinese and American intracultural 
negotiations in different social situations.  It is an intracultural comparative study because 
in all of these conditions, participants negotiated with a person from the same culture. 
 
Design and participants 
The design was a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial, with culture (Chinese vs. American), 
accountability (high vs. low), and the other party’s group membership (ingroup vs. 
outgroup) as between-dyads factors.  Dependent variables include relationship 
negotiation frame, relationship-based negotiation tactics, fixed-pie perceptions, joint gain, 
and relational capital. 
I invited 242 undergraduate students (124 from China, and 118 from the U.S.) to 
participate this study.  Students in China were from Sun Yat-Sen University in 
Guangzhou, Guangdong; while the American students were from Vanderbilt University 
in Nashville, Tennessee.  Participants were recruited through posts at online bulletin 
board system, flyers on campus, or notices at psychological pool.  Each participant was 
paid $5 dollars for participation.   
 
Negotiation Task 
 An integrative negotiation task used in a previous study (Gelfand & Realo, 1999) 
was modified to serve the purpose of this study (see details in manipulations).  The 
negotiation was about a brochure printing contract.  In order to meet a client’s urgent 
demand for advertising brochures, two managers, one from the Client Services Division 
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and the other from the Production Division, need to reach agreements on how to print 
those brochures.  The negotiation involves four issues: (a)the quality of paper used in 
printing advertising brochures; (b) how many copies of brochures would be printed; (c) 
how many pages with color in each brochure would be printed; and (d) when the bill 
needs to be paid.   
Each participant received a separate payoff schedule (see Appendix A).  For each 
of the four issues, there are five alternatives that negotiators could choose, and each 
alternative represents certain values for negotiators (in terms of points).  As shown, 
among the four issues, two (paper quality and the number of color pages) were 
distributive issues (i.e., one party’s gain is the other party’s loss), on which buyers and 
sellers had perfectly opposite interests.  Integrative potential was present for the other two 
issues (i.e., the number of copies and the billing date).  For the buyers, the most profitable 
issue was the number of copies and the least profitable issue was the billing date; whereas 
for the sellers, the most profitable issue was the billing date and the least profitable issue 
was the number of copies.  If negotiators could trade the least profitable issue for the 
most profitable issue, they can both create higher values than just taking the middle 
points on the two issues. 
 Failure to reach an agreement would result in zero points for each negotiation 
party. In addition, in order to motivate negotiators, participants were told that the points 
they earned from negotiation would be translated into real money— earned points 
divided by1000.   
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Manipulations 
Manipulation of Group Membership 
One of the most popular methods to manipulate group membership is the minimal 
group paradigm (Tajfel, 1970), in which researchers randomly and arbitrarily assign 
participants into different groups with clear but fake boundaries (e.g., Kramer & Brewer, 
1984; Thompson, 1993).  Although such a method is convenient and effective in many 
cases, past cross-cultural research suggests that people from collectivistic culture (such as 
the Chinese culture) define ingroup/outgroup more on a relational or similarity base 
rather than in terms of mere categorical memberships (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Chen et al., 
1998; Earley, 1993).  Therefore, some scholars suggest using a modified version of 
minimal group paradigm in cross-cultural research (cf. Chen et al., 1998; Wright et al., 
1997), which combines multiple ways to make group boundaries salient.  Study 1 
followed this suggestion.   
Several procedures were used together to induce a sense of ingroup/outgroup 
boundary.  First, rather than being randomly assigned into fake categories, participants 
were led to believe that they were assigned into different groups based on their social 
networks, personalities and hobbies (Chen et al., 1998; see details in procedures 
described below).  Second, to make the boundary of groups clear, participants were 
seated with their group fellows but away from participants in the other group, and the two 
groups used stationery with distinct colors (red vs. blue).  Third, before negotiations, 
participants finished a brainstorming task with fellow group members, which was 
expected to reinforce the boundary between groups (Wright et al., 1997).  Finally, the 
distinction between ingroup and outgroup was highlighted in the negotiation 
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arrangements (Thompson, 1991).  Participants in the ingroup conditions negotiated with a 
person from their own group.  By contrast, participants in the outgroup conditions 
negotiated with a person from the other group.   
Manipulation of Accountability 
Following previous studies (Carnevale et al., 1981; Gelfand & Realo, 1999), I 
used two procedures to manipulate accountability.  First, in the high accountability 
conditions, participants wrote a report to their division managers after the negotiation to 
justify their negotiation processes and outcomes.  A reporting form was included in their 
negotiation packages.  Participants in the low accountability conditions did not do so.  
Second, participants in the high accountability conditions were told that their “managers” 
would evaluate reports, and allocate rewards based on those reports and negotiation 
results.   By contrast, participants in the low accountability conditions were told that their 
managers would not evaluate the performance, the negotiation processes and outcomes 
were confidential, and their gains from the negotiation are independent of managers’ 
judgments. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were invited to the lab in groups of eight people each.  The 
experimental procedures are depicted in Figure 4.1 and the logistical arrangements are 
described in Figure 4.2. 
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FIGURE 4.1 
Procedures in Study 1     
Step 2: 
Personality survey 
Step 3: 
Grouping, and 
Role Instructions 
Step 4: 
Group Brainstorming 
Task 
 
Step 5: 
Draw a Lot to 
“Decide” the Role 
Step 7: 
Negotiation 
Step 8: 
Post-negotiation 
Survey 
Step 9: 
Debrief 
Step 6: 
Negotiation Scenarios and 
Pre-negotiation Survey 
Step 1: 
Grouping Survey 
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   Connotations:  
   1 (or 2,…8): Person number 
 
                 Service Division                                 Production Division      
                 Red Star Advertising                     Blue Sky Advertising 
FIGURE 4.2 
Logistical Arrangements in Study 1   
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Logistic Arrangement: 
Step 1 & 2: 8 participants were seated in Room A, filling out a grouping survey and a personality survey . 
Step 3 & 4: Grouping was done.  Each color (blue or red) represents a company (Blue Sky or Red Star), each shape (square or circle) 
represents a division (customer services or production), and a number refers to a person.  For example, the role of Person 1 is: an 
employee working for the Customer Services Division in Blue Sky Advertising.  
Step 5-8: Negotiation pairs are formed.  In the in-group condition, all 8 participants negotiate with an employee working for another 
division but in the same company.  For example, Person 1 negotiates with Person 3, an employee working for the Production Division 
at Blue Sky Advertising.  In the out-group condition, all 8 participants negotiate with an employee working for another division in 
another company.  For example, Person 1 negotiates with Person 5, an employee working for the Production Division at Red Star 
Advertising. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.2 (Continue) 
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Step 1. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were asked to fill in a short 
grouping survey.  There are two sections in this survey: in the first section, each 
participant was asked to report his (or her) own major and hobbies, and the majors and 
hobbies of his (or her) three best friends on campus; in the second section there were 
twelve attitude items, which were taken from a short need-for-closure survey (Neuberg, 
Judice, & West, 1997, see Appendix B for specific items). 
Step 2. When waiting period for grouping decisions, participants filled out another 
survey, which contained several personality scales, including allocentrism-idiocentrism 
(Triandis, 1994), self monitoring (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986), and social orientation 
(Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997).   
Step 3. The experimenter announced the grouping decision, which was claimed to 
be based on participants’ similarities in personalities, social networks, and hobbies 
information collected in Step 1.  Participants were actually randomly divided into two 
groups, each having 4 members.  To further highlight the group boundary, participants 
were asked to sit with fellow group members, but far away from members of the other 
group (cf. Thompson, 1993). Then they spent a couple of minutes introducing themselves 
to their fellow group members.  At the same time, the experimenter gave every 
participant a company tag, a pen with color (either red or blue), and role instructions.   
Each participant was informed by the role instruction that s/he was working with 
three group members in an advertising company. Two of them worked in the service 
division and two of them in the production division.  Participants also learned that the 
other four participants sitting far away (the other group) were employees working for 
another advertising company.  Participants were told that the two companies were 
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different from each other in terms of management philosophy, HR policies, and employee 
orientations, and the two companies never interacted with each other before.   
Step 4. After reading the role instructions, participants then spent 10 minutes with 
fellow group members on a brainstorming task, which was about how to categorize 
twelve common fruits (Choi & Thompson, 2004). Each group was asked to create as 
many categorization criteria as possible. The purpose of this task was claimed to compare 
the creativity of the two groups, while its real purpose was to further stress the boundary 
between the two groups (c.f., Wright et al., 1997).   
Step 5. After the brainstorming task, participants learned from further instructions 
that there would be a negotiation task, and that the two members working for the same 
division in the same company needed to draw a lottery to decide which role they would 
play: a negotiation representative or a manager. The lot itself did not directly tell 
participants their roles. There was only a number on the lot: either number “1” or number 
“2.”  If participants drew lot number “1,” they were told to stay at the original room, and 
if it was “2,” they were sent to another room.  After all participants finished drawing the 
lot, group members were separated, and sent to different rooms, with their pens and 
company tags.   
Step 6. Participants then were paired with their negotiation partners in different 
rooms, but they were not allowed to talk to each other until the negotiation started.  The 
experimenter gave each participant a folder (red or blue), which contained a negotiation 
scenario and a pre-negotiation survey.  Every participant was told that s/he was the 
negotiation representative while the other member in the same division was her/his 
manager (c.f., Gelfand & Realo, 1999). Participants in the ingroup conditions were paired 
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with a member from another division of the same advertising company. The scenario said 
that a client contacted the service division of the company for printing more brochures, so 
the service division needed to negotiate with the production division about how to print 
out those brochures.  In contrast, participants in the outgroup conditions were paired with 
a member from another advertising company.  The scenario told them that a client of one 
advertising company requested more brochures.  But due to the full capacity of 
production, that company needed to negotiate with another company about how to print 
out those brochures. 
In addition, participants in the high accountability conditions were told that they 
needed to write a report to their managers after negotiation, and their managers would 
reward them based on the report; whereas participants in the low accountability 
conditions were told that the negotiation process and outcome were confidential, and had 
nothing to do with the actual rewards they could get.    
Step7. After reading the negotiation scenario, participants filled out a pre-
negotiation survey, which included items of manipulation checks, negotiator’s 
relationship frame, and fixed-pie perceptions before negotiation, expectations of 
negotiation atmosphere, and expectations of the other party.  Then pairs negotiated with a 
time limit of 30 minutes.  The whole negotiation process was audio-taped. 
Step 8. After negotiation, participants filled out a post-negotiation survey, which 
contained items of relationship-based tactics, fixed-pie perceptions after negotiation, 
relational capital, evaluation of negotiation atmosphere, evaluation of the other party, and 
Schwartz’s (1992) cultural value scale.   
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Step 9. Lastly, participants were debriefed.  Each participant was rewarded the 
same amount of money ($5 U.S. dollars) after debriefing. 
 
Measures  
Relationship Negotiation Frame.  Participants’ relationship negotiation frame was 
measured by a 5-item scale in the pre-negotiation survey. The scale was created based on 
previous literature on negotiation frame (Pinkley, 1990; Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994) and 
on relational self in negotiation (Gelfand et al., 2006).  The items include: “It is important 
for me to develop good relationship with the other party;” “I do not care much about 
relation development with the other party (reverse);” “I hope to develop good relationship 
with the other party via negotiation;” “I do not think that relationship should be a focus 
during negotiation (reverse);” and “I am willing to adjust my behavior to foster good 
relationship with the other party during negotiation.”  As some researchers suggest that 
Chinese respondents tend to exhibit the central tendency bias (e.g., Hui, Lee, & Rousseau, 
2004), we used a 6-point scale focusing respondent attention away from the scale’s mid-
point (i.e., “neither agree nor disagree”).  As a result, the survey items were on six-point 
response format ranging from 1, “strongly disagree,” to 6, “strongly agree.”  
I conducted factor analysis for both the Chinese sample and the American sample 
to check the reliability of this new scale.  For each sample, I firstly randomly selected 
half of the cases to conduct exploratory factor analysis (the extracting method was 
principle components, and the rotation method was varimax).  The results showed that 
the five items loaded on a single scale for both the Chinese random sub-sample (the 
proportion of variance explained by the extracted factor was 48.75%) and the American 
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random sub-sample (the proportion of variance explained by the extracted factor was 
46.75%).  Then the other half of the cases in each sample was submitted to confirmatory 
factor analysis with a single-factor model.    The results showed satisfactory fit index for 
both the Chinese random sub-sasmple (χ2=9.48, df=5, CFI=.98, NNFI=.96, SRMR=.03) 
and the American random sub-sample (χ2=10.06, df=5, CFI=.93, NNFI=.90, SRMR=.05).  
In addition, all loadings of each item on the factor were significant and above .50 for both 
sub-samples.  Therefore, the mean of the five items was calculated as the measure of 
relationship frame.  The Cronbach’s Alpha for the overall sample was .80.  The scale also 
had satisfactory reliability statistics for both Chinese (Cronbach’s Alpha=.83) and 
American sub-samples (Cronbach’s Alpha=.72).  
Fixed-pie Perceptions.  Participants reported their fixed-pie perceptions twice in 
the study, once before negotiation (in the pre-negotiation survey) and once immediately 
after negotiation (in the post-negotiation survey). 
Fixed-pie perceptions were assessed in the way suggested by past research (e.g., 
De Dreu et al., 2000; Thompson & Hastie, 1990).  Participants were presented with a 
profit schedule without the points and they filled in the points they thought that the other 
party would get for each of the contract levels specified.  Participants could use their own 
profit schedules to make inferences. 
The fixed-pie perceptions were measured as the sum of deviance (absolute 
differences) between estimates of the other party’s real payoff points and negotiators’ 
estimate points on two integrative issues (copy issue and billing date issue in the current 
study).  For example, if a buyer had a perfect fixed-pie perception, and assumed that the 
seller had the exact opposite interest on the copy issue (see Appendix A), then the fixed-
88 
 
pie perception is [(4000-0) + (3000-1000) + (2000-2000) + (1000-3000) + (0-4000)]=0.  
In contrast, if a buyer does not have a fixed-pie perception, and accurately infers seller’s 
preference on the copy issue, then the fixed-pie perception is the absolute value of 
[(4000-0) + (3000-300) + (2000-600) + (1000-900) + (0-1200)]=7000.  There are two 
integrative issues, so the range of fixed-pie perceptions varies from 0 to 14000 points, 
with 0 referring to the perfect fixed-pie perceptions and 14000 referring to perfect 
integrative perceptions.  In other words, the smaller the number is, the more one has 
fixed-pie perceptions.   
Relationship-based Tactics. Past research suggests that there are two ways to 
measure negotiation tactics: coding verbal transcripts (e.g., Adair et al., 2001; Pruitt & 
Lewis, 1975), or using self- or peer-reported questionnaires (e.g., Beersma & De Dreu, 
2002; De Dreu et al., 2001).  For this dissertation, I asked all participants to self-report 
relationship-based tactics in the post-negotiation survey.   
Since none of the three existing negotiation tactics scales (Rahim Organizational 
Conflict Inventory—II, Rahim, 1983; Rahim & Magner, 1995; the Dutch Test for conflict 
handling, De Dreu et al., 2001; and a negotiation norm scale from Tinsley and Pillutla’s 
(1998) study) explicitly emphasize relationship-based tactics, I created a scale to measure 
relationship-based tactics.  Based on Gelfand et al.’s (2006) conception and existing 
relationship-based influence tactics scale (Fu et al., 2004), I create a relationship-based 
tactics scale, which includes the following items: “during negotiation, I tried to find the 
similarity between us, such as in hobbits and experience;” “I talked about irrelevant 
topics before negotiation to establish good relationship with the other party;” “I asked the 
other party to accept my offer as a personal favor;” “I persuaded the other party by 
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emphasizing my group interest;” “I tried to find similarity between us to make my request 
easier;” and “ I tried to persuade the other party by emphasizing our long-term 
relationship.”   
For the overall sample, the Cronbach’s Alpha was .63.  The scale also had 
satisfactory reliability statistics for both Chinese (Cronbach’s Alpha=.62) and American 
sample (Cronbach’s Alpha=.71).  
Joint Gain.  The joint gain was calculated as the sum of individual gains within 
each dyad. 
Relational Capital. A four-item scale proposed by Curhan and colleagues (2006) 
was used to measure negotiators’ relational capital after negotiation (see Appendix C for 
specific items).   The Cronbach’s Alpha for the overall sample was .89, and both Chinese 
(Cronbach’s Alpha=.85) and American sub-sample (Cronbach’s Alpha=.90) showed 
good reliability statistics as well.  
Cultural Value Measures. Although I do not specify the connection between 
cultural values and negotiation in this dissertation, it is beneficial to include cultural value 
measures in this study because it enables me to check whether participants in my samples 
appropriately represent their cultural categories (Brett et al., 1997).  The allocentrism-
idiocentrism scale (Triandis, 1994) has 16 items, mapping out the extent to which 
individuals focus on the interdependence with others.  This scale achieved satisfactory 
reliability for both the Chinese sample (Cronbach’s alpha=.77) and the American sample 
(Cronbach’s alpha=.76). 
Schwartz’s cultural value survey includes 57 items on 9-point scales (range from -
1 to 7).  Previous studies suggest that it has ten sub-dimensions.  The dimensions of 
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power, conformity, security, stimulation, and benevolence showed satisfactory reliability 
for both the Chinese and the American sub-samples (details below). 
 
Data Analysis and Results 
Final Sample and Characteristics 
Four students who did not finish negotiation within given time limits and eight 
students who did not report on key dependent variables were excluded from further 
analysis in this study.  The final sample size was 230 (120 from China, and 110 from the 
U.S.), and the response rate was 100%.  Table 4.1 shows the number of participants in 
each condition.  Among the 230 participants, 60% were females (54.2% of the Chinese 
sample, and 66.4% of the American sample); Chinese participants (mean age=22.72 years, 
s.d.=.88) were slightly elder than American participants (mean age=21.21 years, 
s.d.=1.48, t(229)=9.24, p<.01).  Since age was not significantly correlated with any other 
variables within either sub-sample, it was excluded from the subsequent analyses to avoid 
the confounding effect with culture.  Table 4.2 shows correlation coefficients for key 
variables in Study 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.1 
Number of Participants in Each Condition (Study 1) 
 
 Accountability 
Culture Low High 
 Outgroup  
   
American n=28 n=24 
Chinese n=30 n=30 
 Ingroup  
   
American n=26 n=32 
Chinese n=32 n=28 
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TABLE 4.2 
Correlation Coefficients between Variables (Study 1) 
 
          Variables 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Chinese  -0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.03 0.36** -0.12* -0.12* -0.36**
2. Ingroup -0.04  0.03 0.24** -0.08 0.23** 0.05 0.04 0.19* 
3. Accountability -0.04 0.02  0.07 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.06 
4. Relationship Frame 0.17* 0.35** 0.11  0.02 0.12 -0.01 -0.09 0.15* 
5. Fixed-pie Perceptions BN 0.06 -0.10 0.01 -0.06  -0.13 0.24** 0.08 0.01 
6. Relationship Tactics 0.46** 0.31** -0.05 0.27** -0.07  -0.03 -0.07 0.02 
7. Fixed-pie Perceptions PN -0.15† 0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.24** 0.01  0.33** 0.18** 
8. Economic Gains -0.18* 0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.13 -0.17* 0.57**  0.22** 
9. Relational Capital -0.43** 0.23** 0.08 0.25** 0.03 -0.13† 0.23** 0.23**  
† p<.10 * p<.05 **p<.01   one-tailed 
 
1. Correlation coefficients presented in the lower diagonal are based on dyadic-level data (N=115), while those presented in the 
upper diagonal are based on individual-level data (N=230)  
2. “Chinese” refers to the variable of “Culture”, with Chinese coded as “1”, and American coded as “0”.  “Fixed-pie perceptions 
BN” refers to fixed-pie perceptions before negotiation, whereas ‘Fixed-pie perceptions PN” refers to Fixed-pie perceptions 
post negotiation. Economic gains at the dyadic level are the joint gains, and economic gains at the individual level are 
individual gains. 
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In order to make sure that participants in this study were representative of their 
own cultures, I compared several cultural values between the Chinese and American sub-
sample.  As Table 4.3 shows, the Chinese sample displayed higher level of allocentrism 
(Mean=6.26) than the American sample (Mean=6.06); the Chinese sample placed more 
value on power (Mean=3.99), conformity (Mean=4.94), and security (Mean=5.03) than 
the American sample did (power Mean=3.38, conformity Mean=4.50, and security 
Mean=4.50), whereas the American sample emphasized stimulation (Mean=4.41) and 
benevolence (Mean=5.54) more than the Chinese sample did (stimulation Mean=4.06, 
benevolence Mean=5.09).  All of these t-tests were significant at the .05 level, and all of 
the cultural differences were consistent with findings from past research (Schwartz, 1992; 
Triandis, 1994).  Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the sampled Chinese and 
American students were representative of their own cultural groups. 
Treatment of Data 
Since all dependent variables (i.e., relationship negotiation frame, relationship-
based tactics, fixed-pie perceptions, and relational capital) except for joint gain were 
reported by individuals, it is important to check the interdependence of these variables 
before further data analysis (Kashy & Kenney, 2000), because (1) negotiation is a social 
interaction process that data from two individuals within a dyad may be correlated, and (2) 
standard statistical methods, such as ANOVA and linear multiple regressions, usually 
assume independence among observations.  
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TABLE 4.3 
Comparison of Individual-Level Cultural Values (Study 1) 
 
 American (N =110) Chinese (N = 120) t value of 
mean 
difference 
p value of 
mean 
differenceMean Cronbach’s 
α 
Mean Cronbach’s 
α 
Allocentrism 6.06 .76 6.26 .77 -2.43 <.05 
Power 3.38 .82 3.99 .70 -3.53 <.01 
Conformity 4.50 .67 4.94 .61 -3.77 <.01 
Security 4.67 .66 5.03 .77 -3.39 <.01 
Stimulation 4.41 .74 4.06 .76 1.95 .05 
Benevolence 5.54 .74 5.09 .82 4.40 <.01 
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Following Kenny and colleagues’ advice (Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006), I 
checked the intra-class correlations (ICC(1))2 for these variables. Except for two pre-
negotiation variables (relationship negotiation frame [ICC(1)=.02, F(114, 115)=1.04, 
p>.40) and fixed-pie perceptions before negotiation [ICC(1)=.12, F(114, 115)=1.27, 
p>.10)), all post-negotiation variables (relationship-based tactics (ICC(1)=.33, F(114, 
115)=1.99, p<.001), fixed-pie perceptions after negotiation (ICC(1)=.29, F(114, 
115)=1.83, p=.01), and relational capital (ICC(1)=.36, F(114, 115)=2.12, p<.001) were 
non-independent at the dyadic level.  So in the following, relationship negotiation frame 
and fixed-pie perceptions before negotiation were analyzed at the individual level, 
whereas relationship-based tactics, fixed-pie perception after negotiation, and relational 
capital were aggregated and analyzed at the dyadic level. 
 Manipulation Checks 
To make sure that the manipulation of accountability and group membership were 
sucessful, participants answered several manipulation check questions in the pre-
negotiation survey.  All those questions were on 6-point scales from 1=strongly disagree 
to 6=strongly agree. 
The accountability manipulation check questions were: (1) After negotiation, my 
manager will formally evaluate me based on the agreements I reach; (2) My manager will 
scrutinize the negotiation process after negotiation; (3) I need to justify the negotiation 
process and outcomes to my manager; and (4) I feel that my manager is more powerful 
than me. These items formed a reliable scale (for the Chinese sample, Cronbach’s 
Alpha=.82; for the American sample, Cronbach’s Alpha=.84). The average score of these 
                                                 
2 Here the intra-class correlations=[(Between-dyad variance - Within-dyad variance)/( Between-dyad 
variance + Within-dyad variance)].  It indicates the proportion of variance due to dyadic membership. 
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items for each sub-sample was submitted to a two-way ANOVA (accountability X group 
membership).  For the Chinese sample, results showed a very strong main effect of 
accountability, F(1, 116)=36.30, p<.001, η2 =.24.  Participants in the high accountability 
conditions (Mean=5.17) were significantly more inclined to believe they were held 
accountable than those in the low accountability conditions (Mean=4.01).  For the 
American sample, results showed a very strong main effect of accountability as well, F(1, 
106)=87.70, p<.001, η2 =.45.  Participants in the high accountability conditions 
(Mean=5.02) were significantly more inclined to believe they were held accountable than 
those in the low accountability conditions (Mean=3.35).  For both Chinese and American 
samples, neither group membership nor the interaction between group membership and 
accountability had any significant effects on the score.  Figure 4.3 shows the results of 
manipulation check for accountability. 
The group membership manipulation check questions were: (1) the one I will 
negotiate with is an ingroup member; (2) the one I will negotiate with is an outgroup 
member (reversed). The internal reliability of these two items were very high (for the 
Chinese sample, Cronbach’s Alpha=.91; for the American sample, Cronbach’s 
Alpha=.94). The average score of these two items for each sub-sample was submitted to a 
two-way ANOVA (accountability X group membership).   
For the Chinese sample, results showed a very strong main effect of group 
membership, F(1, 116)=91.59, p<.001, η2 =.44.  Participants in the ingroup conditions 
(Mean=4.74) were significantly more inclined than those in the outgroup conditions to 
consider the other party as an ingroup member (Mean=2.61).  
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   Chinese Sample                                                                               American Sample 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.3 
Manipulation Check of Accountability (Study 1) 
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For the American sample, results showed a very strong main effect of group 
membership as well, F(1, 106)=112.70, p<.001, η2 =.52.  Participants in the ingroup 
conditions (Mean=4.87) were significantly more inclined than those in the outgroup 
conditions to consider the other party as an ingroup (Mean=2.09).   For both Chinese and 
American samples, neither accountability nor the interaction between group membership 
and accountability had any significant effects on the score.  Figure 4.4 shows the results 
of manipulation check for group membership. 
 Relationship Negotiation Frame 
A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was conducted, with culture (Chinese vs. American), 
accountability (low vs. high), and group membership (ingroup vs. outgroup) as three 
between-subject factors and relationship negotiation frame as the dependent variable.  
Table 4.4 shows the results.   Hypothesis 1a predicts that Chinese negotiators are more 
likely than American negotiators to have a relationship negotiation frame.   There was a 
marginal main effect of culture (F(1, 222)=1.74, p=.09, η2 =.01).  A simple comparison 
confirmed that compared with American negotiators (Mean=4.57, s.d.=.72), Chinese 
negotiators had a slightly higher level of relationship frame (Mean=4.69, s.d.=.92).   
Therefore, Hypothesis 1a was marginally supported.  Hypothesis 2a predicts that 
Chinese-American differences in having a relationship negotiation frame will be larger in 
high accountability conditions than in low accountability conditions, which suggests an 
interaction effect between culture and accountability.  The ANOVA results provided 
support to such a prediction—there was a significant interaction effect between culture 
and accountability (F(1, 222)=3.14, p<.05, η2 =.01) on relationship negotiation frame.  
Figure 4.5.1 depicts such a finding.  
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FIGURE 4.4 
Manipulation Check of Group Membership (Study 1) 
100 
 
 
TABLE 4.4 
ANOVA Results for the Effects of Culture, Accountability, and Group Membership on  
Relationship Frame (Study 1) 
 
Predictors 1 Relationship Frame  
Main Effects    F df      η2 
Chinese   1.74† 1,222 .008 
Ingroup 14.40** 1,222 .061 
Accountability     .85 1,222 .004 
    
Two-Way Interactions    
Chinese X Accountability  3.14* 1,222 .014 
Chinese X Ingroup  2.75* 1,222 .012 
Ingroup X Accountability    .80 1, 222 .004 
    
Three-Way Interaction    
Chinese X Ingroup X Accountability  2.75* 1,222 .012 
R2   .11 
n   230 
 † p<.10  * p<.05  **p<.01   one-tailed 
 
Note: 1. For the variable of “Chinese”, Chinese=1, American=0; for the variable of “Ingroup”, Ingroup condition=1, Outgroup 
condition=0; for the variable of “Accountability”, High Accountability=1, Low Accountability=0. 
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FIGURE 4.5.1        FIGURE 4.5.2 
Culture X Accountability on Relationship Frame    Culture X Group Membership on Relationship Frame 
 
 
FIGURE 4.5 
Two-way Interactions on Relationship Frame (Study 1) 
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Two further split-sample t-tests demostrated that in high accountability conditions 
Chinese negotiators (mean=4.83, s.d.=.96) had a higher level of relationship negotiation 
frame than American negotiators did (mean=4.54, s.d.=.86) , t(112)=1.66, p<.05, whereas 
in low accountability conditions there was no difference between Chinese (mean=4.56, 
s.d.=.88) and American negotiators (mean=4.60, s.d.=.55) in terms of having a 
relationship negotiation frame (t(114)=.27, p>.70).  Therefore, Hypothesis 2a was 
supported.  Hypothesis 3a predicts that Chinese-American differences in having a 
relationship negotiation frame will be larger when the other party in the negotiation is an 
ingroup member rather than an outgroup member, which suggests an interaction effect 
between culture and group membership.  The ANOVA results provided support to such a 
prediction—there was a significant interaction effect between culture and group 
membership (F(1, 222)=2.75, p<.05, η2 =.01) on relationship negotiation frame.  Figure 
4.5.2 depicts such a finding.  Two further split-sample t-tests indicated that Chinese 
negotiators (mean=4.98, s.d.=.69) had a higher level of relationship negotiation frame 
than American negotiators did (mean=4.68, s.d.=.75) when negotiating with an ingroup 
member (t(116)=2.26, p<.05), whereas there was no difference between Chinese 
(mean=4.40, s.d.=1.04) and American negotiators (mean=4.45, s.d.=.68) in terms of 
having a relationship negotiation frame when the other party was an outgroup member 
(t(110)=.30, p>.70). Therefore, Hypothesis 3a was supported. 
Hypothesis 4a posits that both group membership and accountability moderate the 
impact of culture on negotiation frame, such that the predicted differential impact of 
accountability by Chinese and Americans on relationship negotiation frame exists only 
when the other party is an ingroup member, as opposed to an outgroup member.  The 
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ANOVA results, again, provided supporting evidence to such a prediction—there was a 
significant three-way interaction effect between culture, accountability and group 
membership (F(1, 222)=2.75, p<.05) on relationship negotiation frame.  Figure 4.6 
illustrates the interaction.   
To clearly demonstrate this finding, I conducted four split-sample t-tests.  In the 
low accountability/outgroup condition, American negotiators (mean=4.62, s.d.=.42) had a 
higher level of relationship frame than Chinese negotiators did (mean=4.22, s.d.=.89, 
t(56)=2.22, p<.05); whereas in the high accountability/outgroup condition, there was no 
difference between Chinese (mean=4.59, s.d.=1.16) and American negotiators 
(mean=4.26, s.d.=.86, t(52)=1.16, p>.10).   By contrast, when negotiating with an 
ingroup member under low accountability condition, Chinese negotiators (mean=4.88, 
s.d.=.75) had a marginally higher relationship frame than did American negotiators 
(mean=4.58, s.d.=.68, t(56)=1.61, p=.06); and when negotiating with an ingroup member 
under high accountability condition, such a difference became statistically more 
significant (Chinese negotiators, mean=5.09, s.d.=.60; and  American 
negotiators,mean=4.76, s.d.=.81, t(58)=1.76, p<.05). Therefore, Hypothesis 4a was 
generally supported.   
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FIGURE 4.6 
Three-way Interaction Effect on Relationship Frame (Study 1) 
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The three-way interaction effect can be understood in an alternative way.  When 
the other party is an outgroup member, American negotiators had less of a relationship 
negotiation frame under high accountability conditions (mean=4.26) than under low 
accountability conditions (mean=4.62, s.d.=.42, t(50)=1.97, p<.05).  This finding is 
consistent with previous research finding that accountability intensifies competition 
among American negotiators (e.g., Pruitt et al., 1978).  In contrast, when the other party 
is an outgroup member, Chinese negotiators had more relationship frame under high 
accountability conditions (mean=4.59, s.d.=1.16) than under low accountability 
conditions (mean=4.22, s.d.=.89, t(58)=1.38, p<.10).  Such a finding is consistent with 
the study reported by Gelfand and Realo (1999), who found that accountability made 
collectivists more cooperative.  When the other party is an ingroup member, however, 
accountability did not have significant effect on relationship frame either for American or 
for Chinese negotiators. 
Relationship-based Tactics 
Relationship-based tactics were analyzed at the dyadic level in a 2X2X2 ANOVA 
(results are shown in the first column of Table 4.5).  As Hypothesis 1b predicted, Chinese 
negotiation dyads (Mean=3.49, s.d.=.60) generally used more relationship-based tactics 
during negotiation than American dyads did (Mean=2.83, s.d.=.68), F(1, 106)=34.70, 
p<.01, η2 =.25.  In addition, there was a marginal interaction effect between culture and 
group membership on relationship-based tactics, F(1, 106)=1.87, p=.09,  η2 =.02.  A 
simple comparison revealed that given low accountability, the mean difference in using 
relationship-based tactics was .52 between Chinese dyads (Mean=3.45, s.d.=.71) and 
American dyads (Mean=2.93, s.d.=.52), t(55)=3.12, p<.01; whereas under high 
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accountability conditions, the mean difference increased to .78 between Chinese dyads 
(Mean=3.52, s.d.=.47) and American dyads (Mean=2.74, s.d.=.80), t(55)=4.50, p<.01.   
Therefore, Hypothesis 2b was marginally supported.  But there were no other significant 
interactional effects, so Hypothesis 3b and 4b were not supported by the data. 
Fixed-pie Perceptions 
The fixed-pie perceptions before negotiationwere reported in the pre-negotiation 
survey.  Recall that the higher the number is for this measure, the less fixed-pie 
perceptions one has (0 means perfectly fixed-pie perceptions, whereas 14000 means 
perfectly no bias).  Consistent with findings from past research (Thompson & Hastie, 
1990; De Dreu et al., 2000), the results suggested that negotiators in this study generally 
had relatively high fixed-pie bias before negotiation (mean=2385.98) and the variance 
was large (s.d.=3471.24).  But none of the predictors or their interactions had any 
significant effects on this variable. 
Now let us shift the focus to the fixed-pie perceptions after negotiation.  
Hypothesis 5a and 5b predicted that Chinese negotiation dyads would have more fixed-
pie perceptions after negotiation than would American dyads only under the ingroup and 
high accountability condition, but not in other conditions.  To test the existence of such a 
three-way interaction effect, I analyzed the dyadic means of fixed-pie perceptions after 
negotiation using a 2X2X2 ANOVA (results shown in the second column at Table 4.5).  
As expected, there was a significant three-way interaction effect between culture, group 
membership, and accountability, F(1, 106)=2.87, p<.05, η2 =.03.  To further illustrate this 
finding, several simple comparisons were conducted.   Table 4.6 shows the means and 
standard deviations of the fixed-pie perceptions after negotiation in each condition.     
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TABLE 4.5 
ANOVA Results for the Effects of Culture, Accountability, and Group Membership on  
Relationship-based Tactics, Fixed-pie Perceptions, and Joint Gain (Study 1) 
 
Predictors 
Relationship-based 
Tactics  
Fixed-pie 
Perceptions After 
Negotiation   Joint Gain
  F (1,106) η2   F (1,106) η2   F (1,106) η2 
Main Effects           
Chinese 34.70** 0.247   2.60† 0.024   4.12* 0.037
Ingroup 17.40** 0.141   0.34 0.003   0.23 0.002
Accountability 0.44 0.004   0.32 0.003   0.03 0.000
              
Two-Way Interactions              
Chinese X Ingroup 0.39 0.004   0.13 0.001   0.00 0.000
Chinese X Accountability 1.87† 0.017   3.08* 0.028   2.69* 0.025
Ingroup X Accountability 0.40 0.004   1.19 0.011   3.20* 0.029
            
Three-Way Interaction           
Chinese X Ingroup X 
Accountability 0.54 0.005   2.87* 0.026   2.47† 0.023
R2 0.34    0.09    0.11  
n 114    114    114  
 
† p<.10  * p<.05  **p<.01   one-tailed 
 
Note: 1. For the variable of “Chinese”, Chinese=1, American=0; for the variable of “Ingroup”, Ingroup condition=1, Outgroup 
condition=0; for the variable of “Accountability”, High Accountability=1, Low Accountability=0. 
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TABLE 4.6 
Fixed-pie Perceptions after Negotiation  
as a Function of Culture, Accountability, and Group Membership  (Study 1) 
 
 Accountability 
Culture Low High 
 Outgroup  
   
American 7500.00    (4708.15) 8004.17    (5087.66) 
Chinese 5853.33    (4397.58) 6256.67    (3973.93) 
 Ingroup  
   
American 7173.08   (5506.99) 8718.75    (4560.59) 
Chinese 9062.50    (4534.00) 4664.29    (3874.05) 
 
Note: Numbers in the parenthesis are standard deviations.
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As Hypothesis 5a predicted, when negotiating with an outgroup member under 
low accountability conditions, Chinese dyads  (Mean=5853.33, s.d.=4397.58) and 
American dyads (Mean=7500.00, s.d.= 4708.15) did not differ from each other on fixed-
pie perceptions, t(26)=.96, p>.30; and when negotiating with an outgroup member under 
high accountability conditions, Chinese dyads (Mean=6256.67, s.d.= 3973.93) and 
American dyads (Mean=8004.17, s.d.= 5087.66) did not differ either, t(25)=1.00, p>.30.   
Hypothesis 5a was supported. 
As Hypothesis 5b predicted, when negotiating with an ingroup member under low 
accountability conditions, Chinese dyads (Mean=5853.33, s.d.=4397.58) and American 
dyads (Mean=7500.00, s.d.= 4708.15) had similar fixed-pie perceptions, t(27)=1.01, 
p>.30.  In contrast, when negotiating with an ingroup member under high accountability 
conditions, Chinese dyads (Mean=6256.67, s.d.= 3973.93) had more fixed-pie 
perceptions than American dyads did (Mean=8004.17, s.d.= 5087.66), t(28)=2.60, p<.05.   
So hypothesis 5b was supported.   Figure 4.7 shows these findings.  
Joint Gain 
Hypothesis 6a and 6b predicted that Chinese negotiation dyads would achieve less 
joint gain than would American dyads only under the ingruop and high accountability 
condition, but not in other conditions.  Again, such a prediction suggests a three-way 
interaction effect, which was tested by analyzing the joint gain using a 2X2X2 ANOVA 
(results are shown in the third column at Table 4.5).   
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FIGURE 4.7 
Three-way Interaction Effect on Fixed-pie Perceptions After Negotiation (Study 1) 
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As expected, there was a marginally significant three-way interaction effect 
between culture, group membership, and accountability, F(1, 106)=2.47, p<.10, η2 =.02.  
To further locate the source of this interaction, several simple comparisons were 
conducted.   Table 4.7 shows the mean and standard deviation of joint gain in each 
condition.    
As Hypothesis 6a predicted, in the low accountability/outgroup condition, there 
was no difference between Chinese dyads (mean=10626.67, s.d.=1020.13) and American 
negotiators (mean=10984.62, s.d.=1038.31),  t(26)=.92, p>.35; in the high 
accountability/outgroup condition, there was no difference between Chinese dyads 
(mean=10966.67, s.d.=860.79, n=15) and American dyads either (mean=11350.00, 
s.d.=1000.45) either,  t(25)=1.07, p>.30.  Hypothesis 6a was supported.As Hypothesis 6b 
predicted, when negotiating with an ingroup member under low accountability condition, 
Chinese dyads (mean=11325.00, s.d.=916.88) did not differ from American dyads 
(mean=11107.69, s.d.=1063.38) on joint gain, t(27)=.59, p>.50; in contrast, when 
negotiating with an ingroup member under high accountability, Chinese negotiators 
significantly made less joint gain (mean=10450.00, s.d.=831.82) than American 
negotiators (mean=11393.75, s.d.=955.31), t(28)=2.87, p<.01). Figure 4.8 shows such 
findings. Therefore, hypothesis 6b was supported.
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TABLE 4.7 
Joint Gain as a Function of Culture, Accountability, and Group Membership  
(Study 1) 
 
 Accountability 
Culture Low High 
 Outgroup  
   
American 10984.62   (1038.31) 11350.00    (1000.45) 
Chinese  10626.67   (1020.130)       10966.67       (860.79) 
 Ingroup  
   
American 11107.69    (1063.38) 11393.75    (955.31) 
Chinese     11325.00       (916.88) 10450.00    (831.82) 
 
Note: Numbers in the parenthesis are standard deviations. 
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FIGURE 4.8 
Three-way Interaction Effect on Joint Gain (Study 1) 
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Relational Capital 
Hypothesis 7a and 7b predict that Chinese dyads would have more relational 
capital than American dyads would only when negotiating with an ingroup member under 
high accountability conditions.  Such a prediction is based on the argument that taking a 
relationship approach usually results in more relational capital.   Since joint gain and gain 
difference within dyads may influence relational capital, a three-way ANCOVA was 
conducted, with joint gain and gain difference as covariates.  The results present in Table 
4.8 showed, however, there was no significant three-way interaction effect, F(1, 104)= 
1.60, p>.20.  Instead, there was a significant interaction effect between culture and group 
membership, F(1, 104)=7.14, p<.01, η2 =.06.  Two further simple comparisons of the 
estimated marginal means suggested that when negotiating with outgroup members, 
Chinese dyads had less relational capital (Mean=4.30, s.d.=.85) than did American dyads 
(Mean=5.28, s.d.=.74), t(53)=5.10, p<.01; but when negotiating with ingroup members, 
Chinese (Mean=5.10, s.d.=.83) and American dyads(Mean=5.32, s.d.=81) did not differ 
on relational capital, t(57)=1.0, p>.20.   Therefore, Hypothesis 7a and 7b were not 
supported. 
Another way to interpret the finding is to compare conditions within each culture.  
I found that after negotiation, American dyads under outgroup conditions (Mean=5.28, 
s.d.=.74) achieved similar relational capital as their counterparts did under ingroup 
conditions (Mean=5.32, s.d.=.83), t(52)=.35, p>.70.  But Chinese dyads under outgroup 
conditions (Mean=4.30, s.d.=.85) achieved much less relational capital than their 
counterparts did under ingroup conditions (Mean=5.10, s.d.=.83), t(58)=3.41, p<.01,  
Figure 4.9 depicts such a finding. 
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TABLE 4.8 
ANOVA Results for the Effects of Culture, Accountability, and Group Membership 
on Relational Capital (Study 1) 
 
Predictors  Relationship Frame  
Covariates F df η2 
Joint gains 1.87 1, 104 .018 
Gain difference 13.87** 1, 104 .117 
    
Main Effects    
Chinese 14.05** 1,104 .119 
Ingroup 14.40** 1,104 .075 
Accountability .63 1,104 .006 
    
Two-Way Interactions    
Chinese X Ingroup 7.14** 1,104 .064 
Chinese X Accountability .68 1,104 .006 
Ingroup X Accountability 1.23 1,104 .012 
    
Three-Way Interaction    
Chinese X Ingroup X Accountability 1.60 1,104 .015 
R2   .39 
n   114 
 † p<.10  * p<.05  **p<.01   one-tailed 
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FIGURE 4.9  
Relational Capital 
as a Function of Culture and Group Membership (Study 1) 
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Recall that negotiators also reported their expectations about negotiation 
atmosphere and the other party before negotiation, and their evaluations of negotiation 
atmosphere and the other party after negotiation.  It would be interesting to examine 
whether negotiation influenced negotiators’ ratings. The expectations and evaluations of 
negotiation atmosphere were measured with three semantic differentials: “I expect 
(evaluate) the atmosphere in negotiation to be (as): very hostile (1) to very friendly (7), 
very competitive (1) to very cooperative (7), and very tense (1) to very relaxed (7).”  The 
expectations and evaluations of the other party were also measure with three semantic 
differentials: “I expect (evaluate) the other negotiator to be (as): very immoral (1) to very 
moral (7), not be trusted at all (1) to be trusted very well (7), and very dishonest (1) to 
very honest (7).”   Since these two dimensions were highly correlated (r=.63 before 
negotiation, and r=.56 after negotiation), I combined the two dimensions.   Then an 
ANOVA was performed, with negotiators’ ratings at time 1 (expectations before 
negotiation) and at time 2 (evaluations after negotiation) as repeated measures, and 
culture, accountability and group membership as between-subject variables.  There were 
some interesting findings (see Table 4.9 for results).
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TABLE 4.9 
ANOVA Results for the Effects of Culture, Accountability, and Group Membership   
on Ratings of Negotiation (Study 1) 
Predictors F (1,219) η2
Main Effects   
Time 13.92** 0.06
Chinese 14.10** 0.06
Ingroup 7.64** 0.03
Accountability 0.08 0.00
  
Two-Way Interactions  
Time X Chinese 39.20** 0.15
Time X Ingroup 2.46† 0.01
Time X Accountability 1.29 0.01
Chinese X Ingroup 1.21 0.01
Chinese X Accountability 0.06 0.00
Ingroup X Accountability 0.39 0.00
  
Three-Way Interactions  
Time X Chinese X Ingroup 4.34* 0.02
Time X Chinese X Accountability 0.00 0.00
Time X Ingroup X Accountability 0.35 0.00
Chinese X Ingroup X Accountability 0.78 0.00
  
Four-Way Interaction  
Time X Chinese X Ingroup X Accountability 0.39 0
† p<.10  * p<.05  **p<.01   one-tailed 
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First, the main effects of time (F(1, 219)=13.92, p<.01, η2=.06), culture (F(1, 
219)=14.10, p<.01, η2=.06), and group membership (F(1, 219)=7.64, p<.01, η2=.03) were 
significant.  Simple comparisons showed that negotiators generally had more positive 
evaluations toward ingroup members (Mean=4.97) than outgroup members (Mean=4.66).  
Second, there was a significant interaction effect between time and culture (F(1, 
219)=39.20, p<.01, η2=.15).  A further examination showed that before negotiation, there 
was no difference between Chinese (Mean=4.51) and American negotiators (Mean=4.67) 
on expectations, t(226)=.15, p>.80; but after negotiation, American negotiators had more 
positive evaluations (Mean=5.38) than did Chinese negotiators (Mean=4.52). Last, there 
was a significant three-way interaction effect between time, culture, and group 
membership, F(1, 219)=4.34, p<.05, η2=.02.  To locate the source of this interaction 
effect, I conducted several simple comparisons.  Results showed that when negotiating 
with an outgroup member, there was no difference in expectations of negotiation between 
Chinese negotiators (Mean=4.49) and American negotiators (Mean=4.46, t(110)=.20, 
p>.80) before negotiation, but after negotiation Chinese negotiators (Mean=4.28) had 
much less positive evaluations than did American negotiators (Mean=5.41, t(110)=6.17, 
p<.001).   When negotiating with an ingroup member, before negotiation there was no 
difference on expectations of negotiation between Chinese negotiators (Mean=4.90) and 
American negotiators (Mean=4.88, t(114)=.11, p>.90), but after negotiation Chinese 
negotiators (Mean=4.75) had less positive evaluations than did American negotiators 
(Mean=5.35, t(114)=2.97, p<.001).   
Interpreting the results in an alternative way, I found that before negotiation both 
American negotiators and Chinese negotiators had less positive expectations of outgroup 
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members (American Mean=4.46; Chinese Mean=4.49) than of ingroup members 
(American Mean=4.88; Chinese Mean=4.90) (American comparison: t(106)=2.26, p<.05; 
Chinese comparison: t(118)=2.44, p<.01). But after negotiation American negotiators 
significantly improved their ratings of the two groups to a similar level (Mean=5.41 in 
outgroup conditions; Mean=5.35 in ingroup conditions), such that there was no difference 
in ratings of ingroup members and of outgroup members after negotiation, t(106)=.27, 
p>.70.  In contrast, Chinese negotiators still had less positive ratings of outgroup 
members (Mean=4.28) than of ingroup members (Mean=4.75) after negotiation, 
t(118)=2.78, p<.01.  Compared with pre-negotiation ratings, when Chinese participants 
negotiated with an outgroup member, their post-negotiation ratings worsened (t(59)=1.62, 
p<.10); but when they negotiated with an ingroup member, their ratings did not 
significantly change (t(60)=1.27, p>.10).  Figure 4.10 shows the results.  
Relations between Dependent Variables 
The analysis above focused on the impacts of culture,  accountability, and group 
membership on dependent variables, including relationship frame, relationship-based 
tactics, fixed-pie perceptions, joint gain, and relational capital.  I have argued that taking 
a relationship approach would influence both negotiation processes and outcomes, so it is 
reasonable to test the relationships between these dependent variables.  In the following, I 
first report the results at the dyadic level.  For variables that were reported at the 
individual level, I further test the relations at the individual level.
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FIGURE 4.10 
Ratings of Negotiation  
as a Function of Time, Culture, Accountability, and Group Membership (Study 1) 
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Relations at the Dyadic Level   
First, having a relationship frame may influence relationship-based tactics, fixed-
pie perceptions, and relational capital.  In terms of relationship-based tactics, it is 
expected that a negotiator with a relationship frame would use more relationship-based 
tactics during negotiation.  Indeed, I found that at the dyadic level the average score of 
relationship frame was significantly and positively related to the average score of 
relationship-based behavior during negotiation (see the lower diagonal in Table 4.2, 
Pearson’s r=.27, p<.01).   
Having a relationship frame may also influence fixed-pie perceptions.  If 
negotiators focus too much on relationship, they may miss the opportunity to logroll and 
to find the priorities of the other party.  As a consequence, having a relationship frame 
may lead to more fixed-pie perceptions.  However, neither the correlation between 
relationship frame and fixed-pie perceptions before negotiation at the dyadic level (r=.-
.06, n.s.) nor the correlation between relationship frame and fixed-pie perceptions after 
negotiation at the dyadic level (r=-.05, n.s.) was significant. 
Having a relationship frame may also impact relational capital.   It is expected 
that having a relationship frame would contribute to more relational capital.  There was, 
as Table 4.2 shows, a positive and significant correlation between relationship frame and 
relational capital (r=.25, p<.01).  
Second, negotiators’ relationship-based tactics may influence their cognition as 
well as negotiation outcomes.  Since relationship-based tactics, fixed-pie perceptions 
after negotiation, joint gain, and relational capital can be analyzed at the dyadic level, the 
analysis centering on relationship-based tactics were conducted at the dyadic level.  The 
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correlation table at the dyadic level (Table 4.2) shows that there was no significant 
correlation between relationship-based tactics and fixed-pie perceptions after negotiation 
(r=.01, n.s.).  Interestingly, both the correlation between relationship-based tactics and 
joint gains (r=-.17, p<.05), and that between relationship-based tactics and relational 
capital (r=-.13, p<.10) were negative.   These two relationships might be driven by the 
fact that Chinese negotiators tended to use more relationship-based tactics than did 
American negotiators, and that Chinese negotiators achieved less joint gain and had less 
relational capital than did American negotiators.  Two regressions of joint gain and 
relational capital on relationship-based tactics respectively showed that when culture was 
controlled, relationship-based tactics was not significant correlated with either joint gain 
(β=-.10, t=.99, p>.20) or relational capital (β=-.09, t=.93, p>.20) any more. 
Third, there was a significant and strong correlation between fixed-pie 
perceptions and joint gain (r=.57, p<.001).  That is, the less fixed-pie perceptions a 
negotiation dyad had, the more joint gain the dyad achieved, which is consistent with 
findings of past research (De Drew et al., 2000; Thompson & Hastie, 1990).  Given that 
culture, group membership, and accountability influenced both fixed-pie perceptions 
(Hypothesis 5) and joint gain (Hypothesis 6), it is reasonable to test whether fixed-pie 
perceptions mediated the relationship between the three predictors and joint gain.  
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), mediation requires that (1) the predictors (culture, 
group membership, and accountability) should be significantly related with the mediator 
(fixed-pie perceptions); (2) the predictors should be significantly related with the 
dependent variable (joint gain); (3) the mediator should be significantly related with the 
dependent variable; and (4) the impact of the predictors on the dependent variable should 
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disappear or be less after the mediator is controlled.  Step 1, 2, 3 had been supported by 
the former analysis.   To finish step 4, I regressed joint gain on the dummy variables of 
culture, accountability, group membership, and their interactions, both before and after 
fixed-pie perceptions were controlled for.  Results showed that the marginal significant 
effect of the three-way interaction (β=-.38, t(113)=-1.57, p<.10) disappeared when fixed-
pie perceptions were controlled for (β=-.17, t(113)=-.79, p>.40).  Therefore, fixed-pie 
perceptions mediated the effects of culture, group membership, and accountability on 
joint gain.   
Figure 4.11 summarizes all of the findings in Study 1 reported above. 
 
The results at the dyadic level are neat, but at the expense of ignoring the 
variances within dyads.  Since negotiation is a social dynamics and interactive process, it 
would be interesting to explore the within-dyad dynamics using advanced statistical tools.   
Relations at the Individual Level   
The analysis at the dyadic level showed that relationship frame was positively 
related to relationship-based tactics and relational capital.  Since relationship frame, 
relationship-based tactics, and relational capital were all measured at the individual level, 
a more fine-grained question would be: did a focal negotiator’s own relationship frame 
affct her own negotiation behavior or outcomes, or did her partner’s relationship frame 
influence the focal negotiator’s negotiation behavior or outcomes, or did both of them 
have impacts?
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FIGURE 4.11 
Summary of Findings in Study 11 
 
Note: 1. The solid lines represent the effects of the three-way interaction (culture X accountability X group membership) on dependent 
variables (or mediator), while the dashed lines represent the relations between dependent variables.
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One statistical challenge to answer this question is that the dependent variables 
(relationship-based tactics and relational capital) were interdependent within dyads (see 
Treatment of Data).   Thus, to run ordinary regressions may violate the assumption that 
observations are independent.  Fortunately, scholars suggest that Hierarchical Linear 
Model (HLM) is helpful in solving this problem (e.g., Kashy & Kenney, 2000).  HLM 
allows the existence of variance at the dyadic level, so that the individual level 
correlations can be accurately estimated.   I constructed three Hierarchical Linear Models, 
with negotiators’ relationship-based tactics, fixed-pie perceptions after negotiation, and 
relational capital at the individual level as the dependent variable respectively.  For all of 
these models, a negotiator’s own relationship frame and her negotiation partner’s 
relationship frame were the individual-level predicting variables.  Table 4.10 shows the 
results. 
The first column shows the results for relationship-based tactics, which suggests 
that a negotiator’s own relationship frame was marginally and positively related to her 
own relationship-based tactics during negotiation (t(225)=1.52, p<.10), and her partner’s 
relationship frame was significantly and positively related to the focal negotiator’s 
relationship-based tactics (t(225=2.57, p<.01).   Therefore, the data showed that both a 
negotiator’s own and her negotiation partner’s relationship frame were positively related 
to one’s relationship-based tactics during negotiation. 
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TABLE 4.10 
HLM Results for the Effects of Relationship Frame  
on Relationship-based tactics, Fixed-pie perceptions After Negotiation, and Relational Capital (Study 1) 
 
 
      Own Relationship-
Based Tactics 
Fixed-pie Perceptions Relational Capital 
After negotiation 
      Null
Raw 
Coefficient
t-
value Null
Raw 
Coefficient
t-
value Null
Raw 
Coefficient
t-
value
Individual 
Level                        
  
Own  
Relationship 
Frame 
 
 0.11† 1.52    -66.32 -0.14    0.24** 2.76
  
Partner's  
Relationship 
Frame 
 
 0.18* 2.57    -323.74 -0.7    0.29** 3.38
     
 
Individual Level 
Variance 0.51 0.49    2.27E+07 2.29E+07    0.8 0.79
Dyadic 
                        Level 
   Joint Gain                      0.0002** 2.47
   Gain Difference                      -0.0003** -4.27
                             
  
Dyad-level 
Variance 0.26 0.24    1.07E+07 1.08E+07    0.47 .24  
           
† p<.10  * p<.05  **p<.01   one-tailed. At the individual level, n=226; at the dyadic level, n=113. 
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In another HLM, fixed pie perceptions after negotiationwas the dependent 
variable (see the second column of Table 4.10).  However, neither the focal negotiator’s 
relationship frame (t(225)=-.14, n.s.) nor the other party’s relationship frame (t(225)=-.70, 
n.s.) had significant effects on fixed-pie perceptions.  It seems that the way relationship 
frame influences fixed-pie perceptions is more complicated than expected.  For example, 
some scholars argue that the distance of relationship orientations between two negotiators 
may influence negotiation dynamics (e.g., Gelfand et al., 2006).  Future research should 
examine in that direction. 
The third HLM was conducted with relational capital as the dependent variable 
(joint gain and gain difference were controlled at the dyadic level, see the results on the 
third column of Table 4.10).  We can learn that both the focal negotiator’s relationship 
frame (t(225)=2.76, p<.01) and the other party’s relationship frame (t(225)=3.38, p<.01) 
had positive effects on the focal negotiator’s subjective evaluation of relationship.    
Content Anlysis of the Chinese Negotiation 
All the negotiation simulations were audio-taped.  Due to the financial and time 
limits, only those of the Chinese sample were transcribed and analyzed.  College students 
in China were recruited to transcribe the 60 negotiation audio clips of the Chinese sample.  
Because of bad recording quality in a few cases, only 54 clips were finally transcribed.  
Transcripts captured the words that were spoken, but not nonverbal features, pauses, or 
overlaps.    
To develop a coding manual for content analysis of negotiation strategies, I 
randomly chose four manuscripts, coded them, and compared my coding schemes with 
existing coding manuals (i.e., Adair et al., 2001; Moore et al., 1999; Weingart, Olekalns, 
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& Smith, 2004).  Eight categories were identified, including distributive negotiation 
behavior, integrative negotiation behavior, soft tactics, hard tactics, haggling, 
substantiation, summarizing, reaction, questions, and procedural comments (see Table 
4.11 for definitions, sub-categories, and examples). 
I trained two Chinese college students to conduct content analysis on a weekly 
basis for about two months.  I asked them to independently code the four manuscripts that 
I used to develop the coding manual, and then discussed with them code by code.  During 
the discussion, I revised the manual to clarify definitions or to capture new categories.  
When I believed that the two coders had mastered the coding manual, I randomly chose 
three new manuscripts, and asked the two coders to perform the coding independently. 
Coding was completed in two steps: (1) coders identified the coding units in each 
manuscript (i.e., unitizing); and then (2) coders categorized each coding unit into one of 
the coding categories (i.e., categorizing).  Guetzkow’s (1950) U3, an index of the 
disagreement in unitizing, was .01.  According to Folger, Hews, and Poole (1984), U 
scores below .10 indicates satisfactory agreement, so the interrater agreement on 
unitizing was very high.  The interrater agreements on categorizing were calculated for 
each coding category, with Cohen’s Kappa varying from .91 to .96.  Disagreements about 
unitizing and categorizing were resolved through further discussion.
                                                 
3 U=(O1-O2)/(O1+O2), where  O1 represents the number of units that the first coders reports, and O2 
represents the number of units that the second coder reports (Guetzkow, 1950: p55). 
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TABLE 4.11 
Codes for Chinese Negotiation (Study 1) 
 
General Category Sub Category Definition Examples 
Distributive Negotiation 
Behavior 
Single-issue Offer secure agreement on one 
issue 
“How about choosing 
180 g/m2 for the paper 
quality?” 
 Preferences about a Single Issue Provide issue preferences 
within a single issue 
“I want as many copies 
as possible.” 
 Questions about a Single Issue Ask for preferences within 
a single issue 
“How many color pages 
do you want?” 
    
Integrative Negotiation 
Behavior 
Multi-issue Offer secure agreement on two 
or more issues 
“Twenty thousand copies 
and two color pages?” 
 Priorities about Multiple Issues Provide priorities or 
relative importance of 
issue(s) 
 
“Among the four issues, 
billing date is the most 
important issue for us.” 
 Questions about Multi-issues Ask for priorities or 
relative importance of 
issue(s) 
 
“Given 180g/m2 paper 
quality, how many copies 
you could print for us?” 
    
Soft Tactics Relation-Building Search for commonalities 
or similarities between two 
parties, such as common 
experience, traits, identities 
“We are from the same 
company.” 
 Positive Emotion Express positive attitudes “I wish we could 
successfully corporate 
with each other.” 
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 Sympathizing Express sympathy toward 
the other party, or try to 
obtain the other party’s 
sympathy 
“I know this condition is 
very difficult for you.” 
 Compromising Take the middle point to 
solve differences 
“Let both of us step 
backward a little bit.” 
 Resolution Proposal Propose negotiation 
strategies 
“I wish you could give in 
on issues which are less 
important to you, but 
more important to us.” 
    
Hard Tactics Threats Threat to quit negotiation, 
or to collaborate with a 
third-party 
“If you cannot accept this 
offer, I have to quit this 
negotiation.” 
 Distancing Emphasize dissimilarities 
between two parties 
“We are from two very 
different companies.” 
 Blaming Directly blame the other 
party’s suggestions, 
positions, or attitudes 
“I doubt the honesty of 
your company.” 
    
Haggling Deny other’s suggestion Directly deny the other 
party’s offer, suggestions, 
or proposals 
“We can never accept 
such an offer.” 
 Stay Firm Resist to change own offer 
or proposals 
“I cannot give in any 
more on this issue.” 
 Weaken other’s positioning Weaken the other party’s 
offers, suggestions, or 
proposals 
“You can make it 
because one and two 
color pages do not make 
any different to you.”  
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Substantiation Substantiation Defend arguments, argue 
position on issues 
“General Technology is 
the biggest client of our 
company.” 
    
Summarizing Summarizing the other party’s 
preferences 
Summarize the other 
party’s preferences or 
positions 
“You mentioned that you 
need as many copies as 
possible.” 
    
Reaction Positive Reaction Agree “Yes.” 
 Negative Reaction Disagree “No, of course not.” 
    
Questions    
 Questions about Bottom Line of a 
Single Issue 
Ask for bottom line within 
a single issue or package 
“What is your bottom 
line for the billing date?” 
    
 Questions about Substantiation Question or clarification of 
argument presented 
“Why do you need so 
many copies for this 
exhibition?” 
 Other Questions Other questions “Did you say you need 
two color pages?” 
    
Procedural Comments Procedural Suggestions Comments regarding 
procedures to be used in 
negotiation 
“Let’s move on to the 
next issue.” 
 Time Check Comments regarding time “How many minutes do 
we have now?” 
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I focused on five negotiation behaviors: distributive negotiation behavior refers to 
information seeking, information revealing, and inquires about single issues; integrative 
negotiation behavior refers to information seeking, information revealing, and inquiries 
about multiple issues; soft tactics focus on building relations, expressing positive 
emotions, and sympathizing the other party’s needs; hard tactics include threatening, 
distancing from, or blaming the other party; and haggling refers to directly denying the 
other party’s suggestions, weakening the other party’s positions, or resisting to change 
one’s own positions.  Since negotiation behaviors were highly interdependent within 
dyads, negotiation behavior was thus analyzed at the dyadic level (e.g., Adair et al., 2001).  
In addition, since the total number of tactics varied across dyads, the counts of each 
category were divided by the total number of tactics for each dyad (e.g., Ben-Yoav & 
Pruitt, 1984b).   Table 4.12 shows the correlations between the percentages of each 
category and the key variables in this study. 
As Table 4.12 illustrates, relationship frame was marginally and negatively 
related to distributive behavior (r=-.18, p<.10), and it was significantly and negatively 
related to integrative behavior (r=-.24, p<.05).  In other words, if a negotiation dyad had a 
higher relationship frame, the dyad spent less time on either distributing or integrating 
economic gains.   Relationship frame was significantly and positively related to soft 
tactics (r=.30, p<.01), and it was significantly and negatively related to hard tactics (r=-
.24, p<.05).  Thus, having a high level of relationship frame encouraged the use of soft 
tactics during negotiation, but discouraged the use of hard tactics.  
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TABLE 4.12 
Correlation Coefficients between Negotation Behaviors and Key Variables (Chinese Sample, Study 1) 
 
Variables1 1 2    3    4       5       6         7           8      9        10        11    12 
1.      Ingroup — 
2.      Accountability -0.05 — 
3.      Relationship Frame 0.40** 0.22* — 
4.      Relationship Tactics 0.30** 0.08 0.30** — 
5.      Fixed-pie Perceptions PN 0.12 -0.20† 0.05 -0.04 — 
6.      Joint Gain 0.06 -0.12 0.00 -0.18† 0.63** — 
7.      Relational Capital 0.44** 0.12 0.55** 0.30** 0.24* 0.11 — 
8.      Distributive Behavior -0.27* -0.01 -0.18† -0.34** -0.19† -0.31** -0.14 — 
9.      Integrative Behavior -0.24* 0.04 -0.24* -0.29* 0.35** 0.51** -0.03 -0.13 — 
10.    Soft Tactics -0.07 0.30** 0.25* 0.14 0.16 0.20† 0.08 -0.16 0.15 — 
11.    Hard Tactics -0.25* -0.05 -0.24* -0.29* -0.07 0.20† -0.47** -0.15 0.10 0.20† — 
12.    Haggling -0.26* 0.29* -0.09 -0.12 -0.08 -0.05 -0.16 -0.21† 0.19† 0.12 0.36** 
† p<.10  * p<.05  **p<.01   one-tailed 
 
1. All variables are at the dyadic level.  “Fixed-pie perceptions PN” refers to Fixed-pie perceptions post negotiation.  N=54. 
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Relationship-based tactics showed similar patterns as relationship frame.  It was 
significantly and negatively related to distributive behavior (r=-.34, p<.01), integrative 
behavior (r=-.29, p<.05), and hard tactics (r=-.29, p<.05).  Unexpectedly, the correlation 
between relationship-based tactics and soft tactics was not significant, although it was 
positive (r=.14, n.s.). 
 Scholars have proposed that fixed-pie perceptions are modified if negotiators 
focus on integrating interests rather than on distributing interests (Thompson and Hastie, 
1990).  As expected, fixed-pie perceptions (recall that the higher the number, the less 
fixed-pie perceptions) were negatively related to distributive behavior (r=-.19, p<.10), but 
positively related to integrative behavior (r=.35, p<.01).  Not surprisingly, joint gain was 
negatively related to distributive behavior (r=-.31, p<.01), but positively related to 
integrative behavior (r=.51, p<.01).   Table 4.12 also shows that relational capital was 
negatively and significantly related to hard tactics (r=-.47, p<.01).   
I also conducted several variance analyses to examine how negotiation conditions 
(i.e., accountability and group membership) influenced negotiation behaviors.  Table 4.13 
shows the ANOVA results for each negotiation tactics.  First, group membership 
influenced distributive behavior (F(1, 50)=3.89, p<.05, η2=.07).  Specifically, Chinese 
dyads in the outgroup conditions showed more distributive behavior (mean=.16) than 
those in the ingroup conditions (mean=.13, t(52)=1.99, p<.05).  Second, group 
membership also influenced integrative behavior (F(1, 50)=3.00, p<.05, η2=.06).   
Chinese dyads in the outgroup conditions showed more distributive behavior (mean=.13) 
than those in the ingroup conditions (mean=.10, t(52)=1.79, p<.05).
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TABLE 4.13 
ANOVA Results for the Effects of Accountability and Group Membership  
on Negotiation Tactics (Chinese Sample, Study 1) 
 
 
Predictors
Distributive 
Behavior
Integrative 
Behavior
  
 
F (1,50) η2 F (1,50) η2
Main Effects        
Accountability 0.08 0.002 0.01 0.000
Ingroup 3.89* 0.072 3.00* 0.057
 
Two-Way Interaction        
Accountability X Ingroup 0.13 0.002 0.20 0.004
 
R2 0.07 0.06 
N 54 54 
 
† p<.10 * p<.05 **p<.01   one-tailed 
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In addition, accountability had a significant effect on soft tactics (F(1, 50)=5.00, 
p<.01, η2=.09), with those in the high accountability conditions (mean=.09) using more 
soft tactics than those in the low accountability conditions (mean=.06, t(52)=2.30, p<.05).  
Further, group membership had a significant effect on hard tactics (F(1, 50)=3.55, p<.05, 
η2=.07).  In particular, Chinese dyads in the ingroup conditions (mean=.09) used less 
hard tactics than those in the outgroup conditions (mean=.17, t(52)=1.86, p<.05).  Last, 
both accountability and group membership significantly influenced the use of haggling 
for Chinese dyads (accountability, F(1, 50)=4.17, p<.05, η2=.08; group membership, F(1, 
50)=3.02, p<.05, η2=.06).  Specifically, Chinese dyads in the high accountability 
conditions (mean=.09) used more haggling tactics than those in the low accountability 
conditions (mean=.06, t(52)=.2.22, p<.05).   Chinese dyads in the ingroup conditions 
(mean=.06) used less haggling tactics than those in the outgroup conditions (mean=.09, 
t(52)=1.93, p<.05). 
 
Discussion 
Study 1 showed that cultural differences in negotiation can be intensified or 
attenuated by both accountability and group membership in negotiation. Specifically, 
there are three-way interaction effects between culture, accountability, and group 
membership on three dependent variables: relationship frame, fixed-pie perceptions after 
negotiation, and joint gain.  
In terms of relationship negotiation frame, my predictions were generally 
supported by the data.  Chinese negotiators on average had a higher level of relationship 
frame than American negotiators (Hypothesis 1a), which seems to be concordant with the 
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traditional trait/entity view of culture.  But such a main effect of culture was marginal 
(p=.09), and it was moderated by both accountability (Hypothesis 2a) and the group 
membership of the other party (Hypothesis 3a).  Chinese negotiators had a higher level of 
relationship frame than American negotiators did only under high accountability 
conditions, and there was no cross-cultural difference under low accountability 
conditions.  Such a finding is consistent with the dynamic constructivist view of culture, 
which argues that accountability motivates people to use the culturally accessible 
knowledge, thus intensifying cross-cultural differences (Chiu et al., 2000). Also, Chinese 
negotiators had a higher level of relationship frame only when the other party was an 
ingroup member, and there was no cross-cultural difference when the party was an 
outgroup member.  This finding, again, lends support to the dynamic constructivist view 
of culture, which proposes that people will use culturally accessible knowledge only 
when the knowledge is applicable to the social context (Wong & Hong, 2005).  Last, 
there was a significant three-way interaction between culture, accountability, and group 
membership on relationship frame (Hypothesis 4a).  Further analysis showed that it was 
only in the high accountability/ingroup condition that Chinese negotiators had a higher 
level of relationship frame than did American negotiators.  Interestingly, it appears that 
American negotiators had a higher level of relationship frame than did Chinese 
negotiators only in the low accountability/outgroup condition. 
Findings on fixed-pie perceptions are consistent with my predictions as well.  In 
the high accountability/ingroup condition, Chinese negotiation dyads had more fixed-pie 
perceptions after negotiation than American dyads (Hypothesis 5b).  But there was no 
difference in other conditions (Hypothesis 5a & 5b).   
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Consonant with the findings about relationship frame and fixed-pie perceptions, 
results for joint gain also indicated a significant three-way interaction effect between 
culture, accountability, and group membership, suggestingthat Chinese negotiation dyads 
achieved lower joint gain than American dyads only in the high accountability/ingroup 
condition (Hypothesis 6b), but not in any other conditions (Hypothesis 6a & 6b).   
 With regard to relationship-based tactics, the strong main effect of culture 
indicates that Chinese negotiation dyads used these tactics more than American dyads did 
(Hypothesis 1b).  However, accountability moderated this main effect of culture, such 
that cross-cultural differences were greater under high accountability condition than 
under low accountability conditions (Hypothesis 2b). 
 Two hypotheses about relational capital (Hypothesis 7a and 7b) were not 
supported by the data.  I proposed that Chinese dyads would have more relational capital 
than would American dyads only in the high accountability/ingroup condition, but not in 
other conditions.  Rather, there was no three-way interaction effect on this dependent 
variable.  The results indicated that (1) when negotiating with an ingroup member, 
Chinese dyads reported similar relational capital as American dyads did, but (2) when 
negotiating with an outgroup member, Chinese dyads reported less relational capital than 
American dyads did.   A follow-up analysis on the change of the ratings of negotiation 
showed that American negotiators significantly improved evaluations of negotiation after 
negotiation, no matter whether the other party was an ingroup member or an outgroup 
member.  This finding is consistent with Thompson’s (1993) results, confirming that the 
intergroup contact hypothesis worked for Americans (Pettigrew, 1986; Sherif et al., 1961).  
However, such a hypothesis did not apply to Chinese negotiators: when they negotiated 
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with an ingroup member, their evaluations did not change; and when they negotiated with 
an outgroup member, their evaluations even worsened.  In addition, Chinese negotiators 
always had higher ratings of ingroup members than of outgroup members, no matter 
before or after negotiation.  It seems that the boundary demarcating ingroup from 
outgroup members was more strict for the Chinese than for Americans. 
There were some interesting correlations between dependent variables.  For 
example, relationship frame was positively related to both relationship-based tactics, and 
relational capital at the dyadic level.  It is not hard to imagine that a negotiator with a 
high level of relationship frame was likely to use relationship-based tactics during 
negotiation.  Also, a high level of relationship frame contributed to the accumulation of 
relational capital after negotiation.    
In addition, fixed-pie perceptions after negotiation fully mediated the impacts of 
culture, accountability, and group membership on joint gain.  That is, the interaction of 
culture, accountability, and group membership influenced fixed-pie perceptions, which in 
turn influenced joint gain.  The less fixed-pie perceptions a negotiation dyad had, the 
more joint gain the dyad could achieve.  
Furthermore, both a negotiator’s own and her negotiation partner’s relationship 
frame were positively related to the negotiator’s relationship-based tactics.  Last, both a 
negotiator’s own and her negotiation partner’s relationship frame were positively related 
to the negotiator’s relational capital.   
In summary, Study 1 provides important evidence supporting the dynamic 
constructivist view of culture.  However, it is only an intra-cultural comparative study.  It 
is both practically and theoretically important to extend it to an intercultural study.   
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Study 2—Intercultural vs. Intracultural Negotiation 
The purpose of Study 2 is to extend Study 1, an intracultural comparative study, 
to an intercultural study. Unlike Study 1, in which group membership was manipulated 
by using a modified minimal intergroup method, Study 2 set up intergroup boundaries by 
priming one’s culture identity, a naturally-occurring social category.  Previous research 
suggest that in intercultural interactions, salient cultural identity make people view those 
from other cultures as outgroup members (Alder & Graham, 1989; Brannen & Salk, 2000; 
Earley & Mosakowski, 2000).  It is reasonable to believe that people would be more 
likely to regard a person sharing the same cultural background, rather than a person with 
a different cultural background, as an ingroup member. 
 
Design and participants 
The design was a 3 X 2 factorial, with condition (Chinese-Chinese, American-
American, and Chinese-American) and accountability (high vs. low) as between-dyad 
factors.  Dependent variables include relationship negotiation frame, relationship-based 
negotiation tactics, fixed-pie perceptions, joint gain, and relational capital.  I invited 168 
graduate students to participate in Study 2.  Fifty-eight were Chinese graduate students 
from Sun Yat-Sen University, and 110 were graduate students from Vanderbilt 
University (31 were Chinese, and 79 were Americans).  The response rate was 100%. 
 
Negotiation Task 
The negotiation task was adapted from Study 1.  In the scenario, an electronics 
company and an advertising company needed to sign a brochure-printing contract, which 
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included four issues: paper quality, number of copies, number of pages with color, and 
billing date.  As in Study 1, in this negotiation task two issues (i.e., paper quality and 
number of color pages) were distributive issues whereas another two (i.e., number of 
copies and billing date) were integrative issues.   
 
Manipulations 
Manipulation of Accountability  
Study 2 used the same method as Study 1 to manipulate accountability.  That is, 
participants in the high accountability conditions were required to write a report to their 
“managers” after negotiation, and they were told that their managers had the power to 
allocate rewards.  By contrast, participants in the low accountability did not to write a 
report, and they were told that the negotiation process and outcome were confidential.  
Manipulation of Group Membership 
Unlike Study 1, which employed a modified minimal group paradigm to 
manipulate group membership, Study 2 manipulated group membership by highlighting 
one’s cultural background.   Two procedures were combined in this study to serve this 
purpose.  First of all, before reading negotiation materials, participants accomplished two 
cultural identity priming tasks.  The first task was to read an essay that discussed the 
dietary differences between the Chinese and Americans (see Appendix D).  In this essay, 
the word “Chinese” appeared for 13 times, and the word “American” appeared for 13 
times.  Chinese participants were asked to circle the word “Chinese” in the essay, 
whereas American participants were asked to circle the word “American” in the essay.  
Such a priming technique presumably made participants’ cultural identity salient (cf. 
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Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999).  To further strengthen one’s 
cultural identity, each participant wrote a short essay about a recent personal experience 
that made the participant proud of his/her own culture. 
 Furthermore, the distinction between ingroup and outgroup was highlighted in 
the negotiation scenarios.  In the ingroup negotiation conditions (intracultural 
negotiation), negotiation scenarios said that negotiators met their negotiation partners in a 
foreign territory.  For example, negotiators in the Chinese-Chinese condition were told 
that they met each other in the United States; while negotiators in the American-
American condition were told that they met each other in China.  Previous research 
suggests that two strangers from the same country may regard each other as ingroup 
members when they meet in a foreign country (Chen & Li, 2005).  Therefore, such 
information would presumably increase participants’ feeling of ingroupness.  In the 
outgroup condition (intercultural negotiation), by contrast,  half of the dyads were told 
that they met each other in the United States, and the other half of the dyads were told 
that they met each other in China.  
 
 Procedure  
Participants were invited to the lab in groups of four people.  In the intracultural 
conditions (Chinese-Chinese and American-American), 4 participants were from the 
same culture; while in the intercultural condition (Chinese-American), 2 participants 
were from the Chinese culture and the other 2 were from the American culture.  Figure 
4.12 and Figure 4.13 show the experimental procedures and the logistical arrangements in 
Study 2 respectively. 
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FIGURE 4.12 
Procedures in Study 2 
Step 1: 
Cultural Identity 
Priming Tasks 
Step 2 
Get to know a 
Colleague 
Step 3: 
Draw a Lot to 
“Decide” the Role 
Step 5: 
Negotiation 
Step 6: 
Post-negotiation 
Survey 
Step 7: 
Debrief 
Step 4: 
Negotiation scenario and 
Pre-negotiation survey 
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Logistic Arrangement: 
Step 1 & 2: 4 participants are seated in two different rooms, with 2 persons assigned working in one company and the other 2 working 
in the other company.  
Step 3-7: Participants were separated from their colleagues, and then paired with their negotiation partners, who were from the other 
company.   
 
FIGURE 4.13 
Logistical Arrangements in Study 2 
Room B
Step 1 & 2 Step 3-7 
3
4
Room A Room B Room A
1
2
1
3
2
4 
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Step 1.  Upon arrival at the laboratory, four participants first worked on two 
cultural identity priming tasks (i.e., read the dietary difference essay and wrote a culture 
reflection essay).   
Step 2. Participants were assigned into two teams with two persons in each team. 
Each team was sent to two separated rooms, and the two team members on each team 
spent 5 minutes getting to know each other.  (Notice that in the intercultural negotiations, 
the two persons in each team were from the same culture.)     
Step 3. Further instructions told each two-person team that there would be a 
negotiation task, and that each member needed to participate in a drawing to decide the 
further role in the following negotiation task (as a negotiation representative or as a 
manager). The experimenter then organized participants to draw the lot.  The drawing 
itself did not directly tell participants the role, but only a number: either number “1” or 
number “2”.  If participants drew lot number “1,” they were told to stay at the original 
room, and if it was “2,” they were sent to another room.  Then group members were 
separated, and sent to different rooms, with their pens and company tags. 
Step 4. Everyone then was given a negotiation package, containing a negotiation 
scenario and a pre-negotiation survey.  The instructions told every participant that s/he 
was assigned as the representative while the other member in the team was assigned as 
the manager.   In fact, everyone was assigned as a negotiation representative. 
In the intracultural negotiation condition, the scenario specified that the 
negotiation took place in a foreign country where two companies from the same country 
met and negotiated.  For example, participants in the Chinese intracultural negotiation 
condition (Chinese-Chinese) were informed that they represented a Chinese company, 
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and the negotiation was in the United States.  In contrast, in the intercultural negotiation 
condition (Chinese-American), the location of negotiation was randomly specified as 
either in China or in the United States.  
Participants in the high accountability conditions were told that they need to write 
a report to their managers after negotiation, and their managers would allocate the points 
they got from negotiation based on the report; whereas participants in the low 
accountability conditions were told that they would negotiation on their own, and the 
negotiation process and outcome would be confidential.   
After reading the scenario, participants filled out a pre-negotiation survey, which 
included measures of manipulation check, relationship frame, fixed-pie perceptions 
before negotiation, expectations of negotiation atmosphere, and expectations of the other 
party.   
Step 5. Negotiation started immediately after participants finished the pre-
negotiation survey.  Each pair was given 30 minutes to negotiate.   
Step 6. After finishing negotiation, participants filled out a post-negotiation 
survey, which included measures of relationship-based tactics, fixed-pie perceptions after 
negotiation, relational capital, evaluation of negotiation atmosphere, evaluation of the 
other party, allocentrism (Triandis, 1994), and Schwartz’s (1992) cultural value scales. 
Step 7. Lastly, they were debriefed, and everyone received monetary rewards ($5 
for participants in China, $20-$25 for participants in the U.S.).    
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Measures 
All dependent variables and cultural value scales (i.e., relationship negotiation 
frame, relationship-based tactics, fixed-pie perceptions, joint gain and relational capital) 
were measured in the same way as in Study 1.  In terms of reliability, both relationship 
negotiation frame and relational capital worked well for each sub-sample (see Table 4.14 
for details), but the scale of relationship-based tactics did not achieve satisfactory 
reliability for the Chinese subsample in the intercultural negotiation condition 
(Cronbach’s alpha=.34).   
 
Data Analysis and Results 
Final Sample and Characteristics 
Three pairs who did not finish negotiation within the time limit were excluded 
from further analyses. Therefore, the final sample size in Study 2 was 162.  Table 4.15 
shows the number of participants in each condition.  Among the 162 participants, 56.2% 
were females (63.1% of the Chinese sample, while 48.7% of the American sample); 
Chinese participants (mean age=25.15 years, s.d.=2.04) were slightly younger than 
American participants (mean age=27.77 years, s.d.=4.60, t(158)=4.63, p<.01). 
In order to make sure that participants in this study were representative of their 
own cultures, I compared several cultural values between the Chinese and American sub-
sample (see Table 4.16 for comparison results).  Similar to findings in Study 1, the 
Chinese sample had higher level of allocentrism, and placed more value on power, 
conformity, and security, but placed less value on benevolence than the American sample 
did.  
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TABLE 4.14 
Reliability of Measures in Study 2 (Cronbach’s Alpha) 
 
 
 
Chinese in Ch-Ch Chinese in Ch-Am American in Ch-Am American in Am-Am
 
Relationship Negotiation 
Frame 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.84 
     
Relationship-based Tactics 0.65 0.34 0.67 0.63 
     
Relational Capital 0.83 0.90 0.88 0.93 
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TABLE 4.15 
Number of Participants in Each Condition in Study 2 
 
 
 Condition 
 Chinese-Chinese Chinese-American American-American 
    
Low Accountability n=30 n=28 n=24 
    
High Accountability n=24 n=32 n=24 
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TABLE 4.16 
Comparison of Individual-Level Cultural Values in Study 2 
 
 American (N = 78) Chinese (N = 83) t value of mean
difference
p value of mean 
difference
Mean Cronbach’s α Mean Cronbach’s α 
Allocentrism 6.05 .74 6.36 .79 -2.15 <.05 
Power 3.38 .75 3.99 .51 -3.86 <.01 
Conformity 4.37 .65 4.96 .60 -3.56 <.01 
Security 4.76 .76 5.10 .58 -2.50 <.01 
Stimulation 4.26 .53 4.28 .58 .10 n.s. 
Benevolence 5.40 .76 5.17 .69 1.76 <.10 
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All of these t-tests were significant at the .05 level, and all of the directions were 
consistent with the findings of past research (Schwartz, 1992; Triandis, 1994).  One 
exception was stimulation, for which neither the Chinese nor the American sample 
showed satisfied reliability.  In short, it is reasonable to believe that the Chinese sample 
and the American sample were representative of their own cultural groups. 
Treatment of Data  
As in Study 1, I checked the interdependence of the key dependent variables 
before further data analysis.  The intra-class correlations (ICC(1)) suggested that 
relationship negotiation frame (ICC(1)=.10, F(80, 80)=.82, p>.80), fixed-pie perceptions 
before negotiation (ICC(1)=.03, F(80, 71)=.96, p>.60), and relationship-based tactics 
(ICC(1)=.07, F(80, 80)=1.149, p>.20) were independent at the dyadic level, whereas 
fixed-pie perceptions after negotiation (ICC(1)=.34, F(80, 79)=2.04, p<.01), and 
relational capital (ICC(1)=.32, F(80, 81=1.96, p<.01) were non-independent at the dyadic 
level.  So in the following, relationship negotiation frame, fixed-pie perceptions before 
negotiation, and relationship-based tactics were analyzed at the individual level, whereas 
fixed-pie perception after negotiation and relational capital were aggregated and analyzed 
at the dyadic level. 
Manipulation Checks 
To make sure that the manipulations of cultural identity and accountability were 
sucessful, I asked several manipulation check questions in the pre-negotiation survey.   
153 
 
Four manipulation check questions of accountability were the same as those used 
in Study 1.  A 4 (Condition 14: Chinese in the Chinese-Chinese negotiation, Chinese in 
the Chinese-American negotiation, Americans in the Chinese-American negotiation, and 
Americans in the American-American negotiation) X 2 (high and low accountability) 
ANOVA on this rating suggested a strong main effect of accountability, F(1, 
153)=141.65, p<.001, η2=.48 (see Figure 4.14 for the results).  As expected, participants 
in the high accountability conditions (Mean=5.01) felt more accountable than those in the 
low accountability conditions did (Mean=2.92). Figure 4.14 shows the results of 
manipulation check of accountability. 
Manipulation check of group membership included one item: I will negotiate with 
an ingroup member.  Participants answered this question in the pre-negotiation survey on 
6-point scales with 1=strongly disagree, and 6=strongly agree.  Rating on this question 
was submitted to a 4X2 (Condition 1 X Accountability) ANOVA.  The results showed 
that condition had a significant effect on this item, F(1, 152)=38.91, p<.001, 
η2=.43( Figure 4.15 showed the results).  Chinese participants in the intra-cultural 
negotiations felt the other party more as an ingroup member (Mean=3.43) than did those 
in the inter-cultural negotiations (Mean=2.38, t(81)=3.53, p<.01).  In the similar manner, 
American participants in the intra-cultural negotiations felt the other party more as an 
ingroup member (Mean=5.35) than did those in the intercultural negotiations (Mean=4.59, 
t(75)=2.63, p<.01).  
                                                 
4 “Condition 1” and “Condition” are different.  “Condition 1”, which refers to conditions at the individual 
level, has 4 levels (Chinese in the Chinese-Chinese negotiation, Chinese in the Chinese-American 
negotiation, Americans in the Chinese-American negotiation, and Americans in the American-American 
negotiation; by contrast, “Condition”, which refers to conditions at the dyadic level, has 3 levels (Chinese-
Chinese intracultural negotiation, Chinese-American intercultural negotiation,  and American-American 
intracultural negotiation. 
154 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
FIGURE 4.14 
Manipulation Check of Accountability (Study 2) 
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FIGURE 4.15 
Manipulation Check of Group Membership (Study 2) 
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However, Chinese participants in the intra-cultural negotiations regarded the other 
party less as an ingroup member (Mean=3.43) than did American participants in the intra-
cultural negotiations (Mean=5.35, t(100)=9.35, p<.01).  In addition, Chinese participants 
in the inter-cultural negotiations regarded the other party less as an ingroup member 
(Mean=2.38) than did American participants in the inter-cultural negotiations 
(Mean=4.59, t(56)=5.28, p<.01).  Generally speaking, the manipulation of group 
membership did not work very well with the Chinese participants in the Chinese-Chinese 
condition and with the American participants in the Chinese-American condition.  
Relationship Negotiation Frame 
Hypothesis 1a predicts that in general Chinese negotiators would have a higher 
level of relationship negotiation frame than would American negotiators.  Further, 
Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 3a respectively suggest that accountability and negotiating 
with an ingroup member would intensify such a cross-cultural difference.  Moreover, 
Hypothesis 4a predicts a three-way interaction effect between cultural, accountability, 
and group membership on relationship negotiation frame.   
A 2 (culture: Chinese vs. American) X 2 (Intra- vs. Inter-cultural negotiation: 
equivalent to ingroup vs. outgroup negotiation) X 2 (Low vs. high accountability) 
ANOVA was conducted at the individual level (see Table 4.17 for results).  There was a 
strong main effect of culture on relationship negotiation frame (F(1, 153)=26.55, p<.01, 
η2=.15).  Specifically, Chinese negotiators had a higher level of relationship frame 
(Mean=5.19) than American negotiators (Mean=4.62).  Therefore, Hypothesis 1a was 
supported.  
157 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.17 
ANOVA Results for the Effects of Culture, Accountability, and Group Membership 
on  
Relationship Negotiation Frame (Study 2) 
 
Predictors 
Relationship 
Negotiation Frame     
  F (1,153) η2    
Main Effects      
Chinese 26.55** 0.148    
Ingroup 1.99† 0.013    
Accountability 3.64* 0.023    
        
Two-Way Interactions        
Chinese X Ingroup 0.01 0.004    
Chinese X Accountability 1.75† 0.011    
Ingroup X Accountability 0.31 0.002    
       
Three-Way Interaction      
Chinese X Ingroup X 
Accountability 0.24 0.002    
R2 0.20     
n 161     
 
† p<.10  * p<.05  **p<.01   one-tailed 
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The only significant interaction effect, however, was the marginal interaction 
effect between culture and accountability (F(1, 153)=1.75, p<.10,  η2=.01, see Figure 
4.16).   To pinpoint such a finding, I conducted two simple comparisons.  When the 
accountability was low, Chinese negotiators (Mean=5.16) had a higher level of 
relationship frame than American negotiators (Mean=4.45), t(79)=4.63, p<.01.  When the 
accountability was high, although Chinese negotiators (Mean=5.21) still had higher level 
of relationship frame than American negotiators (Mean=4.80, t(78)=2.91, p<.01), 
compared with the low accountability conditions such a cross-cultural difference 
decreased.   
Exploring this finding from another angle, I conducted another two simple 
comparisons, finding that accountability did not significantly change Chinese negotiator’s 
relationship frame (t(81)=.61, p>.50), but it significantly increased American negotiator’s 
relationship frame (t(76)=2.37, p<.05).  The results actually indicated a reversed finding 
from Hypothesis 2a.  Therefore, Hypothesis 2a, 3a, and 4a were not supported.  One 
explanation to these findings is that the manipulation of group membership did not work 
well with the Chinese participants in the Chinese-Chinese condition and with the 
American participants in the Chinese-American condition.  In particular, American 
participants in the intra-cultural negotiations regarded the other party more as an ingroup 
member than did Chinese participants in the intra-cultural negotiations, and American 
participants in the intercultural negotiations also viewed the other party more as an 
ingroup member than did Chinese participants in the intercultural negotiations.  As a 
consequence, accountability may intensify the use of relationship-based tactics only for 
the American participants, but not for the Chinese participants.
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FIGURE 4.16 
Culture X AccountabilityÆ Relationship Frame (Study 2) 
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Since group identification may influence whether a person follows group norms 
(e.g., Jetten et al., 2002), I infer that: Chinese participants with high Chinese cultural 
identification regarded another Chinese more as an ingroup member, and thus were more 
likely to have a relationship frame than those with low Chinese cultural identification.  In 
the pre-negotiation survey, I asked participants to evaluate “I strongly identify with 
Chinese culture” on a 6-point scale.  I used this item as an index of Chinese cultural 
identification, and investigated whether Chinese cultural identification interacted with 
acccountabilily influencing relationship frame in the Chinese-Chinese condition.  I split 
the Chinese sample in the Chinese-Chinese condition based on the mean of Chinese 
cultural identification, and then conducted a two-way ANOVA (Chinese cultural 
identification and accountability) on relationship frame.  As expected, the results showed 
that: (1) for the Chinese with high Chinese cultural identification, participants in the high 
accountability conditions had a higher level of relationship frame (Mean=5.33) than did 
those in the low accountability conditions (Mean=5.02, t(36)=1.60, p<.10); and (2) for 
the Chinese with low Chinese cultural identification, participants in the high 
accountability conditions had a lower level of relationship frame (Mean=4.71) than did 
those in the low accountability conditions (Mean=5.21, t(14)=1.63, p<.10).  Figure 4.17 
illustrates the results. 
Relationship-based Tactics 
Given that relationship-based tactics did not achieve satisfactory reliability for the 
Chinese sub-sample in the intercultural (outgroup) condition (Cronbach’s alpha=.37), the 
participants in the intercultural negotiations were excluded from further analysis for this 
variable.  
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Figure 4.17 
The Impact of Chinese Cultural Identification and Accountability  
on Relationship Frame in the Chinese-Chinese Condition 
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The individual score of relationship-based tactics was submitted to a 2X2 (Culture 
X Accountability) ANOVA for the intracultural negotiation sample (Chinese-Chinese 
and American-American).   There was a very strong main effect of culture (F(1, 
87)=60.16, p<.001, η2=.41), with Chinese negotiators (Mean=3.89) using more 
relationship-based tactics than American negotiators (Mean=2.54).  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1b was supported. 
There was also a marginal interaction effect between culture and accountability 
(F(1, 87)=1.64, p=.10, η2=.02).  As Figure 4.18 shows, under low accountability 
conditions Chinese negotiator (Mean=3.67) used more relationship-based tactics than 
American negotiators did (Mean=2.53, t(47)=4.90, p<.01), and under high accountability 
conditions, the Chinese-American difference was even larger (Chinese Mean=4.15, 
American Mean=2.56, t(40)=5.96, p<.01).   Interpreting this finding in an alternative way, 
I found that Chinese negotiators used more relationship-based tactics under high 
accountability conditions than under low accountability conditions (t(51)=2.24, p<.05), 
whereas accountability did not influence American negotiators in using relationship-
based tactics (t(36)=.09, p>.90).  Therefore, Hypothesis 2b was marginally supported.  
However, Hypothesis 3b and 4b were not supported.   
Fixed-pie Perceptions 
Study 2 measured fixed-pie perceptions twice: once before negotiation and the 
other after negotiation.  As in Study 1, in Study 2 none of the predictors or their 
interactions had any significant effects on the fixed-pie perceptions before negotiation.
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FIGURE 4.18 
Condition X AccountabilityÆRelationship-based Tactics (Study 2) 
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In terms of the fixed-pie perceptions after negotiation, Hypothesis 5a implies that 
there would be no difference on fixed-pie perceptions between Chinese and American 
negotiators in intercultural negotiations (Chinese-American condition), no matter whether 
the accountability is high or low.  To test this hypothesis, a 2X2 (Culture X 
Accountability) ANOVA was conducted with the intercultural negotiation sample at the 
individual level5.  The results indicated a marginal main effect of culture (F(1, 54)=1.79, 
p=.09, η2=.03), but the interaction effect was not significant (F(1, 54)=1.39, p>.10).  A 
further investigation suggested that after intercultural negotiation Chinese negotiators had 
more fixed-pie perceptions (Mean=5664.18) than did American negotiators 
(Mean=7730.95). Therefore, Hypothesis 5a was not supported. 
 Hypothesis 5b predicts that Chinese negotiators would have more fixed-pie 
perceptions than American negotiators in the high accountability/intracultural conditions, 
but not in the low accountability/intracultural conditions. To test this hypothesis, a 2X2 
(Culture X Accountability) ANOVA was conducted at the dyadic level with the 
intracultural negotiation sample (see results at the first column of Table 4.18).  There was 
a strong main effect of culture (F(1, 47)=16.87, p<.01, η2=.260).  A simple comparison 
showed that Chinese dyads (Mean=5435.19) had more fixed-pie perceptions after 
negotiation than did American dyads (Mean=11291.67).  In addition, there was a 
marginal interaction effect between culture and accountability (F(1, 47)=2.56, p<.10, 
η2=.05). Simple comparisons showed that under low accountability conditions, Chinese 
                                                 
5 Since the fixed-pie perceptions within dyads were interdependent (intra-class correlation coefficient=.15, 
p<.10), a more strict way to analyze the data is to test a hierarchical linear model (HLM) with culture as the 
level-1 predictor, accountability as the level-2 predictor, and individual fixed-pie perception as the 
dependent variable.  The HLM results showed a similar finding as ANOVA: Culture had a marginal effect 
on individual fixed pie perceptions (t=1.33, p<.10), and there was no significant effect of accountability 
(t=.30, p>.70).  Such a HLM model, however, does not permit to test the interaction between culture and 
accountability because the number of subjects per group was only 2 (Kashy & Kenney, 2000).    
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dyads had more fixed-pie bias (Mean=5043.33) than American dyads did 
(Mean=11708.33, t(25)=4.51, p<.001, whereas under high accountability conditions the 
difference between Chinese and American dyads was marginal (Chinese Mean=7656.25, 
American Mean=10583.33, t(22)=1.59, p=.06).   To interpret the two-way interaction 
differently, I found that Chinese dyads had less fixed-pie perceptions after intracultural 
negotiation under high accountability conditions than under low accountability conditions 
(t(25)=1.50, p<.10); while for American dyads, there was no effect of accountability on 
fixed-pie perceptions after negotiation.  Figure 4.19 shows the results.  These findings 
were opposite to the predictions of Hypothesis 5b. 
Another way to explore the data is to compare dyads in the 3X2 (Condition X 
Accountability) cells, which can tell us how intracultural and intercultural negotiations 
differ when accountability varies.  The 3X2 ANOVA showed that the only significant 
effect was the main effect of condition (F(2, 75)=9.63, p<.01, η2=.20; see the results on 
the first column of Table 4.19).  American intracultural negotiation dyads 
(Mean=11145.83) had less fixed-pie perceptions than both Chinese intracultural 
negotiation dyads (Mean=6349.79) and Chinese-American intercultural negotiation dyads 
(Mean=6641.74), while there was no difference on fixed-pie perceptions between 
Chinese intracultural negotiation dyads (Mean=6349.79) and Chinese-American 
intercultural negotiation dyads. 
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FIGURE 4.19 
Intracultural Sample: Culture X AccountabilityÆ Fixed-pie Perceptions after 
Negotiation (Study 2) 
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TABLE 4.18 
Intracultural Negotiations: ANOVA Results for the Effects of Culture and Accountability on  
Fixed-pie Perceptions after Negotiation, Joint Gain, and Relational Capital (Study 2) 
 
Predictors 
Fixed-pie 
Perceptions After 
Negotiation  Joint Gain  
Relational 
Capital 
F (1,47) η2 F (1,47) η2 F (1,47) η2
Covariates         
Joint Gains -- -- 4.51** 0.091
Gain Difference -- -- 7.6** 0.144
 
Main Effects 
Chinese 16.87** 0.264 29.90** 0.389 1.60 0.034
Accountability 0.41 0.009 1.79† 0.037 0.01 0.000
 
Two-Way Interactions 
Chinese X Accountability 2.56† 0.052 0.58 0.012 0.06 0.001
 
R2 0.31 0.42 0.35
N 51 51 51
 
† p<.10  * p<.05  **p<.01   one-tailed 
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TABLE 4.19 
ANOVA Results for the Effects of Condition and Accountability on  
Fixed-pie Perceptions after Negotiation, Joint Gain and Relational Capital (Study 2) 
 
Predictors 
Fixed-pie 
Perceptions After 
Negotiation  Joint Gain  
Relational 
Capital 
η2 F (1,47) η2 F (1,47) η2
Covariates         
Joint Gains -- -- 4.49* 0.058
Gain Difference -- -- 12.36** 0.145
 
Main Effects 
Condition 9.63** 0.200 12.16** 0.245 1.42 0.037
Accountability 0.18 0.002 1.39 0.018 0.01 0.000
 
Two-Way Interactions 
Condition X Accountability 1.32 0.034 0.37 0.010 0.02 0.000
 
R2 0.23 0.27 0.28
N 81 81 81
 
† p<.10  * p<.05  **p<.01   one-tailed 
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Joint Gain 
Hypothesis 6b6 predicts that there are be no difference on joint gain between 
Chinese and American dyads in the low accountability/intracultural conditions, but 
Chinese dyads would achieve lower joint gain than American dyads in the high 
accountability/intracultural conditions. To test this hypothesis, a 2X2 (Culture X 
Accountability) ANOVA was conducted with the intracultural negotiation sample at the 
dyadic level (see results at the second column of Table 4.18).  There was a strong main 
effect of culture (F(1, 47)=29.90, p<.01, η2=.39).  A simple comparison showed that 
Chinese dyads (Mean=10848.15) achieved lower joint gain than did American dyads 
(Mean=12054.17).  However, there was no significant interaction effect between culture 
and accountability on joint gain (F(1, 47)=.58, p>.40).  In other words, no matter whether 
the accountability was high or low, Chinese dyads made less joint gain than American 
dyads in intracultural negotiations.  Therefore, Hypothesis 6b was only partially 
supported. 
Did intercultural and intracultulral negotiations yield different joint gain? A 
follow-up 3X2 (Condition X Accountability) ANOVA informed that only “condition” 
had a strong main effect on joint gain (F(2, 75)=12.16, p<.01, η2=.25; see the second 
column in Table 4.19).  Specifically, Chinese intra-cultural negotiation dyads 
(Mean=10848.45) significantly made less joint gain than both intercultural negotiation 
dyads (mean=11480.00) and American intracultural negotiation dyads (mean=12054.17).  
In addition, intercultural negotiation dyads significantly made more joint gain than 
                                                 
6 Hypothesis 6a proposed that there is no difference on joint gains between Chinese and American 
negotiators in the outgroup conditions, no matter whether the accountability is high or low.  This 
hypothesis cannot be tested with the intercultural negotiation (Chinese-American) sample in Study 2 
because joint gain is an outcome at the dyadic level.   
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Chinese intracultural negotiation dyads but significantly less joint gain than American 
intracultural negotiation dyads.  In other words, among the three conditions, Chinese 
intracultural negotiation dyads made least joint gain, Chinese-American intercultural 
negotiation dyads made moderate joint gains, and American intracultural negotiation 
dyads made the most joint gain.  Figure 4.20 illustrates such a finding.  
Relational Capital 
Hypothesis 7a proposed that after intercultural negotiations, Chinese negotiators 
would have similar relational capital as American negotiators, no matter whether the 
accountability is high or low.  To test this hypothesis, a 2X2 (Culture X Accountability) 
ANOVA was conducted with the intercultural negotiation sample at the individual level.  
None of the predictors or the interaction had any significant effects (culture, F(1, 26)=.47, 
p>.50; accountability, F(1, 26)=.05, p>.80; interaction, F(1, 26)=0.01, p>.90).  In other 
words, Chinese and American negotiators had the same level of relational capital after 
intercultural negotiation.  Therefore, Hypothesis 7a was supported.  
Hypothesis 7b predicted that there would be no difference on relational capital 
between Chinese and American dyads in the low accountability/intracultural conditions; 
but Chinese dyads would have more relational capital than American dyads in the high 
accountability/intracultural conditions. To test this hypothesis, a 2X2 (Culture X 
Accountability) ANOVA was conducted at the dyadic level with the intracultural 
negotiation sample. In addition, since joint gain and gain difference within dyad may 
influence relational capital, these two variables were added as covariates.  The third 
column of Table 4.18 shows the results.  
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FIGURE 4.20 
Condition Æ Joint Gain (Study 2) 
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Neither the main effects (Culture, F(1, 47)=1.60, p>.10; Accountability, F(1, 
47)=.01, p>.90) nor the interaction effect (F(1, 47)=.06, p>.90) was significant.   In other 
words, no matter whether in high or low accountability conditions, there was no 
difference on relational capital between Chinese and American dyads in intracultural 
negotiations.  Therefore, Hypothesis 7b was only partially supported. 
A follow-up 3X2 (Condition X Accountability) ANCOVA was conducted with 
joint gain and gain difference as covariates.  None of the predictors had significant effect 
on relational capital (see the third column in Table 4.19). 
 
As in Study 1, participants in Study 2 also reported their expectations about 
negotiation atmosphere and about the other party before negotiation, as well as their 
evaluations of negotiation atmosphere and of the other party after negotiation.  The 
atmosphere dimension and the other party dimension, as I found in Study 1, were highly 
correlated (r=.50 before negotiation, and r=.68 after negotiation).  Therefore, I combined 
the two dimensions.   Then an ANOVA was performed, with negotiators’ ratings at time 
1 (expectations before negotiation) and at time 2 (evaluations after negotiation) as 
repeated measures, and culture, accountability, and group membership as between-
subject variables.  Table 4.20 shows the results. 
First, the main effects of time (F(1, 153)=21.72, p<.01, η2=.12) and culture (F(1, 
153)=14.10, p<.05, η2=.02) were significant.  Second, there was a very strong interaction 
between time and culture (F(1, 153)=7.00, p<.01, η2=.04).  A further examination showed 
that before negotiation, there was no difference between Chinese (Mean=4.52) and 
American negotiators (Mean=4.59) on expectations before negotiation, t(57)=.38, p>.70. 
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TABLE 4.20 
ANOVA Results for the Effects of Time, Culture, Accountability, and Group 
Membership on  
Ratings of Negotiation (n=161) (Study 2) 
Predictors F (1,153) η2
Main Effects  
Time 21.72** 0.12
Chinese 2.90* 0.02
Ingroup 0.46 0.00
Accountability 0.49 0.00
   
Two-Way Interactions   
Time * Chinese 7.00** 0.04
Time * Ingroup 0.00 0.00
Time * Accountability 0.07 0.00
Chinese * Ingroup 1.54 0.01
Chinese * Accountability 0.05 0.00
Ingroup * Accountability 0.14 0.00
   
Three-Way Interactions   
Time * Chinese  *  Ingroup 9.32** 0.06
Time * Chinese  *  Accountability 0.03 0.00
Time * Ingroup  *  Accountability 0.00 0.00
Chinese * Ingroup * Accountability 0.46 0.00
   
Four-Way Interaction   
Time * Chinese  *  Ingroup  *  Accountability 1.07 0.02
   
R2  0.30
† p<.10  * p<.05  **p<.01   one-tailed 
174 
 
 But after negotiation, American negotiators had more positive evaluations 
(Mean=5.28) than did Chinese negotiators (Mean=4.74).  Last, there was a three-way 
interaction between time, culture, and group membership, F(1, 153)=9.32, p<.01, η2=.06.  
To locate the source of this interaction, I conducted several simple comparisons.  Results 
showed that before intercultural negotiations, there was no difference between Chinese 
(Mean=4.52) and American negotiators (Mean=4.59) on expectations, t(57)=.38, p>.70 In 
addition, after intercultural negotiation, there was no difference between Chinese 
negotiators (Mean=4.97) and American negotiators (Mean=4.97) either.  By contrast, 
before intracultural negotiation, there was no difference on expectations of negotiation 
between Chinese negotiators (Mean=4.73) and American negotiators (Mean=4.55, 
t(100)=1.10, p>.20), but after intracultural negotiation Chinese negotiators (Mean=4.62) 
had less positive evaluations than American negotiators (Mean=5.48, t(100)=4.71, 
p<.001).  Interpreting the results alternatively, I found that although American negotiators 
had similar expectations before intracultural negotiation (Mean=4.55) as before 
intercultural negotiation (Mean=4.59, (t(76)=.23, p>.80), but they had more positive 
ratings after intracultural negotiation (Mean=5.48) than after intercultural negotiation 
(Mean=4.97, t(76)=1.96, p<.05).  Like American negotiators, Chinese negotiators had 
similar expectations before intracultural negotiation (Mean= 4.73) as before intercultural 
negotiation (Mean=4.52, t(76)=1.23, p>.10).  However, Chinese negotiators had less 
positive evaluations after intracultural negotiation (Mean=4.62) than after intercultural 
negotiation (Mean=4.97, t(76)=1.69, p<.05).  Compared with pre-negotiation ratings, 
Chinese negotiators’ post-negotiation ratings significantly improved (t(28)=2.39, p<.01) 
when Chinese participants were in intercultural negotiation conditions; but when they 
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were in intracultural negotiation conditions, their ratings did not significantly change 
(t(53)=.71, p>.40).  Figure 4.21 showed the results.  
Relations between Dependent Variables 
I further examined the relations between those dependent variables.  First, it is 
logical to infer that having a relationship frame would influence relationship-based tactics, 
fixed-pie perceptions, and relational capital. 
In terms of relationship-based tactics, it is expected that a negotiator with a 
relationship frame would use more relationship-based tactics during negotiation.  Given 
that the reliability statistics of the relationship-based tactics was not satisfactory for the 
Chinese sample in the intercultural negotiation, I focused on the intracultual negotiation 
sub-samples.  Recall that both relationship frame and relationship-based tactics were 
independent (see 4.2.6.2. Treatment of Data), so I regressed relationship-based tactics on 
a negotiator’s own relationship frame and her negotiation partner’s relationship frame at 
the individual level.  It is expected that both a negotiator’s own relationship frame and the 
negotiation partner’s relationship frame are positively related to a negotiator’s 
relationship-based tactics.  Such an expectation was confirmed by the regression results, 
which showed that a negotiator’s own relationship frame (β=.31, t(99)=3.32, p<.01) and 
the negotiation partner’s relationship frame (β=.28, t(99)=2.99, p<.01). 
The connection between relationship frame and fixed-pie perceptions was also 
explored.  A hierarchical linear model (HLM) was analyzed with fixed pie bias after 
negotiation as the dependent variable, and one’s own relationship frame and partner’s 
relationship frame as the predicting variables (see the first column of Table 4.21 for 
results).  
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FIGURE 4.21 
Evaluations of Negotiation  
as a Function of Time, Culture, Accountability, and Group Membership (Study 2) 
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TABLE 4.21 
HLM Results for the Effects of Relationship Frame  
on Fixed-pie perceptions After Negotiation, and Relational Capital (Study 2) 
 
 
    Fixed-pie Perceptions Relational Capital 
After negotiation 
    Null
Raw 
Coefficient t-value Null
Raw 
Coefficient
t-
value
Individual 
Level           
  
Own  
Relationship Frame   -1391.79 -2.51**   0.04 0.35
  
Partner's  
Relationship Frame   -382.18 -0.60   -0.14 -1.12
   
 
Individual Level 
variance 2.25E+07 2.22E+07   0.82 0.81
Dyadic 
           Level 
  Joint Gain         0.0003** 3.25
  Gain Difference         -0.0003** -3.35
              
  
Dyad-level 
variance 1.18E+07 1.15E+07   0.36 .21  
      
† p<.10  * p<.05  **p<.01   one-tailed. At the individual level, n=156; at the dyadic level, n=78. 
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Results showed that a focal negotiator’s relationship frame was significantly and 
positively related to fixed-pie bias (t(75)=-2.51, p<.01.), but the effect of the other party’s 
relationship frame was not significant (t(75)=-.60, n.s.).  So a negotiator was more likely 
to have fixed-pie perceptions when relationship frame was high rather than low. 
Having a relationship frame may also impact subjective evaluation of relationship 
after negotiation.   It is expected that having a relationship frame would contribute to the 
positive evaluation of relationship. Another HLM was conducted with subjective 
evaluation of relationship as the dependent variable (joint gains and gain differences were 
controlled at the dyadic level, see the second column on Table 4.21 for the results).  
However, neither the focal negotiator’s relationship frame (t(75)=.35, p<.01) nor the 
other party’s relationship frame (t(75)=-1.12, p>.10) had any effects on the focal 
negotiator’s subjective evaluation of relationship.    
Second, like the data in Study 1, the data in Study 2 revealed a sizable and 
significant correlation between fixed-pie perceptions and joint gain (r=.56, p<.001).  That 
is, the less fixed-pie perceptions a negotiation dyad had, the more joint gain the dyad 
achieved.  Given that condition influenced both fixed-pie perceptions and joint gain, it is 
reasonable to test whether fixed-pie perceptions mediated the relationship between 
condition and joint gains.  I compared two ANOVAs with joint gain as the dependent 
variable, and with condition, accountability, and the interaction between culture and 
accountability as the predictors, before and after fixed-pie perceptions had been 
controlled for.  Results showed that the effect of condition (F(2, 75)=12.26, p<.01, 
η2=.25) decreased when fixed-pie perceptions was controlled for (F(2, 74)=6.24, p<.01, 
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η2=.14).  Therefore, fixed-pie perceptions partially mediated the effect of condition and 
accountability on joint gains.   
 
Discussion 
The purpose of Study 2 is to extend Study 1 to intercultural negotiations.  By 
priming negotiators’ cultural identity, I expected that negotiators would regard partners 
within intracultural negotiations as ingroup members, while partners within intercultural 
negotiations as outgroup members.  Manipulation check showed that participants 
regarded people from the same culture more as ingroup members than those from another 
culture.  However, the manipulation of group membership did not work very well with 
the Chinese participants in the Chinese-Chinese condition and with the American 
participants in the Chinese-American condition.  In particular, Chinese participants in the 
intraculutral negotiations did not regard another Chinese as an ingroup member at the 
expected level, whereas American participants in the intercultural negotiations 
unexpectedly regarded the Chinese opponents as an ingroup member.    The unsuccessful 
manipulation of group membership may account for the findings that none of the three-
way interaction effects on those dependent variables were significant in Study 2.   
Several findings in Study 2 provided evidence for the trait/entity view of culture.  
For example, no matter whether in intercultural negotiations or in intracultural 
negotiations, or no matter whether accountability was high or low, Chinese negotiators 
generally had a higher level of relationship frame than American negotiators (Hypothesis 
1a).  In the same vein, Chinese negotiators generally used more relationship-based tactics 
than American negotiators in negotiation (Hypothesis 1b).  In addition, I found that the 
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variance of cultural identification may partially explain why I did not get significant 
interaction effect between accountability and group membership.  Especially, for Chinese 
participants in the intracultural negotiations, Chinese cultural identification interacted 
with accountability influencing relationship fram such that accountability increased the 
level of relationship frame only for those with high Chinese cultural identification, but it 
decreased the level of relationship frame for those with low Chinese cultural 
idenfitication.  Such a finding suggests that group identification may play a role in 
applying group-endorsed knowledge (e.g., Jetten et al., 2002). 
Moreover, probably because a relationship focus hindered information collection 
during negotiation (seeRelations between Dependent Variables), Chinese negotiators 
generally had more fixed-pie perceptions than American negotiators.  Also, fixed-pie 
perceptions in turn influenced joint gain (see Relationships between Dependent 
Variables).  Consistent with the finding about fixed-pie perceptions, Chinese dyads 
achieved lower joint gain in intracultural negotiations than American dyads. 
At the same time, culture did interact with accountability influencing several 
dependent variables.  But some findings were as expected, while some were not.  For 
instance, Chinese negotiators used more relationship-based tactics in high accountability 
conditions than in low accountability conditions, but accountability did not influence the 
use of relationship-based tactics for American negotiators.  Such a finding supported 
Hypothesis 2b.  On the other hand, I also found an interaction effect between culture and 
accountability on relationship frame.  Specifically, accountability did not influence 
relationship frame of Chinese negotiators, but it made American negotiators have a 
higher level of relationship frame, which was opposite to the prediction of Hypothesis 2a.  
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In addition, there was another interaction effect between culture and accountability on 
fixed-pie perceptions, suggesting that accountability made Chinese intracultural 
negotiators have less fixed-pie perceptions while it did not influence fixed-pie 
perceptions for American intracultural negotiators.  Such a finding was opposite to the 
prediction of Hypothesis 5b.     
None of the predicting variables had any effects on relational capital (Hypothesis 
7a and 7b).  But interestingly, the analysis on the change of ratings on negotiation 
showed that there was a three-way interaction between time, culture, and group 
membership.  Specifically, before negotiation, there was no difference between Chinese 
and American negotiators in any condition.  But after negotiation, Chinese and American 
negotiators in the intercultural negotiation increased their ratings to the similar level; 
Chinese intracultural negotiators did not change their ratings; and American intracultural 
negotiators significant increased their ratings.  The pattern that American negotiators 
showed in Study 2 was similar to that in Study 1.  That is, negotiation made Americans 
increase their ratings of negotiation, no matter whether the negotiation partner was an 
ingroup member or an outgroup member.  However, the pattern that Chinese negotiators 
showed in Study 2 was different from that in Study 1.  In Study 1, Chinese negotiators 
did not change their ratings when they negotiated with an ingroup member, but their 
ratings worsened when they negotiated with an outgroup member.  In Study 2, Chinese 
negotiators did not change their ratings when they negotiated with another person from 
the same culture (an ingroup member), but their ratings increased when they negotiated 
with a person from another culture (an outgroup member). 
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Lastly, the results of Study 1 and Study 2 did not match in many ways.  Table 
4.22 compares the findings in Study 1 and Study 2.  One reason why there were so many 
inconsistent findings between Study 1 and Study 2 may be the fact that these two studies 
used different manipulations of group membership.  It is reasonable to believe that the 
manipulation of group membership in Study 2 was much weaker than that in Study 1.  In 
Study 1, group membership was manipulated by a modified minimum group paradigm.  
The manipulated group membership (two different companies) matched the negotiation 
scenarios (negotiation within or between companies) smoothly.  By contrast, in Study 2 
group membership was manipulated by priming one’s cultural identity.  Some 
manipulation procedures may not work well.  For example, one priming procedure was to 
ask participants to “imagine” that they meet the other party in a foreign country (c.f., 
Chen & Li, 2005).  Although the manipulation check showed that the opearationalization 
might work, participants may doubt the authenticity of the manipulation.  In addition, 
although the cultural priming tasks in Study 2 may prime participant’s cultural identity, 
the negotiation scenario, which told participants that they represent their own company, 
may prime participants’ company identity (identity as a representative of a company). It 
was not clear how participants handle these two identities at the same time during 
negotiation.  It is possible that the company identity dominated cultural identity during 
negotiations. 
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TABLE 4.22 
Summary of Findings 
 
Hypotheses in Study 1 Study 1 Results Hypotheses in Study 2 Study 2 
Results 
Hypothesis 1a: CultureÆ 
relationship negotiation frame  
Marginally 
Supported 
Hypothesis 1a: The same as in 
Study 1 
Supported 
Hypothesis 1b: CultureÆ 
relationship-based tactics  
Supported Hypothesis 1b: The same Supported 
Hypothesis 2a: Culture X 
Accountability Æ relationship 
negotiation frame  
Supported Hypothesis 2a: The same Not 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2b: Culture X 
Accountability Ærelationship-
based tactics  
Marginally 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2b: The same 
 
Marginally 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3a: Culture X Group 
membership Æ relationship 
negotiation frame 
Supported Hypothesis 3a: The same Not 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3b: Culture X Group 
membership Æ relationship-based 
tactics  
Not Supported Hypothesis 3b: The same Not 
Supported 
Hypothesis 4a: Culture X 
Accountability X Group 
membership Æ relationship 
negotiation frame 
Supported Hypothesis 4a: The same Not 
Supported 
Hypothesis 4b: Culture X 
Accountability X Group 
membership Ærelationship-based 
tactics 
Not Supported Hypothesis 4b: The same Not 
Supported 
Hypothesis 5a: for Outgroup, 
Culture X Accountability ~Æ 
fixed-pie perceptions  
Supported Hypothesis 5a: In intercultural 
negotiations, Culture X 
Accountability ~Æfixed-pie 
perceptions  
Not 
Supported 
Hypothesis 5b: for ingroup, Culture 
X Accountability Æ fixed-pie 
perceptions  
Supported Hypothesis 5b:  In intracultural 
negotiations,  
Culture X Accountability 
Æfixed-pie perceptions 
Not 
Supported 
Hypothesis 6a: for Outgroup, 
Culture X Accountability ~Æ joint 
gain 
Supported Not applicable  
Hypothesis 6b: for ingroup, Culture 
X Accountability Æ joint gain 
Supported Hypothesis 6b: In intracultural 
negotiations,  
Culture X Accountability 
Æjoint gain 
Marginally 
Supported 
 
Hypothesis 7a: for Outgroup, 
Culture X Accountability ~Æ 
relational capital 
Not Supported Hypothesis 7a: In intercultural 
negotiations, Culture X 
Accountability ~Ærelational 
capital 
Supported 
Hypothesis 7b: for ingroup, Culture 
X Accountability Æ relational 
capital  
Not Supported Hypothesis 7b: : In intracultural 
negotiations,  
Culture X Accountability 
Ærelational capital 
Marginally 
Supported 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation, I examined cross-cultural negotiation following a dynamic 
constructivist approach.  I explored the social conditions under which cross-cultural 
differences on negotiation may be intensified or attenuated.  In an attempt to answer this 
question, I investigated Chinese and American negotiators in different social conditions 
with varying levels of accountability (low vs. high) and different group membership of 
their negotiation partners(ingroup vs. outgroup).  I collected experimental data from two 
sets of negotiation simulations.     
In following, I will highlight the theoretical and empirical contributions that this 
dissertation makes, followed by a discussion of the limitations of this research.  Last, I 
will present several directions for future research in light of the findings of this 
dissertation. 
 
Contributions 
This dissertation can make several theoretical contributions to the literature.  First, 
it can bridge a big gap in previous cross-cultural negotiation research, where social 
conditions have rarely been explored together with culture.  Specifically, previous cross-
cultural negotiation research implicitly takes a trait/entity view of culture, attributing any 
cross-cultural differences in negotiation to the main effect of culture (see Morris & Fu, 
2001).  This dissertation, based on the dynamic constructivist view of culture (Hong et al., 
2000), proposes that cross-cultural difference would be observed only when cultural 
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knowledge is activated and when it is applicable to the given social context.   In 
particular, I argue that accountability and the group membership of the other party in 
negotiation should moderate the main effects of culture on negotiation.  The results of 
Study 1 in this dissertation provide empirical evidence generally supporting my 
arguments.  For example, although in general Chinese negotiators had a higher level of 
relationship frame than did American negotiators, such a difference was moderated by 
accountability and group membership.  In particular, the cross-cultural difference on 
relationship frame was found only in the high accountability condition but not in the low 
accountability conditions, and such a difference was found only in the ingroup conditions 
but not the in the ouotgroup conditions.   In addition, I found that the cross-cultural 
differences between Chinese and American negotiators in fixed-pie perceptions and joint 
gain were most pronounced when negotiators negotiated with an ingroup member under 
high accountability conditions.  All of these findings have confirmed the validity of the 
dynamic constructivist approach. 
Second, this dissertation extends the research scope of the dynamic constructivist 
view of culture.  Existing literature on the dynamic constructivist view of culture mainly 
focuses on human cognitions, such as attribution (e.g., Chiu et al., 2000; Hong et al., 
2000; Hong et al., 2003) or attitudes and values (Verkuyten and Pouliasi, 2002, 2006), 
while there are few studies exploring human behaviors (one exception is Wong & Hong, 
2005).  The present research extends the domain of dynamic constructivist approach to 
negotiation, a very important type of social interaction in everyday life.  The research 
findings of this dissertation prove that the dynamic constructivist approach can predict 
the conditions under which cross-cultural differences may appear or disappear on 
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negotiation frame, negotiation tactics, fixed-pie perceptions, joint gain, and relational 
capital. 
Third, being cross-cultural negotiation research, this dissertation can correct the 
over-generalization tendency of existing negotiation theory, which has mainly been 
developed and studied in the west.  For example, as a classic social contextual construct 
in negotiation, accountability has long been regarded as something that motivates 
competition in negotiation (e.g., Carnevale et al., 1981).  Such a claim has been generally 
accepted without qualifications until a study was reported by Gelfand and Realo (1999), 
who found that accountability motivated different negotiation norms in different cultures 
(collectivists vs. individualists).  In particular, accountability encouraged collectivists to 
cooperate whereas it drove individualists to compete in negotiation.  This dissertation 
adds a nuance by taking group membership into consideration.  The results of Study 1 
suggested that when the other party was an outgroup member, the Chinese were as 
competitive as American negotiators.  In addition, despite the general expectation of the 
Chinese being more relationship-oriented, I found that American negotiators were as 
relationship-oriented as Chinese negotiators in the low accountability/ingroup conditions, 
and it was only in the high accountability/ingroup conditions that the Chinese were 
significantly more relationship-oriented than Americans.  These findings have indicated 
that it is very important to examine negotiation theory in different cultures.  Moreover, it 
is critical to take social conditions into consideration when we discuss cross-cultural 
differences in negotiation.   
Last, this dissertation contributes to the currently active scholarly discussion 
about the connection between relationship and negotiation (Gelfand et al., 2006; McGinn, 
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2006).  Existing empirical studies on how relationship impacts negotiation outcomes have 
yielded mixing findings.  Some studies have found a negative relationship (e.g., Fry et al., 
1983), others point to a positive relationship (Moore et al., 1999), and still others argue 
that it is not justified to investigate such a connection because relations should never be 
used instrumentally (McGinn, 2006).  This dissertation provides an alternative approach 
of viewing relationship concerns as embedded in culture.  In other words, relationship 
orientation is not instrumental; rather, it is a cultural norm or schema, which takes effect 
only when activated.  For example, in Study 1, I found that Chinese negotiators had a 
higher level of relationship frame than did American negotiators in the high 
accountability/ingroup condition.   Although I did not find relationship frame mediated 
the relationship between social contexts (culture, accountability, and group membership) 
and joint gain, under the high accountability/ingroup conditions, relationship-orientation 
was a hurdle in making joint gain for Chinese negotiators but a facilitator in making joint 
gain for American negotiators.  In addition, Study 2 found that Chinese negotiators, who 
generally had a higher level of relationship frame, achieved lower joint gain than 
American negotiators.   Such a finding lends itself to viewing relationship through a 
cultural lens.  I argue that different cultures may have different expectations in using a 
relationship approach in negotiation.   Therefore, the same level of relationship 
orientation in negotiation may have distinct effects across cultures.  Future research 
should further explore the connection between relationship and negotiation from a 
cultural perspective.   
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Besides theoretical contributions, this dissertation may make several empirical 
contributions as well.  For example, a new scale of relationship frame was developed and 
validated with two cross-cultural samples.  Past research used open-ended questions and 
coding to quantify negotiator’s frame (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994), which is neat but 
very time consuming.  The new measure developed by this dissertation may be a 
usefultool for future negotiation research on negotiation frame.  
In addition, the group membership manipulation procedure (especially in Study 1) 
may be employed or consulted for future negotiation research.  Past research on 
intergroup negotiation manipulated group membership in a relatively weak way, and it is 
probably the reason why the connection between group membership and negotiation 
outcomes has been elusive (Harinck & Ellemers, 2006; Moore et al., 1999; Thompson, 
1993).  For example, in some studies only the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, 1970) 
was used (Thompson, 1993), while in other studies participants’ majors or school 
affiliations were used as the group boundary (Harinck & Ellemers, 2006; Moore et al., 
1999).  Given that group identity is a dynamic and fluid construct (Turner, 1987), these 
traditional methods may not clarify group boundaries enough.  Study 1 in this dissertation 
used a modified minimal group paradigm (Chen et al., 1998; Wright et al., 1997) to 
manipulate group membership.  Future research may use similar methods to highlight 
intergroup boundaries. 
 
Limitations 
No research is perfect, and this dissertation is not an exception.  There are several 
limitations of this present research.  First of all, I used two sets of negotiation simulations 
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to address my research question—when cross-cultural differences appear or disappear.  
Experiments gave me the advantage of manipulating social conditions, but at the same 
time the disadvantage of generalizing the results to real-world negotiation settings.   
Nevertheless, I believe that several characteristics of this research give the results wider 
applicability.  On the one hand, group membership was manipulated in multiple ways, 
including social network, personality, hobbies, social categories (Study 1) or naturally-
occurring identity (Study 2).  I believe that people actually define ingroup and outgroup 
members in multiple ways, such as social category, personality and social networks.  
Using multiple ways to manipulate group membership helps to capture the essence of 
group membership.  On the other hand, accountability manipulation was opearationalized 
in ways that captured the important aspects of representation and responsibility (i.e., 
rewards system and report).  These being said, it is of course important to incorporate 
other research methods (such as interviews and field studies) to study cross-cultural 
negotiation.  
Second, the student sample may also limit the generalizability of the findings.  
Study 1 recruited college students, while Study 2 recruited graduate students.  Since most 
participants did not have negotiation experiences, it is reasonable to question whether the 
results could be generalized to experienced negotiators. There is evidence, however, that 
experts and novices behave similarly in negotiations (e.g., De Dreu, Giebels, & Van de 
Vliert, 1998; Neale & Bazerman, 1991).   
Third, the results of Study 1 and Study 2 did not match with each other.  As I 
discussed at the end of reporting Study 2 (4.2.7), the manipulation of group membership 
in Study 2 might be weak.  Two identities could be salient during negotiation: one was 
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negotiator’s cultural identity, and the other was negotiator’s identity as a representative.  
It is not clear how participants handled these two identities during negotiation.  In short, 
future research should find a better way to apply the dynamic constructivist approach to 
intercultural negotiations.   
 
Future Directions 
Enlightened by this dissertation, future research may take several directions to 
make further contributions to the cross-cultural research.  First, with the guidance of the 
dynamic constructive view of culture, scholars can investigate other potentially important 
social contextual factors that may activate cultural knowledge in negotiation.  According 
to the dynamic constructivist view of culture, for example, time pressure is another 
contextual factor may trigger culturally typical knowledge (Morris & Gelfand, 2004).  
Culture provides accessible knowledge to guide people’s cognition, emotion, and 
behavior.  When under time pressure, people are more likely to use accessible knowledge 
than when under no time pressure (Chiu et al., 2000; Higgins, 1996).  It would be 
interesting to explore how culture and time pressure interact to influence the appearance 
or the disappearance of cross-cultural differences during negotiation. 
Second, an emerging research topic in cross-cultural research is biculturalism 
(e.g., Hong et al.., 2000).   With globalization, more and more people can incorporate 
over one cultural system, and these people may play very critical role in international 
business (Friedman & Liu, forthcoming; Lam, 2000).  It is thus very interesting to 
explore how bicultural people perform in different cultural settings.  For example, some 
scholars found that bicultural people can switch between cultural frames according to 
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cultural primes (e.g., Hong et al., 2000).  A bicultural person may behave like a Chinese 
when s/he negotiates with a Chinese, and s/he may behave like an American when s/he 
negotiates with an American.  It would be interesting to see whether bicultural people 
may perform better than monocultual people in intercultural negotiations.  If bicultural 
people have better skills in understandings the othe culture than monocultural people, it is 
reasonable to expect that they perform better in intercultural negotiations than 
monocultural people.  Moreover, bicultural people are expected to serve as boundary 
spanners when two different cultural groups negotiate (Friedman & Liu, forthcoming).  
In addition, some scholars suggest that some bicultural people can smoothly 
switch cultural frames given cultural primes, while some bicultural people have 
difficulties in doing so (e.g., Benet-MartÍnez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002; Friedman, Liu, 
Chi, Hong, & Sung, working paper).  Only bicultural people with high bicultural identity 
integration (the extent to which people can integrate two different cultural systems 
peacefully) can seamlessly switch between different cultures.   It is thus important to see 
how bicultural identity integration influences bicultural people in cross-cultural 
negotiations. 
Last, but not the least, cross-cultural negotiation in teams has rarely been explored.  
Team negotiations play a very critical role in the business world (Gelfand, Brett, Imai, 
Tsai, & Huang, 2006). It is thus very important to examine cross-cultural differences in 
team negotiations as well as in intercultural team negotiations.  Although the dynamic 
constructivist view of culture does not explicitly discuss phenomenon beyond the 
individual level, it has the potential to guide cross-cultural team negotiation research.  
The cultural knowledge activation conditions, such as availability, accessibility, and 
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activation, are presumably useful to the future theory building.   Team characteristics, 
such as team power structure, team diversity and task interdependence may also influence 
knowledge use in team negotiation.  For example, team knowledge may be more 
accessible to team members in a team with high task interdependence than with low task 
interdependence.  Deadlines may activate team knowledge so that team differences could 
be found under high time pressures.  It would be an exciting research project to combine 
the dynamic constructivist approach and the team literature to investigate cross-cultural 
team negotiations.
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Appendix A: Payoff Schedule in Negotiation  
 
Buyer’s Pay-off Schedule 
 
Paper Quality   Copies   Colorful Pages   Billing 
Options Value  Options Value  Options Value  Options Value 
250g/m2 2400   50,000 copies 4000   4 pages 2000   5 weeks 1200 
220 g/m2 1800   40,000 copies 3000   3 pages 1500   4 weeks 900 
200 g/m2 1200   30,000 copies 2000   2 pages 1000   3 weeks 600 
180 g/m2 600   20,000 copies 1000   1 page 500   2 weeks 300 
160 g/m2 0   10,000 copies 0   0 page 0   1 week 0 
 
Seller’s Pay-off Schedule 
 
Paper Quality  Copies  Colorful Pages  Billing 
Options Value  Options Value  Options Value  Options Value 
250g/m2 0  50,000 copies 0  4 pages 0  5 weeks 0 
220 g/m2 600  40,000 copies 300  3 pages 500  4 weeks 1000 
200 g/m2 1200  30,000 copies 600  2 pages 1000  3 weeks 2000 
180 g/m2 1800  20,000 copies 900  1 page 1500  2 weeks 3000 
160 g/m2 2400  10,000 copies 1200  0 page 2000  1 week 4000 
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Appendix B:  
Items of the Short Need for Closure Scale in the Short Grouping Survey 
 
 Please judge the extent to which the following sentences describe who you are.  Choose 
an appropriate number form 1-9 and write it down on the blank.  There is no right or 
wrong answer to each question.  Please make judgments based on your first response. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not like 
me at all 
Not like 
me 
A little 
like me 
Like me, 
but less 
than half 
Half like 
me, half 
not 
Like me 
more 
than half 
Some-
what 
like me 
Like me Very 
much 
like me 
 
1. ______It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.   
2. ______ I’m not bothered by things that interrupt my daily routine.    
3. ______I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.  
4. ______I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.  
5. ______I enjoy being spontaneous.   
6. ______I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours makes my life tedious.   
7. ______ I don’t like situations that are uncertain.   
8. ______I hate to change my plans at the last minute.  
9. ______I hate to be with people who are unpredictable.   
10. ______I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.   
11. ______I enjoy the exhilaration of being in unpredictable situations.   
12. ______ I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear. 
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Appendix C: Relational Capital Scale from Curhan et al., 2006 
 
 
1. What kind of “overall” impression did your counterpart(s) make on you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Extremely 
negative 
  Neither 
negative nor 
positive 
  Extremely 
positive 
 
2. How satisfied are you with your relationship with your counterpart(s) as a result of this 
negotiation? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at all   Moderately   Perfectly  
 
3. Did the negotiation make you trust your counterpart(s)? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at all   Moderately   Perfectly  
 
4. Did the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relationship with your counterpart(s)? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NA 
Not at all   Moderately   Perfectly  
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Appendix D: Cultural Identity Priming Essay in Study 2 
 
Cultural Reflection 
Culture is the pattern of thinking, feeling, and behaving shared by a social group.  
Many aspects in life, such as etiquette, custom, and diet, can reflect the influence of 
culture.  
 
Please read the following essay about dietary habits. Please circle out the word of 
“American” when you read through the essay.  For example,  
 “…comparison between Chinese and American…” 
 
 
Essay 
A comparison of dietary habits between Chinese and Americans 
 
Dietary habits can reflect cultural differences.  The following comparison between 
Chinese and American dietary habits may give you a general sense of how the two 
cultures are different from each other in diet. 
 
1. Chinese love fresh food, so that they do grocery shopping very frequently; while most 
Americans do grocery shopping once a week, storing food in refrigerators. 
2. Chinese prepare a lot of food to celebrate traditional festivals or gatherings; while 
Americans focus relatively less on food in these celebrations.  
3. Chinese usually put salt into dishes when cooking, while Americans put little or even 
no salt when cooking. 
4. Most of Chinese love using monosodium glutamate when cooking, but Americans 
rarely use it. 
5. Chinese eat much more fresh vegetables and fruits than Americans, whereas 
Americans intake much more dairy product than Chinese. 
6. Many Chinese, especially those living in the Pearl River Delta area, loving eating 
animal organs, but Americans never. 
7. Americans like having dessert after meals, whereas Chinese like having fruits after 
meals. 
  8. Many Americans love drinking coffee, whereas many Chinese love drinking tea. 
9．Most Chinese like eating tofu or food made from soy beans, but relatively fewer 
Americans like tofu. 
10．Many Chinese, especially Cantonese, love making soups with many ingredients, 
whereas Americans make soups in a relatively simple way. 
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